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Optimal Transport and Equilibrium Problems in Mathematical Finance
Xiaowei Tan
The thesis consists of three independent topics, each of which is discussed
in an individual chapter.
The first chapter considers a multiperiod optimal transport problem where
distributions µ0, . . . , µn are prescribed and a transport corresponds to a scalar
martingale X with marginals Xt ∼ µt. We introduce particular couplings
called left-monotone transports; they are characterized equivalently by a no-
crossing property of their support, as simultaneous optimizers for a class of
bivariate transport cost functions with a Spence–Mirrlees property, and by
an order-theoretic minimality property. Left-monotone transports are unique
if µ0 is atomless, but not in general. In the one-period case n = 1, these
transports reduce to the Left-Curtain coupling of Beiglbo¨ck and Juillet. In the
multiperiod case, the bivariate marginals for dates (0, t) are of Left-Curtain
type, if and only if µ0, . . . , µn have a specific order property. The general
analysis of the transport problem also gives rise to a strong duality result
and a description of its polar sets. Finally, we study a variant where the
intermediate marginals µ1, . . . , µn−1 are not prescribed.
The second chapter studies the convergence of Nash equilibria in a game of
optimal stopping. If the associated mean field game has a unique equilibrium,
any sequence of n-player equilibria converges to it as n→∞. However, both
the finite and infinite player versions of the game often admit multiple equi-
libria. We show that mean field equilibria satisfying a transversality condition
are limit points of n-player equilibria, but we also exhibit a remarkable class of
mean field equilibria that are not limits, thus questioning their interpretation
as “large n” equilibria.
The third chapter studies the equilibrium price of an asset that is traded
in continuous time between N agents who have heterogeneous beliefs about
the state process underlying the asset’s payoff. We propose a tractable model
where agents maximize expected returns under quadratic costs on inventories
and trading rates. The unique equilibrium price is characterized by a weakly
coupled system of linear parabolic equations which shows that holding and liq-
uidity costs play dual roles. We derive the leading-order asymptotics for small
transaction and holding costs which give further insight into the equilibrium
and the consequences of illiquidity.
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Let µ = (µ0, . . . , µn) be a vector of probability measures µt on the real line. A measure P
on Rn+1 whose marginals are given by µ is called a coupling (or transport) of µ, and the
set of all such measures is denoted by Π(µ). We shall be interested in couplings P that are
martingales; that is, the identity X = (X0, . . . , Xn) on Rn+1 is a martingale under P . Hence,
we will assume that all marginals have a finite first moment and denote by M(µ) the set
of martingale couplings. A classical result of Strassen [104] shows that M(µ) is nonempty
if and only if the marginals are in convex order, denoted by µt−1 ≤c µt and defined by the
requirement that µt−1(φ) ≤ µt(φ) for any convex function φ, where µ(φ) :=
∫
φdµ.
The first goal of this paper is to introduce and study a family of “canonical” couplings
P ∈ M(µ) that we call left-monotone. These couplings specialize to the Left-Curtain
coupling of [16] in the one-step case n = 1 and share, broadly speaking, several proper-
ties reminiscent of the Hoeffding–Fre´chet coupling of classical optimal transport. Indeed,
left-monotone couplings will be characterized by order-theoretic minimality properties, as si-
multaneous optimal transports for certain classes of reward (or cost) functions, and through
no-crossing conditions on their supports.
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The second goal is to develop a strong duality theory for multiperiod martingale optimal
transport, along the lines of [18] for the one-period martingale case and [78] for the classical
optimal transport problem. That is, we introduce a suitable dual optimization problem and
show the absence of a duality gap as well as the existence of dual optimizers for general
transport reward (or cost) functions. The duality result is a crucial tool for the study of the
left-monotone couplings.
We also develop similar results for a variant of our problem where the intermediate
marginals µ1, . . . , µn−1 are not prescribed (Section 1.9), but we shall focus on the full
marginal case for the purpose of the Introduction.
1.1.1 Left-Monotone Transports
For the sake of orientation, let us first state the main result and then explain the terminology
contained therein. The following is a streamlined version—the results in the body of the
paper are stronger in some technical aspects.
Theorem 1.1.1. Let µ = (µ0, . . . , µn) be in convex order and P ∈ M(µ) a martingale
transport between these marginals. The following are equivalent:
(i) P is a simultaneous optimal transport for f(X0, Xt), 1 ≤ t ≤ n whenever f : R2 → R
is a smooth second-order Spence–Mirrlees function.
(ii) P is concentrated on a left-monotone set Γ ⊆ Rn+1.
(iii) P transports µ0|(−∞,a] to the obstructed shadow Sµ1,...,µt(µ0|(−∞,a]) in step t, for all
1 ≤ t ≤ n and a ∈ R.
There exists P ∈M(µ) satisfying (i)–(iii), and any such P is called a left-monotone trans-
port. If µ0 is atomless, then P is unique.
Let us now discuss the items in the theorem.
(i) Optimal Transport. This property characterizes P as a simultaneous optimal trans-
port. Given a function f : Rn+1 → R, we may consider the martingale optimal transport
2




recall that P (f) = EP [f(X0, . . . , Xn)]. A Lipschitz function f ∈ C1,2(R2;R) is called a
smooth second-order Spence–Mirrlees function if it satisfies the cross-derivative condition
fxyy > 0; this has also been called the martingale Spence–Mirrlees condition in analogy
to the classical Spence–Mirrlees condition fxy > 0. Given such a function of two variables
and 1 ≤ t ≤ n, we may consider the n-step martingale optimal transport problem with
reward f(X0, Xt). Characterization (i) states that a left-monotone transport P ∈ M(µ) is
an optimizer simultaneously for the n transport problems f(X0, Xt), 1 ≤ t ≤ n, for some
(and then all) smooth second-order Spence–Mirrlees functions f .
In the one-step case, a corresponding result holds for the Left-Curtain coupling [16];
here the simultaneous optimization becomes a single one. In view of the characterization
in (i), an immediate consequence is that if there exists P ∈ M(µ) such that all bivariate
projections P0t = P ◦ (X0, Xt)−1 ∈ M(µ0, µt) are of Left-Curtain type, then P is left-
monotone. However, such a transport does not exist unless the marginals satisfy a very
specific condition (see Proposition 1.6.9), and in general the bivariate projections of a left-
monotone transport are not of Left-Curtain type.
(ii) Geometry. The second item characterizes P through a geometric property of its
support. A set Γ ⊆ Rn+1 will be called left-monotone if it has the following no-crossing
property for all 1 ≤ t ≤ n: Let x = (x0, . . . , xt−1), x′ = (x′0, . . . , x′t−1) ∈ Rt and
y−, y+, y′ ∈ R with y− < y+
be such that (x, y+), (x, y−), (x′, y′) are in the projection of Γ to the first t+ 1 coordinates.
Then,
y′ /∈ (y−, y+) whenever x0 < x′0.
That is, if we consider two paths in Γ starting at x0 and coinciding up to t− 1, and a third
path starting at x′0 to the right of x0, then at time t the third path cannot step in-between




















Figure 1.1: Two examples of forbidden configurations in left-monotone sets.
P ∈ M(µ) can be characterized by the fact that it is concentrated on a left-monotone set
Γ. (In Theorem 1.7.16 we shall state a stronger result: we can find a left-monotone set that
carries all left-monotone transports at once.)
In the one-step case n = 1, left-monotonicity coincides with the Left-Curtain property
of [16]. However, we emphasize that for t > 1, our no-crossing condition differs from the
Left-Curtain property of the bivariate projection (X0, Xt)(Γ) as the latter would not contain
the restriction that the first two paths have to coincide up to t−1 (see also Example 1.6.10).
This corresponds to the mentioned fact that the bivariate marginal P0t need not be of Left-
Curtain type. On the other hand, the geometry of the projection (Xt−1, Xt)(Γ) is also quite
different from the Left-Curtain one, as our condition may rule out third paths crossing from
the right and left at t − 1, depending on the starting point x′0 rather than the location of
x′t−1.
(iii) Convex Ordering. This property characterizes left-monotone transports in an order-
theoretic way and will be used in the existence proof. To explain the idea, suppose that µ0
consists of finitely many atoms at x1, . . . , xN ∈ R. Then, for any fixed t, a coupling of µ0
and µt can be defined by specifying a “destination” measure for each atom. We consider all
chains1 µ0|xi ≤c θ1 ≤c · · · ≤c θt of measures θs in convex order that satisfy the marginals
constraints θs ≤ µs for s ≤ t. Of these chains, keep only the terminal measures θt and
compare them according to the convex order. The obstructed shadow of µ0|x1 in µt through
1Here µ0|xi denotes a Dirac measure of mass µ0({xi}) at xi.
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µ1, . . . , µt−1, denoted Sµ1,...,µt(µ0|xi), is defined as the unique least element2 among the θt.
A particular coupling of µ0 and µt is the one that successively maps the atoms µ0|xi to
their obstructed shadows in the remainder of µt, starting with the left-most atom xi and
continuing from left to right. In the case of general measures, we consider the restrictions
µ0|(−∞,a] instead of successively mapping the atoms. Characterization (iii) then states that
a left-monotone transport P ∈ M(µ) maps µ0|(−∞,a] to its obstructed shadow at date
t for all 1 ≤ t ≤ n and a ∈ R. This shows in particular that the bivariate projections
P0t = P ◦ (X0, Xt)−1 of a left-monotone coupling are uniquely determined. In the body of
the text, we shall also give an alternative definition of the obstructed shadow by iterating
unobstructed shadows through the marginals up to date t; see Section 1.6.
The above specializes to the construction of [16] for the one-step case, which corresponds
to the situation of t = 1 where there are no intermediate marginals obstructing the shadow.
When t > 1, the obstruction by the intermediate marginals once again entails that P0t need
not be of Left-Curtain type. More precisely, Characterization (iii) gives rise to a sharp
criterion (Proposition 1.6.9) on the marginals µ, describing exactly when this coincidence
arises.
(Non-)Uniqueness. We have seen above that for a left-monotone transport P ∈ M(µ)
the bivariate projections P0t, 1 ≤ t ≤ n are uniquely determined. In particular, for n = 1,
we recover the result of [16] that the left-monotone coupling is unique. For n > 1, the
situation turns out to be quite different depending on the nature of the first marginal. On
the one extreme, we shall see that when µ0 is atomless, there is a unique left-monotone
transport P ∈ M(µ). Moreover, P has a degenerate structure reminiscent of Brenier’s
theorem: it can be disintegrated as P = µ0 ⊗ κ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ κn where each one-step transport
kernel κt is concentrated on the graphs of two functions. On the other extreme, if µ0 is a
Dirac mass, the typical case is that there are infinitely many left-monotone couplings—see
Section 1.8 for a detailed discussion. We shall also show that left-monotone transports are
not Markovian in general, even if uniqueness holds (Example 1.7.17).
2See Definition 1.6.6 and Lemma 1.6.7 for details on this construction.
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1.1.2 Duality
The analysis of left-monotone transports is based on a duality result that we develop for
general reward functions f : Rn+1 → (−∞,∞] with an integrable lower bound. Formally,
the dual problem (in the sense of linear programming) for the transport problem Sµ(f) =






where the infimum is taken over vectors φ = (φ0, . . . , φn) of real functions and predictable
processes H = (H1, . . . ,Hn) such that
n∑
t=0
φt(Xt) + (H ·X)n ≥ f ; (1.1.2)
here (H · X)n :=
∑n
t=1Ht (Xt − Xt−1) is the discrete-time integral. The desired result
(Theorem 1.5.2) states that there is no duality gap, i.e. Iµ(f) = Sµ(f), and that the dual
problem is attained whenever it is finite. From the analysis for the one-step case in [18]
we know that this assertion fails for the above naive formulation of the dual, and requires
several relaxations regarding the integrability of the functions φt and the domain V ⊆ Rn+1
where the inequality (1.1.2) is required. Specifically, the inequality needs to be relaxed
on sets that are M(µ)-polar; i.e. not charged by any transport P ∈ M(µ). These sets
are characterized in Theorem 1.3.1 where we show that the M(µ)-polar sets are precisely
the (unions of) sets which project to a two-dimensional polar set of M(µt−1, µt) for some
1 ≤ t ≤ n.
The duality theorem gives rise to a monotonicity principle (Theorem 1.5.4) that un-
derpins the analysis of the left-monotone couplings. Similarly to the cyclical monotonicity
condition in classical transport, it allows one to study the geometry of the support of optimal
transports for a given function f .
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1.1.3 Background and Related Literature
The martingale optimal transport problem (1.1.1) was introduced in [13] with the dual prob-
lem as a motivation. Indeed, in financial mathematics the function f is understood as the
payoff of a derivative written on the underlying X and (1.1.2) corresponds to superhedging f
by statically trading in European options φt(Xt) and dynamically trading in the underlying
according to the strategy H. The value Iµ(f) then corresponds to the lowest price of f for
which the seller can enter a model-free hedge (φ, H) if the marginals Xt ∼ µt are known
from option market data. In [13], it was shown (with the above, “naive” formulation of the
dual problem) that there is no duality gap if f is sufficiently regular, whereas dual existence
was shown to fail even in regular cases. The idea of model-free hedging as well as the con-
nection to Skorokhod embeddings goes back to [64]; we refer to [24, 26, 41, 65, 97, 108] for
further references. A specific multiperiod martingale optimal transport problem also arises
in the study of the maximum maximum of a martingale given n marginals [59].
The one-step case n = 1 has been studied in great detail. In particular, [16] introduced
the Left-Curtain coupling and pioneered numerous ideas underlying Theorem 1.1.1, [61]
provided an explicit construction of that coupling, and [73] established the stability with
respect to the marginals. Our duality results specialize to the ones of [18] when n = 1.
Unsurprisingly, we shall exploit many arguments and results from these papers wherever
possible. As indicated above, and as will be seen in the proofs below, the multistep case
allows for a richer structure and necessitates novel ideas; for instance, the analysis of the
polar sets (Theorem 1.3.1) is surprisingly involved. Other works in the one-step martingale
case have studied reward functions f such as forward start straddles [66, 67] or Asian payoffs
[103]. We also refer to [55, 88] for recent developments with multidimensional marginals.
One-step martingale optimal transport problems can alternately be studied as optimal
Skorokhod embedding problems with marginal constraints; cf. [10, 11, 14, 15]. A multi-
marginal extension [9] of [10] is in preparation at the time of writing and the authors have
brought to our attention that it will offer a version of Theorem 1.1.1 in the Skorokhod
picture, at least in the case where µ0 is atomless and some further conditions are satisfied.
The Skorokhod embedding problem with multi-marginal constraint was also studied in [56].
A multi-step coupling quite different from ours can be obtained by composing in a
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Markovian fashion the Left-Curtain transport kernels from µt−1 to µt, 1 ≤ t ≤ n, as
discussed in [61]. In [74] the continuous-time limits of such couplings for n → ∞ are
studied to find solutions of the so-called Peacock problem [63] where the marginals for a
continuous-time martingale are prescribed; see also [60] and [75] for other continuous-time
results with full marginal constraint. Early contributions related to the continuous-time
martingale transport problem include [47, 48, 52, 92, 102, 106].
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 fixes basic terminology
and recalls the necessary results from the one-step case. In Section 1.3, we characterize the
polar structure of M(µ). Section 1.4 introduces and analyzes the space that is the domain
of the dual problem in Section 1.5, where we state the duality theorem and the monotonicity
principle. Section 1.6 introduces left-monotone transports by the shadow construction and
Section 1.7 develops the equivalent characterizations in terms of support and optimality
properties. The (non-)uniqueness of left-monotone transports is discussed in Section 1.8.
We conclude with the analysis of the problem with unconstrained intermediate marginals
in Section 1.9.
1.2 Preliminaries
Throughout this paper, µt, µ, ν denote finite measures on R with finite first moment, the total
mass not necessarily being normalized. Generalizing the notation from the Introduction to
a vector µ = (µ0, . . . , µn) of such measures, we will write Π(µ) for the set of couplings; that
is, measures P on Rn+1 such that P ◦X−1t = µt for 0 ≤ t ≤ n where X = (X0, . . . , Xn) :
Rn+1 → Rn+1 is the identity. Moreover, M(µ) is the subset of all P ∈ Π(µ) that are
martingales, meaning that
∫
Xs1A(X0, . . . , Xs)dP =
∫
Xt1A(X0, . . . , Xs)dP
for all s ≤ t and Borel sets A ∈ B(Rs+1).
We denote by F = {Ft}0≤t≤n the canonical filtration Ft := σ(X0, . . . , Xt). As usual,
an F-predictable process H = {Ht}1≤t≤n is a sequence of real functions on Rn+1 such that
Ht is Ft−1-measurable; i.e. Ht = ht(X0, . . . , Xt−1) for some Borel-measurable ht : Rt → R.
8





Hs · (Xs −Xs−1).
If X is a martingale under some measure P , then H · X is a generalized (not necessarily
integrable) martingale in the sense of generalized conditional expectations; cf. [70, Proposi-
tion 1.64].
We say that µ = (µ0, . . . , µn) is in convex order if µt−1 ≤c µt for all 1 ≤ t ≤ n; that is,
µt−1(φ) ≤ µt(φ) for any convex function φ : R→ R. This implies that µt−1 and µt have the
same total mass. The order can also be characterized by the potential functions
uµt : R→ R, uµt(x) :=
∫
|x− y|µt(dy).
The following properties are elementary:
(i) uµt is nonnegative and convex,
(ii) ∂+uµt(x)− ∂−uµt(x) = 2µt({x}),
(iii) lim|x|→∞ uµt(x) =∞1µt 6=0,
(iv) lim|x|→∞ uµt(x)− µt(R)|x− bary(µt)| = 0,
where ∂+ and ∂− denote the right and left derivatives, respectively, and
bary(µt) = (
∫
xdµt)/µt(R) is the barycenter. We can therefore extend uµt continuously to
R¯ = [−∞,∞]. The following result of Strassen is classical (cf. [104]; the last statement is
obtained as e.g. in [50, Corollary 2.95]).
Proposition 1.2.1. Let µ = (µ0, . . . , µn) be finite measures on R with finite first moments
and equal total mass. The following are equivalent:
(i) µ0 ≤c · · · ≤c µn,
(ii) uµ0 ≤ · · · ≤ uµn ,
(iii) M(µ) 6= ∅,
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(iv) there exist stochastic kernels κt(x0, . . . , xt−1, dxt) such that
∫
|xt|κt(x0, . . . , xt−1, dxt) <∞ and
∫
xt κt(x0, . . . , xt−1, dxt) = xt−1
for all (x0, . . . , xt) ∈ Rt and 1 ≤ t ≤ n, and
µt = (µ0 ⊗ κ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ κn) ◦ (Xt)−1 for all 0 ≤ t ≤ n.
All kernels will be stochastic (i.e. normalized) in what follows. A kernel κt with the first
property in (iv) is called martingale kernel.
1.2.1 The One-Step Case
For the convenience of the reader, we summarize some results from [16] and [18] for the
one-step problem (n = 1) which will be used later on. In this section we write (µ, ν) instead
of (µ0, µ1) for the given marginals in convex order.
Definition 1.2.2. The pair µ ≤c ν is irreducible if the set I = {uµ < uν} is connected and
µ(I) = µ(R). In this situation, let J be the union of I and any endpoints of I that are
atoms of ν; then (I, J) is the domain of M(µ, ν).
The first result is a decomposition of the transport problem into irreducible parts; cf.
[16, Theorem 8.4].
Proposition 1.2.3. Let µ ≤c ν and let (Ik)1≤k≤N be the (open) components of {uµ < uν},
where N ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,∞}. Set I0 = R\∪k≥1Ik and µk = µ|Ik for k ≥ 0, so that µ =
∑
k≥0 µk.
Then, there exists a unique decomposition ν =
∑
k≥0 νk such that
µ0 = ν0 and µk ≤c νk for all k ≥ 1,
and this decomposition satisfies Ik = {uµk < uνk} for all k ≥ 1. Moreover, any P ∈M(µ, ν)
admits a unique decomposition P =
∑
k≥0 Pk such that Pk ∈M(µk, νk) for all k ≥ 0.
We observe that the measure P0 in Proposition 1.2.3 transports µ0 to itself and is con-
centrated on ∆0 := ∆ ∩ I20 where ∆ = {(x, x) : x ∈ R} is the diagonal. Thus, the transport
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problem with index k = 0 is not actually an irreducible one, but we shall nevertheless refer
to (I0, I0) as the domain of this problem. When we want to emphasize the distinction, we
call (I0, I0) the diagonal domain and (Ik, Jk)k≥1 the irreducible domains of M(µ, ν). Simi-
larly, the sets Vk := Ik × Jk, k ≥ 1 will be called the irreducible components and V0 := ∆0
will be called the diagonal component of M(µ, ν). This terminology refers to the following
result of [18, Theorem 3.2] which essentially states that the components are the only sets
that can be charged by a martingale transport. We call a set B ⊆ R2 M(µ, ν)-polar if it is
P -null for all P ∈ M(µ, ν), where a nullset is, as usual, any set contained in a Borel set of
zero measure.
Proposition 1.2.4. Let µ ≤c ν and let B ⊆ R2 be a Borel set. Then B is M(µ, ν)-polar if
and only if there exist a µ-nullset Nµ and a ν-nullset Nν such that





The following result of [18, Lemma 3.3] will also be useful; it is the main ingredient in
the proof of the preceding proposition.
Lemma 1.2.5. Let µ ≤c ν be irreducible and let pi be a finite measure on R2 whose marginals
pi1, pi2 satisfy
3 pi1 ≤ µ and pi2 ≤ ν. Then, there exists P ∈ M(µ, ν) such that P dominates
pi in the sense of absolute continuity.
1.3 The Polar Structure
The goal of this section is to identify all obstructions to martingale transports imposed by the
marginals µ = (µ0, . . . , µn), and thus, conversely, the sets that can indeed be charged. We
recall that a subset B of Rn+1 is called M(µ)-polar if it is a P -nullset for all P ∈ M(µ).
The result for the one-step case in Proposition 1.2.4 already exhibits an obvious type of
polar set B ⊆ Rn+1: if for some t there is an M(µt−1, µt)-polar set B′ ⊆ R2 such that
B ⊆ Rt−1 × B′ × Rn−t, then B must be M(µ)-polar. The following shows that unions of
such sets are in fact the only polar sets of M(µ).
3By pi1 ≤ µ we mean that pi1(A) ≤ µ(A) for every Borel set A ⊆ R.
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Theorem 1.3.1 (Polar Structure). Let µ = (µ0, . . . , µn) be in convex order. Then a Borel













where (V tk )k≥1 are the irreducible components of M(µt−1, µt) and V t0 is the corresponding
diagonal component.
Before stating the proof, we introduce some additional terminology. The second part

























(Xt−1, Xt)−1(V tkt) ⊆ Rn+1
as occurring in the last expression of (1.3.2) will be referred to as an irreducible component
ofM(µ); these sets are disjoint since V tk ∩V tk′ = ∅ for k 6= k′. Moreover, we call their union
V = ∪kVk
the effective domain of M(µ).
Roughly speaking, an irreducible component Vk is a chain of irreducible components from
the individual steps (t−1, t). In the one-step case considered in [16, 18], it was possible and
useful to decompose the transport problem into its irreducible components and study those
separately to a large extent; cf. Proposition 1.2.3. This is impossible in the multistep case,
as illustrated by the following example.













Figure 1.2: The shaded area represents Vk for k = (1, 1).
δ0, µ1 =
1
2 (δ−1 +δ1) and µ2 =
1
4 (δ−2 +2δ0 +δ2). Then the irreducible components are given
by
V00 = {(x, x, x) : x /∈ (−2, 2)}
V01 = {(x, x) : x ∈ (−2,−1]} × [−2, 0]
V02 = {(x, x) : x ∈ [1, 2)} × [0, 2]
V10 = (−1, 1)× {0} × {0}
V11 = (−1, 1)× [−1, 0)× [−2, 0]
V12 = (−1, 1)× (0, 1]× [0, 2].




(δ(0,−1,−2) + δ(0,−1,0) + δ(0,1,0) + δ(0,1,2)).
While P is supported on V11 ∪ V12, it cannot be decomposed into two martingale parts
that are supported on V11 and V12, respectively: V11 and V12 are disjoint, but P |V11 =
1
4 (δ(0,−1,−2) + δ(0,−1,0)) is not a martingale.
The main step in the proof of Theorem 1.3.1 will be the following lemma.
Lemma 1.3.3. Let Vk be an irreducible component of M(µ) and consider a measure pi
concentrated on Vk such that pit ≤ µt for t = 0, . . . , n. Then there exists a transport
P ∈M(µ) which dominates pi in the sense of absolute continuity.
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Deferring the proof, we first show how this implies the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 1.3.1. Clearly (Xt)







isM(µ)-polar for t = 1, . . . , n. This shows that (1.3.1) is sufficient
for B ⊆ Rn+1 to be M(µ)-polar.
Conversely, suppose that (1.3.1) does not hold; we show that B is not M(µ)-polar. In
view of (1.3.2), by passing to a subset of B if necessary, we may assume that









We may also assume that there are no µt-nullsets Nt such that B ⊆ ∪nt=0(Xt)−1(Nt).
By a result of classical optimal transport [12, Proposition 2.1], this entails that B is not
Π(µ)-polar; i.e. we can find a measure ρ ∈ Π(µ) such that ρ(B) > 0.
We now write B =
⋃
kB ∩ Vk. As ρ(B) =
∑
k ρ(B ∩ Vk) > 0, we can find some k such
that ρ(B ∩ Vk) > 0. But then pi := ρ|Vk satisfies the assumptions of Lemma 1.3.3 which
yields P ∈M(µ) such that P  pi. In particular, P (B) > 0 and B is not M(µ)-polar.
1.3.1 Proof of Lemma 1.3.3
The reasoning for Lemma 1.3.3 follows an induction on the number n of time steps; its rigor-
ous formulation requires a certain amount of control over subsequent steps of the transport
problem. Thus, we first state a more quantitative version of (the core part of) the lemma
that is tailored to the inductive argument.
Definition 1.3.4. Let µ be in convex order and V the effective domain of M(µ). We say
that a finite measure pi has a compact support family if there are disjoint compact product
sets4 K1, . . . ,Km ⊆ V with pi(∪iKi) = pi(Rn+1) such that Ki ⊆ Vki for some irreducible
component Vki for all i = 1, . . . ,m.
Definition 1.3.5. Let µ be in convex order, t ≤ n and σ ≤ µt a finite measure on R. If
t = n, we say that σ is diagonally compatible (with µ) if there is a finite family of compact
sets L1, . . . , Lm ⊆ R with σ(∪iLi) = σ(R). Whereas if t < n, we require in addition that
for every i, either (a) Li ⊆ Ik for some irreducible component (Ik, Jk) of M(µt, µt+1) or
4By a compact product set we mean a set K = A0 × · · · ×An where each At ⊆ R is compact.
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(b) Li ⊆ I0 and there is t + 1 ≤ t′ ≤ n such that Li ⊆ Is0 for the diagonal components of





k ) of M(µt′ , µt′+1), where we set Ink = Jnk = R for notational convenience.
Lemma 1.3.6. Let t < n and let L ⊆ I0 be a compact interval contained in the diagonal
component of M(µt, µt+1) such that µt(L) > 0. There exist a compact interval L′ ⊆ L with
µt(L
′) > 0 and t+ 1 ≤ t′ ≤ n such that L′ ⊆ Is0 for the diagonal component of M(µs, µs+1)





M(µt′ , µt′+1), where we again set Ink = Jnk = R for notational convenience.
Proof. The statement is trivially satisfied for t = n − 1 as we can just take L′ = L. For
t < n− 1, consider the family of irreducible components (It+1k , J t+1k ) ofM(µt+1, µt+2). We
distinguish three cases.
(i) First, consider the case where L ∩ It+1k = ∅ for all k ≥ 1, then L is contained in the
diagonal component of M(µt+1, µt+2).
(ia) If L = {x} consists of a single point with positive mass, then we can conclude by
induction from the result for t+ 1.
(ib) If no endpoint of L is on the boundary of some component Itk, then observe that
µt|L = µt+1|L. We can find L′ ⊆ L from the statement of the lemma for t + 1. Then L′
gives the result as µt(L
′) = µt+1(L′) > 0.
(ic) If L contains more than one point, and also the endpoint of some component Itk.
When this endpoint x has positive point mass, we can set L′ = {x} and conclude as in
(ia). If the endpoint has zero mass, we can find L¯ ⊆ L compact with µt(L¯) > 0 that does
not contain this endpoint and argue as in (ib). (Observe that there might be at most two
endpoints.)
(ii) Next, let k ≥ 1 be such that µt+1(L ∩ It+1k ) > 0 (and in particular L ∩ It+1k 6= ∅).
Then we can find a compact interval L′ ⊆ L∩ It+1k such that µt(L′) > 0 and we directly see
that L′ satisfies the statement of the lemma.
(iii) Finally, suppose that there is k ≥ 1 with L ∩ It+1k 6= ∅ but µt(L ∩ It+1k ) = 0. In
particular this means that L 6⊆ It+1k . It furthermore means that It+1k 6⊆ L, as otherwise
µt+1(I
t+1
k ) = µt(I
t+1
k ) = µt(L ∩ It+1k ) = 0 which contradicts the definition of It+1k . As L is
a compact interval and It+1k is an open interval, we have that L\It+1k is a compact interval
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and µt(L\It+1k ) = µt(L) > 0. Notice that there can be at most two such components It+1k
for fixed L and we will be in case (i) after removing both of them if necessary.
Lemma 1.3.7. Let t ≤ n and let J ⊆ R be an interval such that µt(J) > 0. Then we can
find a compact interval K ⊆ J with µt(K) > 0 such that µt|K is diagonally compatible.
Proof. The case t = n is trivial. Thus, let t < n. We consider the family {Ik}k≥1 of open
sets corresponding to the irreducible components ofM(µt, µt+1) and distinguish two cases.
(i) There is some k ≥ 1 such that µt(Ik ∩ J) > 0. In this case, we can choose a compact
interval K ⊆ Ik ∩ J such that µt(K) > 0.
(ii) Now suppose that µt(Ik ∩ J) = 0 for all k ≥ 1. Then we first notice that there are
at most two components Ik1 ,Ik2 so that Iki ∩ J 6= ∅ and J\(Ik1 ∪ Ik2) is still a nonempty
interval with positive µt-mass, since Ik cannot be contained in J . We can therefore assume
without loss of generality that J ⊆ I0 and is compact. Now we can apply Lemma 1.3.6 to
find a subinterval K ⊆ J such that µt|K is diagonally compatible.
Lemma 1.3.8. Let t ≤ n and let pi be a measure on Rt+1 that has a compact support family
with respect to µ0, . . . , µt and satisfies pis ≤ µs for s ≤ t. In addition, suppose that pit is
diagonally compatible.
Then there is a martingale measure Q on Rt+1 that dominates pi in the sense of absolute
continuity and has a compact support family with respect to µ0, . . . , µt and satisfies Qs ≤ µs
for s ≤ t. In addition, Qt can be chosen to be diagonally compatible. Finally, Q can be
chosen such that dQ = gdpi+dσ where the density g is bounded and the measure σ is singular
with respect to pi.
Proof. We proceed by induction on t. For t = 0 there is nothing to prove; we can set Q = pi.
Consider t ≥ 1 and assume that the lemma has already been shown for (t − 1)-step
measures. We disintegrate
pi = pi′ ⊗ κ(x0, . . . , xt−1, dxt) (1.3.3)
and observe that pi′ satisfies the conditions of the lemma. In particular, pi′t−1 must be
diagonally compatible: the compact sets that it is supported on are either contained in
irreducible components of M(µt−1, µt) or in the diagonal component. Any such compact
subset of the diagonal component of M(µt−1, µt) must correspond to one of the finitely
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many compact sets in the support of pit so that they inherit the compatibility property from
these sets.
By the induction assumption, we then find a martingale measure Q′  pi′ on Rt with
the stated properties. In particular, the marginal Q′t−1 is diagonally compatible with µ.
Again, let {Ik}k≥1 be the open intervals from the irreducible domains (Ik, Jk) of
M(µt−1, µt) and let I0 denote the corresponding diagonal domain. We shall construct a
martingale kernel κˆ by suitably manipulating κ. Let us observe that since pi is concentrated
on V and has a compact support family with respect to µ0, . . . , µt, the following hold for
pi′-a.e. x = (x0, . . . , xt−1) ∈ Rt and a finite family of compact sets Li with properties (a) or
(b) from Definition 1.3.5:
• κ(x, ·) = δxt−1 whenever xt−1 ∈ I0,
• κ(x, ·) is concentrated on some Li with Li ⊆ Jk for xt−1 ∈ Ik with k ≥ 1 and
Q′t−1(Ik) > 0.
By changing κ on a pi′-nullset, we may assume that these two properties hold for all x ∈ Rt.
Step 1. Next, we argue that we may change Q′ and κ such that the marginal (Q′⊗κ)t =
(Q′ ⊗ κ) ◦X−1t satisfies
(Q′ ⊗ κ)t ≤ µt. (1.3.4)
Indeed, recall that dQ′ = dQ′abs + dσ
′ = g′dpi′ + dσ′ where the density g′ is bounded and σ′
is singular with respect to pi′. Using the Lebesgue decomposition theorem, we find a Borel
set A ⊆ Rt such that σ′(A) = σ′(Rt) and pi′(A) = 0. By scaling Q′ with a constant we may
assume that g′ ≤ 1/2. As pit ≤ µt, the marginal (Q′abs ⊗ κ)t is then bounded by 12µt, and it
remains to bound (σ′ ⊗ κ)t in the same way.
Note that Q′t−1 ≤ µt−1 implies σ′t−1 ≤ µt−1. We may change κ arbitrarily on the set A
without invalidating (1.3.3). Indeed, for each irreducible component (Ik, Jk) ofM(µt−1, µt)
we choose and fix a compact interval Kk ⊆ Jk with µt(Kk) > 0 such that µt|Kk is diagonally
compatible; this is possible by Lemma 1.3.7. For x = (x0, . . . , xt−1) ∈ A such that xt−1 ∈ Ik
we then define








is strictly positive because there are only finitely many k with Q′t−1(Ik) > 0 (this is the
purpose of the induction assumption that Q′t−1 is diagonally compatible). As σ
′
t−1 ≤ µt−1,
we may scale Q′ once again to obtain σ′t−1 ≤ 6µt−1. We now have












For the diagonal domain I0 the corresponding inequality holds because we have κ(x, ·) =
δxt−1 for xt−1 ∈ I0 and σ′t−1|I0 ≤ 16µt−1|I0 ≤ 16µt|I0 . As a consequence, we have (σ′⊗ κ)t ≤
1
2µt as desired, so that we may assume (1.3.4) in what follows.
Step 2. We now construct a martingale kernel κˆ such that Q = Q′ ⊗ κˆ has the required
properties. For a fixed irreducible component (Ik, Jk) we have that Q
′
t−1|Ik = Q′t−1|K for
some compact K ⊆ Ik. We can find compact intervals B−, B+ ⊆ Jk with µt(B−) > 0 and
µt(B
+) > 0 such that B− is to the left of K and B+ is to the right of K, in the sense that
x < y < z for x ∈ B−, y ∈ K and z ∈ B+. By Lemma 1.3.7, we can further assume that
we have B+ ⊆ Itk and B− ⊆ Itk′ for some k, k′ ≥ 0, where (Itl )l≥0 belong to the components
of M(µt, µt+1), and that µt|B± is diagonally compatible.
Next, we define two nonnegative functions x 7→ ε−(x), ε+(x) for x = (x0, . . . , xt−1) ∈
Rt−1 ×K as follows:
• for x such that bary(κ(x, ·)) < xt−1, let ε+ be the unique number such that κ(x, ·) +
ε+(x) · µt|B+ has barycenter xt−1,
• for x such that bary(κ(x, ·)) > xt−1, let ε− be the unique number such that κ(x, ·) +
ε−(x) · µt|B− has barycenter xt−1,
• ε±(x) = 0 otherwise.
Observe that these numbers always exist because B− and B+ have positive mass and positive
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distance from the points xt−1 ∈ K. We now define the martingale kernel κˆ by
κˆ(x) := c(ε− · µt|B− + κ+ ε+ · µt|B+)
where 0 < c ≤ 1 is a normalizing constant such that κˆ is again a stochastic kernel. We also
define κˆ(x) = κ(x) for x on the diagonal domain.









k ) ∧ µt(B+k )]
is strictly positive because there are only finitely many k with Q′t−1(Ik) > 0. We can now
define
Q := C · (Q′ ⊗ κˆ).
Then Q is a martingale transport whose marginals satisfy Qs ≤ Q′s ≤ µs for 0 ≤ s ≤ t− 1
whereas Qt ≤ µt by (1.3.4), the construction of κˆ and the choice of C; indeed, for every
xt−1 ∈ Itk we have
3Cκˆ(x) ≤ 3Cε− · µt|B− + 3Cκ+ 3Cε+ · µt|B+
≤ µt|B− + κ+ µt|B+ ≤ 2µt + κ.
To see that Qt is diagonally compatible, observe that Qt is supported by a finite family
of compact sets consisting of the following:
• a finite family of compact sets L¯i ⊆ I0 such that Q′t−1|L¯i is diagonally compatible
(from the induction hypothesis that Q′t−1 is diagonally compatible),
• a finite family of compact sets Li ⊆ Jk for some k ≥ 1 with Q′t−1(Ik) > 0 such that
Qt|Li ≤ µt|Li is diagonally compatible, and
• the sets B±k for the finitely many k such that Q′t−1(Ik) > 0, where Qt|B±k ≤ µt|B±k is
diagonally compatible.
It remains to check that Q has the required decomposition with respect to pi. Indeed, κˆ
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can be decomposed as
κˆ = cκ+ (1− c)κ⊥
where κ⊥ is singular to κ. Recalling the decomposition Q′ = Q′abs + σ
′, we then have
Q′ ⊗ κˆ = cQ′abs ⊗ κ + (1− c)Q′abs ⊗ κ⊥ + σ′ ⊗ κˆ.
The last two terms are singular with respect to pi = pi′ ⊗ κ, and the first term is absolutely
continuous with bounded density.
Proof of Lemma 1.3.3. Let pi be a measure with marginals pit ≤ µt for all t which is con-
centrated on some irreducible component V = Vk and thus, in particular, on the effective
domain V.
Step 1. We first decompose pi =
∑∞
m=1 pi
m such that each pim satisfies the requirements
of Lemma 1.3.8 with t = n.
Indeed, let V = ∩nt=1(Xt−1, Xt)−1(V tkt) and suppose first that kt 6= 0 for 1 ≤ t ≤ n.




, An = J
n
kn
and At = J
t
kt
∩ It+1kt+1 for 1 < t < n. Thus, we can choose increasing
families of compact intervals Kmt such that At = ∪m≥1Kmt for all t. Setting pi1 := pi|∏nt=0K1t








for m > 1 yields the required decomposition.
If kt = 0 for one or more 1 ≤ t ≤ n, we have V ⊆ A0 × · · · ×An, where At is defined as
above when kt 6= 0 6= kt+1 but we use R instead of J tkt when kt = 0 and R instead of It+1kt+1
when kt+1 = 0. After these modifications, pi
m can be defined as above; recall that diagonal
components are always closed.
Step 2. For each of the measures pim, Lemma 1.3.8 yields a martingale measureQm  pim
with the properties stated in the lemma. In particular, each Qm has a compact support
family. We show below that there exist Pm ∈ M(µ) such that Pm  Qm, and then
P :=
∑
2−mPm satisfies P ∈M(µ) and P  pi as desired.
To complete the proof, it remains to show that for fixed m ≥ 1 there exist 0 <  < 1 and
Q¯m ∈ M(µ − (Qm0 , . . . , Qmn )), as we may then conclude by setting Pm := Qm + Q¯m ∈
M(µ). By Proposition 1.2.1, the set M(µ− (Qm0 , . . . , Qmn )) is nonempty if the marginals
20
are in convex order, or equivalently if the potential functions satisfy
uµt−1 − uQmt−1 ≤ uµt − uQmt (1.3.5)
for t = 1, . . . , n. Thus, it suffices to find  > 0 with this property for fixed t, and we have
reduced to a question about a one-step martingale transport problem. Indeed, we have
uµt−1 ≤ uµt on R. Since Qm has a compact support family and in particular is supported
by V, there is a finite collection of compact sets Kj ⊆ R such that each Kj is contained in
one of the intervals It−1kj from the decomposition of (µt−1, µt) into irreducible components,
Qm transports mass from Kj to itself for each j, and Q
m is the identical Monge transport
on the complement (∪jKj)c. On each Kj , Steps (a) and (b) in the proof of [18, Lemma 3.3]
yield  > 0 such that (1.3.5) holds on Kj , and we can choose  > 0 independently of j
since there are finitely many j. On the other hand, (1.3.5) trivially holds on (∪jKj)c since
uQmt−1 = uQmt on that set. This completes the proof.
1.4 The Dual Space
In this section we introduce the domain of the dual optimization problem and show that it
has a certain closedness property. The latter will be crucial for the duality theorem in the
subsequent section.
We shall need a generalized notion of integrability for the elements of the dual space.
To this end, we first recall the integral for concave functions as detailed in [18, Section 4.1].
Definition 1.4.1. Let µ ≤c ν be irreducible with domain (I, J) and let χ : J → R be a
concave function. We define








where −χ′′ is the (locally finite) second derivative measure of −χ on I and |∆χ| is the
absolute magnitude of the jumps of χ at the boundary points J\I.
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for any P = µ⊗ κ ∈M(µ, ν). Moreover, it coincides with the difference µ(χ)− ν(χ) of the
usual integrals when χ ∈ L1(µ) ∩ L1(ν).
For later reference, we record two more properties of the integral.
Lemma 1.4.3. Let µ ≤c ν be irreducible with domain (I, J) and let χ : J → R be concave.
(i) Assume that I has a finite right endpoint r and χ(a) = χ′(a) = 0 for some a ∈ I.
Then χ ≤ 0 and χ1[a,∞) is concave. If ν has an atom at r, then
χ(r) ≥ − C
ν({r}) (µ− ν)(χ1[a,∞))
for a constant C ≥ 0 depending only on µ, ν.
(ii) For a, b ∈ R, the concave function χ¯(x) := χ(x) + ax+ b satisfies
(µ− ν)(χ¯) = (µ− ν)(χ).
Proof. The first part is [18, Remark 4.6] and the second part follows directly from χ¯′′ = χ′′
and ∆χ¯ = ∆χ.
Let us now return to the multistep case with a vector µ = (µ0, . . . , µn) of measures
in convex order and introduce µ(φ) :=
∑n
t=0 µt(φt) in cases where we do not necessarily
have φt ∈ L1(µt). As mentioned previously, in contrast to [18], the multistep transport
problem does not decompose into irreducible components, forcing us to directly give a
global definition of the integral.
Definition 1.4.4. Let φ = (φ0, . . . , φn) be a vector of Borel functions φt : R→ R¯. A vector
χ = (χ1, . . . , χn) of Borel functions χt : R → R is called a concave moderator for φ if for
1 ≤ t ≤ n,
(i) χt|J is concave for every domain (I, J) of an irreducible component of M(µt−1, µt),
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(ii) χt|I0 ≡ 0 for the diagonal domain I0 of M(µt−1, µt),
(iii) φt − χt+1 + χt ∈ L1(µt),










(µt−1 − µt)k(χt) ∈ (−∞,∞], (1.4.1)
where (µt−1 − µt)k(χt) denotes the integral of Definition 1.4.1 on the k-th irreducible com-
ponent of M(µt−1, µt).
Remark 1.4.5. The moderated integral is independent of the choice of the moderator χ. To
see this, consider a second moderator χ˜ for φ; then we have (χ˜t+1−χt+1)−(χ˜t−χt) ∈ L1(µt).
We may assume that (1.4.1) is finite for at least one of the moderators. Using Remark 1.4.2






















µt((χt+1 − χ˜t+1)− (χt − χ˜t)).
It now follows that (1.4.1) yields the same value for both moderators.
For later reference, we also record the following property.










k) is the k-th irreducible domain of M(µt−1, µt).
Next, we introduce the space of functions which have a finite integral in the moderated
sense.
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k≥1(µt−1 − µt)k(χt) <∞.
It follows that µ(φ) is finite for φ ∈ Lc(µ), and we have µ(φ) = ∑t µt(φt) for φ ∈
Πnt=0L
1(µt). The definition is also consistent with the expectation under martingale trans-
ports, in the following sense.
Lemma 1.4.8. Let φ ∈ Lc(µ) and let H = (H1, . . . ,Hn) be F-predictable. If
n∑
t=0
φt(Xt) + (H ·X)n





φt(Xt) + (H ·X)n
]
, P ∈M(µ).
Proof. Let P ∈ M(µ), let χ be a concave moderator for φ, and assume without loss of
generality that 0 is the lower bound. Using Remark 1.4.6, we have that
∑n









(χt|Itk(Xt−1)− χt|Jtk(Xt)) + (H ·X)n ≥ 0.
By assumption, the functions (φt−χt+1 +χt)(Xt) are P -integrable. Therefore, the negative
part of the remaining expression must also be P -integrable. Writing Pt := P ◦(X0, . . . , Xt)−1





(χt|Itk(Xt−1)− χt|Jtk(Xt)) + (H ·X)n
]











χn|Ink (Xn−1)− χn|Jnk (Xn)
]
κn(X0, . . . , Xn−1, dXn).
Iteratively integrating with kernels such that Pt = Pt−1 ⊗ κt and observing that we can




k≥1(χt|Itk(Xt−1)− χt|Jtk(Xt)) + (H ·X)n as its negative
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and the result follows.
We can now define our dual space. It will be convenient to work with nonnegative reward
functions f for the moment—we shall relax this constraint later on; cf. Remark 1.5.3.
Definition 1.4.9. Let f : Rn+1 → [0,∞]. We denote by Dµ(f) the set of all pairs (φ, H)
where φ ∈ Lc(µ) and H = (H1, . . . ,Hn) is an F-predictable process such that
n∑
t=0
φt(Xt) + (H ·X)n ≥ f on V.
By Lemma 1.4.8, the expectation of the left hand side under any P ∈M(µ) is given by
the moderated integral µ(φ); this will be seen as the dual cost of (φ, H) when we consider
the dual problem inf(φ,H)∈Dµ(f) µ(φ) in Section 1.5 below.
The following closedness property is the key result about the dual space.
Proposition 1.4.10. Let fm : Rn+1 → [0,∞], m ≥ 1 be a sequence of functions such that
fm → f pointwise
and let (φm, Hm) ∈ Dµ(fm) be such that supm µ(φm) < ∞. Then there exist (φ, H) ∈
Dµ(f) with
µ(φ) ≤ lim inf
m→∞ µ(φ
m).
1.4.1 Proof of Proposition 1.4.10
An attempt to prove Proposition 1.4.10 directly along the lines of [18] runs into a technical
issue in controlling the concave moderators. Roughly speaking, they do not allow suffi-
ciently many normalizations; this is related to the aforementioned fact that the multistep
problem cannot be decomposed into its components. We shall introduce a generalized dual
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space with families of functions indexed by the components, and prove a “lifted” version of
Proposition 1.4.10 in this larger space. Once that is achieved, we can infer the closedness
result in the original space as well. (The reader willing to admit Proposition 1.4.10 may
skip this subsection without much loss of continuity.)
Definition 1.4.11. Let φ = {φkt : 0 ≤ t ≤ n, k ≥ 0} be a family of Borel functions,
consisting of one function φkt : J
t
k → R¯ for each irreducible component (Itk, J tk) ofM(µt−1, µt)
as indexed by k ≥ 1 and 1 ≤ t ≤ n, functions φ0t : It0 → R¯ for the diagonal components
It0 indexed by 1 ≤ t ≤ n , and a single function φ00 : R → R¯ for t = 0. Similarly, let
χ = {χkt : 1 ≤ t ≤ n, k ≥ 0} be a family of functions, consisting of one concave function
χkt : J
t
k → R for each irreducible component (Itk, J tk) and Borel functions χ0t : It0 → R





t |Itk for t = 1, . . . , n, as well as χn+1 ≡ 0.
We call χ a concave moderator for φ if for all t = 0, . . . , n and k ≥ 0,
φkt + χ
k









t − χt+1) converges in (−∞,∞], where µkt is the second
marginal of the k-th irreducible component in the decomposition ofM(µt−1, µt) as in Propo-















(µt−1 − µt)k(χkt ).










(µt−1 − µt)k(χkt ) <∞.
For φ ∈ Lc,g(µ), the value of µ(φ) is independent of the choice of the moderator χ. This
is shown similarly as in Remark 1.4.5. We can now introduce the generalized dual space.
Definition 1.4.12. Let f : Rn+1 → [0,∞]. We denote by Dgµ(f) the set of all pairs (φ, H)
5The restriction to Itk is important to avoid “double counting” in the sums. Note that the intervals J
may overlap at their endpoints.
6This integral is not related to the notion of a generalized martingale.
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where φ ∈ Lc,g(µ), H = (H1, . . . ,Hn) is F-predictable, and
n∑
t=0
φktt (xt) + (H · x)n ≥ f(x)
for all x = (x0, . . . , xn) and k = (k0, . . . , kn) such that (xt−1, xt) ∈ (Itkt , J tkt) for some
(irreducible or diagonal) component7 and t = 1, . . . , n.
We observe that for any x ∈ V the corresponding k = (k0, . . . , kn) is uniquely defined,
where the index k0 ≡ 0 exists purely for notational convenience.
For later reference, the following lemma elaborates on certain degrees of freedom in
choosing elements of Dgµ(f).
Lemma 1.4.13. Let (φ, H) ∈ Dgµ(f) and let χ be a corresponding concave moderator.
Let 1 ≤ t ≤ n, let (Itk, J tk) be the domain of an irreducible component of M(µt−1, µt) and
c1, c2 ∈ R. Introduce new families (φ˜, H˜) and χ˜ by either (i) or (ii):
(i) Define
φ˜kt (y) = φ
k


















s for s /∈ {t− 1, t},
H˜t = Ht + c1|X−1t−1(Itk), H˜s = Hs for s 6= t






t − χ0t+1|It0 , χ˜0t = 0, and
φ˜kt = φ
k
t − χ0t+1, χ˜kt = χkt for k ≥ 1, t = 0, . . . , n.
7 Given an irreducible component (I, J), the notation (x, y) ∈ (I, J) means that x ∈ I, y ∈ J , whereas
for a diagonal component (I0, I0) it is to be understood as x = y ∈ I0.
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Then (φ˜, H˜) ∈ Dgµ(f) and χ˜ is a corresponding concave moderator. Moreover, we have
n∑
t=0
φktt (xt) + (H · x)n =
n∑
t=0
φ˜ktt (xt) + (H˜ · x)n and
φkt + χ
k
t − χt+1 = φ˜kt + χ˜kt − χ˜t+1 for all k ≥ 1, t = 0, . . . , n,
as well as µ(φ) = µ(φ˜).
Proof. (i) If x is such that (xt−1, xt) /∈ Itk × J tk, then φ˜ktt (xt) = φktt (xt) for t = 0, . . . , n and
H˜(x) = H(x). Otherwise,
φ˜ktt (xt) + φ˜
kt−1














Along with the fact that (µt − µt−1)k(χkt ) = (µt − µt−1)k(χ˜kt ), these identities imply the
assertions.
(ii) Similarly as in (i), the terms in question coincide by construction.
Remark 1.4.14. The modification of Lemma 1.4.13 (i) can be applied simultaneously for









as well as φ˜kt (y) = φ
k
t (y) − (ck1y − ck2) and χ˜kt (y) = χkt (y) + (ck1y − ck2) for the components
k ≥ 1 in step t. The pointwise equalities still hold as above and in particular, the moderated
integral does not change.
Remark 1.4.15. Any (φ, H) ∈ Dµ(f) induces an element (φg, H) ∈ Dgµ(f) with µ(φg) =
µ(φ) by choosing some concave moderator χ for φ and setting
φkt := φt|Jtk , χkt := χt|Jtk .
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We now show the analogue to Lemma 1.4.8 for the generalized dual space.





t (xt) + (H · x)n







t (xt) + (H · x)n
]
, P ∈M(µ).
Proof. Let P ∈ M(µ), let χ be a concave moderator for φ such that χ0t ≡ 0 and assume



















t −χt+1 +χkt(x)t )(xt) is P -integrable. Therefore, the negative
part of the remaining expression must also be P -integrable. Writing Pt := P ◦(X0, . . . , Xt)−1
and using that (χkt )





t (xt−1)− χkt(x)t (xt)) + (H · x)n
]






t (xt−1)− χkt(x)t (xt)) + (H · x)n−1
+
∫ [
(χkn(x)n (xn−1)− χkn(x)n (xn))
]
κn(x0, . . . , xn−1, dxn).
Iteratively integrating with kernels such that Pt = Pt−1 ⊗ κt and observing that we can




t (xt−1) − χkt(x)t (xt)) + (H · x)n as its negative part














(µt−1 − µt)k(χkt )
and the result follows.
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Next, we establish that lifting from Dµ(f) to Dgµ(f) does not change the range of dual
costs.
Proposition 1.4.17. Let f : Rn+1 → [0,∞]. We have
{µ(φg) : (φg, H) ∈ Dgµ(f)} = {µ(φ) : (φ, H) ∈ Dµ(f)}.
Proof. Remark 1.4.15 shows the inclusion “⊇.” To show the reverse, we may apply Lemma
1.4.13 (i) together with Remark 1.4.14 to modify a given pair (φg, H) ∈ Dgµ(f) such that
φkt (x) = 0 for x ∈ J tk\Itk, for all irreducible domains (Itk, J tk) of M(µt−1, µt) and 1 ≤ t ≤ n.
Here we have used that x ∈ J tk\Itk implies µtk({x}) > 0, cf. Definition 1.2.2, and therefore
φg ∈ Lc,g(µ) implies φkt (x) ∈ R; that is, such endpoints can indeed be shifted to 0 by adding
affine functions to φkt .
Let χg be a concave moderator for φg. Using Lemma 1.4.3 (ii) and again Lemma 1.4.13
as above, we can modify χkt to satisfy χ
k
t (x) = 0 for x ∈ J tk\Itk, for all irreducible domains
(Itk, J
t
k) of M(µt−1, µt) and 1 ≤ t ≤ n. Here, the finiteness of χkt at the endpoints follows
from Lemma 1.4.3 (i) and (µt−1 − µt)k(χkt ) <∞.
Still denoting the modified dual element by (φg, H), we define φ ∈ Lc(µ) and a corre-
sponding concave moderator χ by
φt(x) := φ
k
t (x), χt(x) := χ
k
t (x), for x ∈ J tk;
they are well-defined since φkt and χ
k
t vanish at points that belong to more than one set J
t
k.
We have µ(φ) = µ(φg) by construction and the result follows.
Definition 1.4.18. Let 1 ≤ t ≤ n and xt ∈ R. A sequence x = (x0, . . . , xt) is a prede-
cessor path of xt if there are indices (k0, . . . , kt) such that (xs−1, xs) ∈ (Isks , Jsks) for some
component (irreducible or diagonal) of M(µs−1, µs), for all 1 ≤ s ≤ t. We write k(x) for
the (unique) associated sequence (k0, . . . , kt) followed by the path x in the above sense, and
Ψkt (xt) for the set of all predecessor paths with kt = k.
These notions will be useful in the next step towards the closedness result, which is to
“regularize” the concave moderators. For concreteness in some of the expressions below, we
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convene that ∞−∞ :=∞.
Lemma 1.4.19. Let (φ, H) ∈ Dgµ(0). There is a concave moderator χ of φ such that
φkt + χ
k
t − χt+1 ≥ 0 on J tk for all t = 0, . . . , n, k ≥ 1, and (1.4.2)
φ0t + χ
0






(µt−1 − µt)k(χkt ) ≤ µ(φ).
Proof. Fix 1 ≤ t ≤ n and let (Itk, J tk) be the domain of some component ofM(µt−1, µt). We
define χ = (χkt ) by χ
0
0 = 0 and





φks(x)s (xs) + (H · x)t
}
;
then χkt is concave on J
t
k for k ≥ 1 as an infimum of affine functions.
We first show that






∪ {χk′t−1 = +∞}.
In particular, such points only exist after a chain of diagonal components from a point
where φkt (xt) = ∞. Suppose χkt (xt) = +∞ and k ≥ 1, then the predecessor paths of xt




s (xs) <∞} must
hold M(µ)-q.s. as φ ∈ Lc,g(µ). We must therefore have xt ∈ I0t . Then, by definition,




t−1(xt) and the claim follows.
Next, we verify that χ satisfies (1.4.2) and (1.4.3). For notational convenience we for




s (xs) + (H · x)n
}
≥ 0. Restricting the infimum in the
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φks(x)s (xs) + (H · x)t
}
+ φkt (xt)
= χkt (xt) + φ
k
t (xt).
Since ∪k′≥0It+1k′ = R, this will imply (1.4.2) after we check that χkt > −∞ for k ≥ 1 and
χ0t > −∞ holds µ0t -a.s., which also implies that χt > −∞ holds µt−1-almost surely. We
show this inductively for t ≥ 1.
Clearly χn+1 ≥ 0 > −∞. Now, for t ≤ n the induction hypothesis is that χt+1 > −∞
holds almost surely µt.
From φ ∈ Lc,g and χt+1 > −∞ µt-a.s. we have that
φkt <∞, χt+1 > −∞ hold µkt -a.s.
As χkt is concave and J
k
t is the convex hull of the topological support of µ
k
t we then get
χkt > −∞ on all of Jkt from the previous inequality.
For k = 0, the inequality yields {χ0t = −∞} ⊆ {χt+1 = −∞} ∪ {φ0t (xt) =∞} and both
of these sets are µt nullsets. Finally µt−1({χt = −∞}) = 0 as this is a subset of the diagonal
component where µt−1 is dominated by µt.




t − χt+1|Jtk for 0 ≤ t ≤ n; then φ¯kt ≥ 0. Moreover, choose an arbi-
trary P ∈ M(µ) with disintegration P = µ0 ⊗ κ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ κn for some stochastic kernels







t (Xt) + (H ·X)n
]
<∞.










































(µt−1 − µt)k(χkt )
which shows that the right hand side is finite, and therefore χ is a concave moderator for
φ. Finally, the second claim follows from µkt (φ¯
k
t ) ≥ 0.
The last tool for our closedness result is a compactness property for concave functions
in the one-step case; cf. [18, Proposition 5.5].
Proposition 1.4.20. Let µ ≤c ν be irreducible with domain (I, J) and let a ∈ I be the
common barycenter of µ and ν. Let χm : J → R be concave functions such that8
χm(a) = χ
′
m(a) = 0 and sup
m≥1
(µ− ν)(χm) <∞.
There exists a subsequence χmk which converges pointwise on J to a concave function χ :
J → R, and (µ− ν)(χ) ≤ lim infk(µ− ν)(χmk).
We are now ready to state and prove the analogue of Proposition 1.4.10 in the generalized
dual.
Proposition 1.4.21. Let fm : Rn+1 → [0,∞], m ≥ 1 be a sequence of functions such that
fm → f pointwise
and let (φm, Hm) ∈ Dgµ(fm) be such that supm µ(φm) < ∞. Then there exist (φ, H) ∈
8To be specific, let us convene that χ′m is the left derivative—this is not important here.
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Dgµ(f) with
µ(φ) ≤ lim inf
m→∞ µ(φ
m).
Proof. Since (φm, Hm) ∈ Dgµ(fm) and fm ≥ 0, we can introduce a sequence of concave
moderators χm as in Lemma 1.4.19. A normalization of (φ
m, Hm) as in Lemma 1.4.13 (i)
and (ii), in the general form of Remark 1.4.14, allows us to assume without loss of generality
that χ0t,m ≡ 0 and χkt,m(akt ) = (χkt,m)′(akt ) = 0, where akt is the barycenter of µkt—this
modification is the main merit of lifting to the generalized dual space. While the generalized
dual gives enough degrees of freedom to choose this normalization, the dual without the
generalization does not. This is related to the possible overlap of the intervals I, J at the
different times t; see also Figure 1.2 and the paragraph preceding Example 1.3.2.
By passing to a subsequence as in Proposition 1.4.20 for each component and using a
diagonal argument, we obtain pointwise limits χkt : J
t
k → R for χkt,m after passing to another
subsequence.
Since φkt,m + χ
k
t,m − χt+1,m ≥ 0 on J tk9 and χkt,m → χkt as well as χt+1,m → χt+1, we
can apply Komlos’ lemma (in the form of [44, Lemma A1.1] and its remark) to find convex
combinations φ˜kt,m ∈ conv{φkt,m, φkt,m+1, . . . } which converge µkt -a.s. for 0 ≤ t ≤ n. We may
assume without loss of generality that φ˜kt,m = φ
k
t,m. Thus, we can set




k for t = 1, . . . , n,
φ0 := lim inf φ0,m
to obtain
φkt,m → φkt µkt -a.s. and φkt + χkt − χt+1 ≥ 0 on J tk.
9Observe that this inequality will still hold after modifying φ and χ as in Lemma 1.4.13.
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= lim inf µ(φm) <∞.
In particular, we see that φ ∈ Lc,g(µ) with concave moderator χ.
It remains to construct the predictable process H = (H1, . . . ,Hn). With a mild abuse of
notation, we shall identify Ht(x0, . . . , xn) with the corresponding function of (x0, . . . , xt−1)
in this proof.
We first define for each k = (k0, . . . , kt) and x = (x0, . . . , xt) such that k = k(x), the









Hs,m(x0, . . . , xs−1) · (xs − xs−1),
Gkt (x) := lim inf G
k
t,m(x).
Given k = (k0, . . . , kt), we write k
′ = (k0, . . . , kt−1). We claim that there exists an F-
predictable process H such that for all 1 ≤ t ≤ n,
Gk
′
t−1(x0, . . . , xt−1) + φ
kt
t (xt) +Ht(x0, . . . , xt−1) · (xt − xt−1) ≥ Gkt (x0, . . . , xt). (1.4.4)
Once this is established, the proposition follows by induction since G
(0)
0 (x0) = φ0(x0) and
Gkn(x0, . . . , xn) ≥ f(x0, . . . , xn).
35
To prove the claim, write gconc for the concave hull of a function g and observe that
lim inf[Gk
′
t−1,m(x0, . . . , xt−1) +Ht,m(x0, . . . , xt−1) · (xt − xt−1)]
≥ lim inf[(Gkt,m(x0, . . . , xt−1, ·)− φktt,m(·))conc(xt)]
≥ [lim inf(Gkt,m(x0, . . . , xt−1, ·)− φktt,m(·)]conc(xt)
≥ [Gkt (x0, . . . , xt−1, ·)− φktt (·)]conc(xt)
=: φˆkt (x0, . . . , xt−1, xt).
By construction, φˆkt is concave in the last variable and satisfies
Gk
′
t−1(x0, . . . , xt−1) ≥ φˆkt (x0, . . . , xt−1, xt−1).
Let ∂tφˆ
k
t denote the left partial derivative in the last variable and set
Hkt (x0, . . . , xt−1) := ∂tφˆ
k
t (x0, . . . , xt−1, xt−1)
for kt ≥ 1 and Hkt (x0, . . . , xt−1) = 0 for kt = 0; then we have
Gk
′
t−1(x0, . . . , xt−1) +H
k
t (x0, . . . , xt−1) · (xt − xt−1)
≥ φˆkt (x0, . . . , xt−1, xt−1) +Hkt (x0, . . . , xt−1) · (xt − xt−1)
≥ φˆkt (x0, . . . , xt−1, xt)
≥ Gkt (x0, . . . , xt)− φktt (xt).
Finally, for any (x0, . . . , xt−1) ∈ Rt, we define Ht(x0, . . . , xt−1) as

Hkt (x0, . . . , xt−1), if k = k(x0, . . . , xt−1, xt) for some xt ∈ R
0, otherwise;
this is well-defined since k(x0, . . . , xt) depends only on (x0, . . . , xt−1). The predictable
process H satisfies (1.4.4) and thus the proof is complete.
Proof of Proposition 1.4.10. In view of Remark 1.4.15 and Proposition 1.4.17, the result
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follows from Proposition 1.4.21.
1.5 Duality Theorem and Monotonicity Principle
The first goal of this section is a duality result for the multistep martingale transport
problem; it establishes the absence of a duality gap and the existence of optimizers in the
dual problem. (As is well known, an optimizer for the primal problem only exists under
additional conditions, such as continuity of f .) The second goal is a monotonicity principle
describing the geometry of optimal transports; it will be a consequence of the duality result.
As above, we consider a fixed vector µ = (µ0, . . . , µn) of marginals in convex order. The
primal and dual problems as defined follows.
Definition 1.5.1. Let f : Rn+1 → [0,∞]. The primal problem is
Sµ(f) := sup
P∈M(µ)
P (f) ∈ [0,∞],




We recall that a function f : Rn+1 → [0,∞] is called upper semianalytic if the sets
{f ≥ c} are analytic for all c ∈ R, where a subset of Rn+1 is called analytic if it is the image
of a Borel subset of a Polish space under a Borel mapping. Any Borel function is upper
semianalytic and any upper semianalytic function is universally measurable; we refer to [20,
Chapter 7] for background. The following is the announced duality result.
Theorem 1.5.2 (Duality). Let f : Rn+1 → [0,∞].
(i) If f is upper semianalytic, then Sµ(f) = Iµ(f) ∈ [0,∞].
(ii) If Iµ(f) <∞, there exists a dual optimizer (φ, H) ∈ Dµ(f).
Proof. Given our preceding results, much of the proof follows the lines of the corresponding
result for the one-step case in [18, Theorem 6.2]; therefore, we shall be brief. We mention that
the present theorem is slightly more general than the cited one in terms of the measurability
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condition (f is upper semianalytic instead of Borel); this is due to the global proof given
here.
Step 1. Using Lemma 1.4.8 we see that Sµ(f) ≤ Iµ(f) holds for all upper semicontinuous
f : Rn+1 → [0,∞].
Step 2. Using the de la Valle´e–Poussin theorem and our assumption that the marginals
have a finite first moment, there exist increasing, superlinearly growing functions ζµt : R+ →
R+ such that x 7→ ζµt(|x|) is µt-integrable for all 0 ≤ t ≤ n. Define




and let Cζ be the vector space of all continuous functions f such that f/ζ vanishes at infinity.
Then, a Hahn–Banach separation argument can be used to show that Sµ(f) ≥ Iµ(f) holds
for all f ∈ Cζ ; the details of the argument are the same as in the proof of [18, Lemma 6.4].
Step 3. Let f be bounded and upper semicontinuous; then there exists a sequence
of bounded continuous functions fm ∈ Cb(Rn+1) which decrease to f pointwise. As
Cb(Rn+1) ⊆ Cζ , we have Sµ(fm) = Iµ(fm) for all m by the first two steps.
Let U be the set of all bounded, nonnegative, upper semicontinuous functions on Rn+1.
We recall that a map C : [0,∞]Rn+1 → [0,∞] is called a U-capacity if it is monotone,
sequentially continuous upwards on [0,∞]Rn+1 and sequentially continuous downwards on
U . The functional f 7→ Sµ(f) is a U-capacity; this follows from the weak compactness of
M(µ) and the arguments in [78, Propositions 1.21, 1.26].
It follows that Sµ(f
m) → Sµ(f). By the monotonicity of f 7→ Iµ(f) and Step 1 we
obtain
Iµ(f) ≤ lim Iµ(fm) = lim Sµ(fm) = Sµ(f) ≤ Iµ(f).
Step 4. Since Sµ = Iµ on U by Step 3, Iµ is sequentially downward continuous on U like
Sµ. On the other hand, Proposition 1.4.10 implies that it is sequentially upwards continuous
on [0,∞]Rn+1 . As a result, Iµ is a U-capacity.
Step 5. Let f : Rn+1 → [0,∞] be upper semianalytic. For any U-capacity C, Choquet’s
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capacitability theorem shows that
C(f) = sup{C(g) : g ∈ U , g ≤ f}.
As Sµ and Iµ are U-capacities that coincide on U , it follows that Sµ(f) = Iµ(f). This
completes the proof of (i).
Step 6. To see that the infimum Iµ(f) is attained if it is finite, we merely need to apply
Proposition 1.4.10 with the constant sequence fm = f .
We can easily relax the lower bound on f .
Remark 1.5.3. Let f : Rn+1 → (−∞,∞] and suppose there exist φ ∈ ∏nt=0 L1(µt) and a




φt(Xt) + (H ·X)n on V.
Then we can apply Theorem 1.5.2 to [f −∑nt=0 φt(Xt)− (H ·X)n]+ and obtain the ana-
logue of its assertion for f .
The duality result gives rise to a monotonicity principle describing the support of opti-
mal martingale transports, in the spirit of the cyclical monotonicity condition from classical
transport theory. The following generalizes the results of [16, Lemma 1.11] and [18, Corol-
lary 7.8] for the one-step martingale transport problem.
Theorem 1.5.4 (Monotonicity Principle). Let f : Rn+1 → [0,∞] be Borel and suppose that
Sµ(f) <∞. There exists a Borel set Γ ⊆ Rn+1 with the following properties.
(i) A measure P ∈M(µ) is concentrated on Γ if and only if it is optimal for Sµ(f).
(ii) Let µ¯ = (µ¯0, . . . , µ¯n) be another vector of marginals in convex order. If P¯ ∈ M(µ¯) is
concentrated on Γ, then P¯ is optimal for Sµ¯(f).









Proof. As Sµ(f) <∞, Theorem 1.5.2 shows that Iµ(f) = Sµ(f) <∞ and that there exists
a dual optimizer (φ, H) ∈ Dµ(f). In particular, we can define Γ as above.
(i) As 0 ≤ f and P (f) ≤ Sµ(f) < ∞ for all P ∈ M(µ), we see that f is P -integrable
for all P ∈ M(µ). Since ∑nt=0 φt(Xt) + (H · X)n ≥ 0 on the effective domain V, and
P [
∑n
t=0 φt(Xt) + (H ·X)n] = µ(φ) = Iµ(f) < ∞ by Lemma 1.4.8, we also obtain the
P -integrability of
∑n





φt(Xt) + (H ·X)n − f
]
= µ(φ)− P (f) = Sµ(f)− P (f)
and equality holds if and only if P is concentrated on Γ.
(ii) We may assume that P¯ is a probability measure with P¯ (f) < ∞. As a first step,
we show that the effective domain V¯ of M(µ¯) is a subset of the effective domain V of
M(µ). To that end, it is sufficient to show that if 1 ≤ t ≤ n and x ∈ R are such that




+uµ¯t(x), and similarly for the left derivative ∂
− (cf. Proposition 1.2.3).
Indeed, for t and x such that uµt−1(x) = uµt(x), our assumption that Γ ⊆ V implies
Γ ⊆ (Xt−1, Xt)−1
(
(−∞, x]2 ∪ [x,∞)2).
Using also that EP¯ [Xt|Ft−1] = Xt−1 and that P¯ is concentrated on Γ,
uµ¯t−1(x) = EP¯ [|Xt−1 − x|]
= EP¯ [(Xt−1 − x)1Xt−1≥x] + EP¯ [(x−Xt−1)1Xt−1≤x]
= EP¯ [(Xt − x)1Xt−1≥x] + EP¯ [(x−Xt)1Xt−1≤x]
= EP¯ [|Xt − x|] = uµ¯t(x)
as desired. If in addition ∂+uµt−1(x) = ∂
+uµt(x), then Γ ⊆ V implies
Γ ⊆ (Xt−1, Xt)−1
(
(−∞, x]2 ∪ (x,∞)2).
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As P¯ is concentrated on Γ, it follows that
∂+uµ¯t−1(x) = P¯ [Xt−1 ≤ x]− P¯ [Xt−1 > x]
= P¯ [Xt ≤ x]− P¯ [Xt > x] = ∂+uµ¯t(x)
as desired. The same argument can be used for the left derivative and we have shown that
V¯ ⊆ V.
In view of that inclusion, the inequality
∑n
t=0 φt(Xt) + (H ·X)n ≥ f holds on V¯. Since





φt(Xt) + (H ·X)n
]
= P¯ (f) <∞.
We may follow the arguments in the proof of Lemma 1.4.19 to construct a moderator χ
and establish that (φ, H) ∈ Dgµ¯(f), where we are implicitly using the embedding detailed
in Remark 1.4.15. (Note that the proof of Lemma 1.4.19 uses the condition (φ, H) ∈ Dgµ¯(0)
only to establish P¯ [
∑n
t=0 φt(Xt) + (H ·X)n] < ∞. In the present situation the latter is
known a priori and the condition is not needed.) Then, we can modify χ as in the proof of
Proposition 1.4.17 to see that (φ, H) ∈ Dµ¯(f). As a result, we may apply Lemma 1.4.8 to
obtain that




φt(Xt) + (H ·X)n
]
= µ¯(φ),
whereas for any other P ′ ∈M(µ¯) we have




φt(Xt) + (H ·X)n
]
= µ¯(φ) = P¯ (f).
This shows that P¯ ∈M(µ¯) is optimal.
1.6 Left-Monotone Transports




Before moving on to the n-step case, we recall the essential definitions and results regarding
the one-step version of the left-monotone transport (also called the Left-Curtain coupling).
The first notion is the so-called shadow, and it will be useful to define it for measures µ ≤pc ν
in positive convex order, meaning that µ(φ) ≤ ν(φ) for any nonnegative convex function φ.
Clearly, this order is weaker than the convex order µ ≤c ν, and it is worth noting that µ
may have a smaller mass than ν. The following is the result of [16, Lemma 4.6].
Lemma 1.6.1. Let µ ≤pc ν. Then the set
Jµ; νK := {θ : µ ≤c θ ≤ ν}
is non-empty and contains a unique least element Sν(µ) for the convex order:
Sν(µ) ≤c θ for all θ ∈ Jµ; νK .
The measure Sν(µ) is called the shadow of µ in ν.
It will be useful to have the following picture in mind: if µ is a Dirac measure, its shadow
in ν is a measure θ of equal mass and barycenter, chosen such as to have minimal variance
subject to the constraint θ ≤ ν.
The second notion is a class of reward functions.
Definition 1.6.2. A Borel function f : R2 → R is called second-order Spence–Mirrlees if
y 7→ f(x′, y)− f(x, y) is strictly convex for any x < x′.
We note that if f is sufficiently differentiable, this can be expressed as the cross-derivative
condition fxyy > 0 which has also been called the martingale Spence–Mirrlees condition, in
analogy to the classical Spence–Mirrlees condition fxy > 0.
In the one-step case, the left-monotone transport is unique and can be characterized
as follows; cf. [16, Theorems 4.18, 4.21, 6.1] where this transport is called the Left-Curtain
coupling, as well as [95, Theorem 1.2] for the third equivalence in the stated generality.
Proposition 1.6.3. Let µ ≤c ν and P ∈M(µ, ν). The following are equivalent:
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(i) For all x ∈ R and A ∈ B(R),
P [(−∞, x]×A] = Sν(µ|(−∞,x])(A).
(ii) P is concentrated on a Borel set Γ ⊆ R2 satisfying
(x, y−), (x, y+), (x′, y′) ∈ Γ, x < x′ ⇒ y′ /∈ (y−, y+).
(iii) P is an optimizer of Sµ,ν(f) for some (and then all) f : R2 → R second-order Spence–
Mirrlees such that there exist functions a ∈ L1(µ), b ∈ L1(ν) with |f(x, y)| ≤ a(x) +
b(y).
There exists a unique measure P¯ ∈ M(µ, ν) satisfying (i)–(iii), and P¯ is called the (one-
step) left-monotone transport.
If µ is a discrete measure, the characterization in (i) can be understood as follows: the
left-monotone transport P¯ processes the atoms of µ from left to right, mapping each one of
them to its shadow in the remaining target measure.
Next, we record two more results about shadows that will be used below. The first
one, cited from [17, Theorem 3.1], generalizes the above idea in the sense that the atoms
are still mapped to their shadows but can be processed in any given order; in the general
(non-discrete) case, such an order is defined by a coupling pi from the uniform measure to
µ.
Proposition 1.6.4. Let µ ≤c ν and pi ∈ Π(λ, µ) where λ denotes the Lebesgue measure on
[0, 1]. Then there exists a unique measure Q ∈ Π(λ, µ, ν) on R3 such that Q◦(X0, X1)−1 = pi
and
Q|[0,s]×R×R ◦ (X1, X2)−1 ∈M(pis,Sν(pis)), s ∈ R,
where pis := pi|[0,s]×R ◦ (X1)−1.
We shall also need the following facts about shadows.
Lemma 1.6.5. (i) Let µ1, µ2, ν be finite measures satisfying µ1 +µ2 ≤pc ν. Then µ2 ≤pc
ν − Sν(µ1) and Sν(µ1 + µ2) = Sν(µ1) + Sν−Sν(µ1)(µ2).
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(ii) Let µ, ν1, ν2 be finite measures such that µ ≤pc ν1 ≤c ν2. Then, it follows that
Sν1(µ) ≤pc ν2. Moreover, Sν2(Sν1(µ)) = Sν2(µ) if and only if Sν1(µ) ≤c Sν2(µ).
Proof. Part (i) is [16, Theorem 4.8]. To obtain the first statement in (ii), we observe that
Sν1(µ) ≤ ν1 ≤c ν2 and hence
Sν1(µ)(φ) ≤ ν1(φ) ≤ ν2(φ)
for any nonnegative convex function φ. Turning to the second statement, the “only if”
implication follows directly from the definition of the shadow in Lemma 1.6.1. To show the
reverse implication, suppose that Sν1(µ) ≤c Sν2(µ). Then, we have
µ ≤c Sν1(µ) ≤c Sν2(Sν1(µ)) ≤ ν2 and Sν1(µ) ≤c Sν2(µ) ≤ ν2.
These inequalities imply that
Sν2(Sν1(µ)) ∈ Jµ; ν2K and Sν2(µ) ∈ JSν1(µ); ν2K ,
and now the minimality property of the shadow shows that
Sν2(µ) ≤c Sν2(Sν1(µ)) and Sν2(Sν1(µ)) ≤c Sν2(Sν2(µ)) = Sν2(µ)
as desired.
1.6.2 Construction of a Multistep Left-Monotone Transport
Our next goal is to define and construct a multistep left-monotone transport. The following
concept will be crucial.
Definition 1.6.6. Let µ0 ≤pc µ1 ≤c · · · ≤c µn. For 1 ≤ t ≤ n, the obstructed shadow of µ0
in µt through µ1, . . . , µt−1 is iteratively defined by
Sµ1,...,µt(µ0) := Sµt(Sµ1,...,µt−1(µ0)).
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The obstructed shadow is well-defined due to Lemma 1.6.5 (ii). An alternative definition
is provided by the following characterization.
Lemma 1.6.7. Let µ0 ≤pc µ1 ≤c · · · ≤c µn and 1 ≤ t ≤ n. Then Sµ1,...,µt(µ0) is the unique
least element of the set
Jµ0;µtKµ1,...,µt−1 := {θt ≤ µt : ∃θs ≤ µs, 1 ≤ s ≤ t− 1, µ0 ≤c θ1 ≤c · · · ≤c θt}
for the convex order; that is, Sµ1,...,µt(µ0) ≤c θ for all elements θ.
Proof. For t = 1 this holds by the definition of the shadow in Lemma 1.6.1. For t > 1, we
inductively assume that Sµ1,...,µt−1(µ0) is the least element of Jµ0;µt−1Kµ1,...,µt−2 . Consider
an arbitrary element θt ∈ Jµ0;µtKµ1,...,µt−1 and fix some
µ0 ≤c θ1 ≤c · · · ≤c θt−1 ≤c θt with θs ≤ µs, 1 ≤ s ≤ t− 1.
Then, θt−1 ∈ Jµ0;µt−1Kµ1,...,µt−2 and in particular Sµ1,...,µt−1(µ0) ≤c θt−1. Recall that
Sµ1,...,µt(µ0) is defined as the least element for ≤c of
JSµ1,...,µt−1(µ0);µtK = {θ ≤ µt : Sµ1,...,µt−1(µ0) ≤c θ}
⊇ {θ ≤ µt : θt−1 ≤c θ} 3 θt.
Hence, Sµ1,...,µt(µ0) ≤c θt, and as θt ∈ Jµ0;µtKµ1,...,µt−1 was arbitrary, this shows that
Sµ1,...,µt(µ0) is a least element of Jµ0;µtKµ1,...,µt−1 . The uniqueness of the least element
follows from the general fact that θ1t ≤c θ2t and θ2t ≤c θ1t imply θ1t = θ2t .
We can now state the main result of this section.
Theorem 1.6.8. Let µ = (µ0, . . . , µn) be in convex order. Then there exists P ∈ M(µ)
such that the bivariate projections P0t := P ◦ (X0, Xt)−1 satisfy
P0t[(−∞, x]×A] = Sµ1,...,µt(µ0|(−∞,x])(A) for x ∈ R, A ∈ B(R),
for all 1 ≤ t ≤ n. Any such P ∈M(µ) is called a left-monotone transport.
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We observe that an n-step left-monotone transport is defined purely in terms of its
bivariate projections P ◦ (X0, Xt)−1. In the one-step case, this completely determines the
transport. For n > 1, we shall see that there can be multiple (and then infinitely many)
left-monotone transports; in fact, they form a convex compact set. This will be discussed
in more detail in Section 1.8, where it will also be shown that uniqueness does hold if µ0 is
atomless.
Proof of Theorem 1.6.8. Step 1. We first construct measures pit ∈ Π(λ, µt), 0 ≤ t ≤ n such
that
pit|[0,µ0((−∞,x])]×R ◦X−11 = Sµ1,...,µt(µ0|(−∞,x])
for all x ∈ R, as well as measures Qt ∈ Π(λ, µt−1, µt), 1 ≤ t ≤ n such that
Qt|[0,µ0((−∞,x])]×R×R ◦ (X1, X2)−1 ∈
M(Sµ1,...,µt−1(µ0|(−∞,x]),Sµ1,...,µt(µ0|(−∞,x])) (1.6.1)
for all x ∈ R. Indeed, for t = 0, we take pi0 ∈ Π(λ, µ0) to be the quantile10 coupling.
Then, applying Proposition 1.6.4 to pi0 yields the measure Q1, and we can define pi1 :=
Q1 ◦ (X0, X2)−1. Proceeding inductively, applying Proposition 1.6.4 to pit−1 yields Qt which
in turn allows us to define pit := Qt ◦ (X0, X2)−1.
Step 2. For 1 ≤ t ≤ n, consider a disintegration Qt = pit−1 ⊗ κt of Qt. By (1.6.1), we
may choose κt(s, xt−1, dxt) to be a martingale kernel; that is,
∫
xt κt(s, xt−1, dxt) = xt−1
holds for all (s, xt−1) ∈ R2. We now define a measure pi ∈ Π(λ, µ0, . . . , µn) on Rn+2 via
pi = pi0 ⊗ κ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ κn.
10The quantile coupling (or Fre´chet–Hoeffding coupling) is given by the law of (F−1λ , F
−1
µ0 ) under λ, where
F−1µ0 is the inverse c.d.f. of µ0.
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Then, pi satisfies
pi ◦ (X0, Xt)−1 = pit−1 and pi ◦ (X0, Xt, Xt+1)−1 = Qt
for 1 ≤ t ≤ n, and setting P = pi ◦ (X1, . . . , Xn+1)−1 yields the theorem.
The following result studies the bivariate projections P0t of a left-monotone transport
and shows in particular that P0t may differ from the Left-Curtain coupling [16] inM(µ0, µt).
Proposition 1.6.9. Let µ = (µ0, . . . , µn) be in convex order and let P ∈ M(µ) be a
left-monotone transport. The following are equivalent:
(i) The bivariate projection P0t = P ◦ (X0, Xt)−1 ∈ M(µ0, µt) is left-monotone for all
1 ≤ t ≤ n.
(ii) The marginals µ satisfy
Sµ1(µ0|(−∞,x]) ≤c · · · ≤c Sµn(µ0|(−∞,x]) for all x ∈ R. (1.6.2)
Proof. Given µ ≤ µ0, an iterative application of Lemma 1.6.5 (ii) shows that the obstructed
shadows coincide with the ordinary shadows, i.e. Sµ1,...,µt(µ) = Sµt(µ) for 1 ≤ t ≤ n, if and
only if Sµ1(µ) ≤c · · · ≤c Sµn(µ). The proposition follows by applying this observation to
µ = µ0|(−∞,x].
The following example illustrates the proposition and shows that (1.6.2) may indeed fail.























Then the set M(µ) consists of a single transport P ; cf. the left panel of Figure 1.3. Thus,
P is necessarily left-monotone. Similarly, P01 = P ◦ (X0, X1)−1 is the unique element of



























Figure 1.3: The left panel shows the support of the left-monotone transport P from Ex-
ample 1.6.10. The right panel shows the support of P02 (top) and the support of the left-
monotone transport in M(µ0, µ2) (bottom). The elements of the support are represented
by the diagonal lines.
















Therefore, there exists no transport P ∈ M(µ) such that both P01 and P02 are left-
monotone, and Proposition 1.6.9 shows that (1.6.2) fails.
Remark 1.6.11. Of course, all our results on left-monotone transports have “right-monotone”
analogues, obtained by reversing the orientation on the real line (i.e. replacing x 7→ −x ev-
erywhere).
1.7 Geometry and Optimality Properties
In this section we introduce the optimality properties for transports and the geometric
properties of their supports that were announced in the Introduction, and prove that they
equivalently characterize left-monotone transports.
1.7.1 Geometry of Optimal Transports for Reward Functions of
Spence–Mirrlees Type
The first goal is to show that optimal transports for specific reward functions are concen-
trated on sets Γ ⊆ Rn+1 satisfying certain no-crossing conditions that we introduce next.
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Given 1 ≤ t ≤ n, we write
Γt = {(x0, . . . , xt) ∈ Rt+1 : (x0, . . . , xn) ∈ Γ for some (xt+1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn−t}
for the projection of Γ onto the first t+ 1 coordinates.
Definition 1.7.1. Let Γ ⊆ Rn+1 and 1 ≤ t ≤ n. Consider x = (x0, . . . , xt−1), x′ =
(x′0, . . . , x
′
t−1) ∈ Rt and y+, y−, y′ ∈ R with y− < y+ such that (x, y+), (x, y−), (x′, y′) ∈ Γt.
Then, the projection
Γt is left-monotone if y′ /∈ (y−, y+) whenever x0 < x′0.
The set Γ is left-monotone11 if Γt is left-monotone for all 1 ≤ t ≤ n.
We also need the following notion.
Definition 1.7.2. Let Γ ⊆ Rn+1 and 1 ≤ t ≤ n. The projection Γt is nondegenerate if for
all x = (x0, . . . , xt−1) ∈ Rt and y ∈ R such that (x, y) ∈ Γt, the following hold:
(i) if y > xt−1, there exists y′ < xt−1 such that (x, y′) ∈ Γt;
(ii) if y < xt−1, there exists y′ > xt−1 such that (x, y′) ∈ Γt.
The set Γ is called nondegenerate12 if Γt is nondegenerate for all 1 ≤ t ≤ n.
Broadly speaking, this definition says that for any path to the right in Γ there exists a
path to the left, and vice versa. For a set supporting a martingale, nondegeneracy is not a
restriction, in the following sense.
Remark 1.7.3. Let µ be in convex order, V its effective domain and Γ ⊆ V.
(i) There exists a nondegenerate, universally measurable set Γ′ ⊆ Γ such that P (Γ′) = 1
for all P ∈M(µ) with P (Γ) = 1.
(ii) Fix P ∈ M(µ) with P (Γ) = 1. There exists a nondegenerate, Borel-measurable set
Γ′P ⊆ Γ such that P (Γ′P ) = 1.
11This terminology for Γ is abusive since Γ = Γn is in fact a projection itself—it will be clear from the
context what is meant.
12Footnote 11 applies here as well.
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Proof. Let Nt be the set of all x ∈ Γt such that (i) or (ii) of Definition 1.7.2 fail. If P is a
martingale with P (Γ) = 1, we see that Nt × Rn−t+1 is P -null. Moreover, Nt is universally





to prove (i). Turning to (ii), universal measurability implies that there exists a Borel set
N ′t ⊇ Nt such that N ′t\Nt is Pt−1-null, where Pt−1 = P ◦ (X0, . . . , Xt−1)−1. We can then
set Γ′P := Γ\ ∪nt=1 (N ′t × Rn−t+1).
Next, we introduce a notion of competitors along the lines of [16, Definition 1.10].
Definition 1.7.4. Let pi be a finite measure on Rt+1 whose marginals have finite first
moments and consider a disintegration pi = pit ⊗ κ, where pit is the projection of pi onto the
first t coordinates. A measure pi′ = pit ⊗ κ′ is a t-competitor of pi if it has the same last
marginal and
bary(κ(x, ·)) = bary(κ′(x, ·)) for pit-a.e. x = (x0, . . . , xt−1).
Using these definitions, we now formulate a variant of the monotonicity principle stated
in Theorem 1.5.4 (i) that will be convenient to infer the geometry of Γ.
Lemma 1.7.5. Let µ = (µ0, . . . , µn) be in convex order, 1 ≤ t ≤ n and let f¯ : Rt+1 →
[0,∞) be Borel. Consider f(X0, . . . , Xn) := f¯(X0, . . . , Xt) and suppose that Iµ(f) < ∞.
Let (φ, H) ∈ Dµ(f) be an optimizer for Iµ(f) with the property that φs ≡ Hs ≡ 0 for





φt(Xt) + (H ·X)n = f
}
∩ V.
Let pi be a finitely supported probability on Rt+1 which is concentrated on Γt. Then pi(f¯) ≥
pi′(f¯) for any t-competitor pi′ of pi that is concentrated on Vt.
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Proof. Recall that the projections pit and pi
′
t onto the first t coordinates coincide. Thus,
pi[Ht · (Xt −Xt−1)] =
∫
Ht · (bary(κ(X0, . . . , Xt−1, ·)−Xt−1)dpit
=
∫
Ht · (bary(κ′(X0, . . . , Xt−1, ·)−Xt−1)dpi′t
= pi′[Ht · (Xt −Xt−1)].
Using also that the last marginals coincide, we deduce that










φs(Xs) + (H ·X)t
]
≥ pi′[f¯ ].
Next, we formulate an intermediate result relating optimality for Spence–Mirrlees reward
functions to left-monotonicity of the support.
Lemma 1.7.6. Let 1 ≤ t ≤ n and let Γ ⊆ V be a subset such that Γt is nondegenerate.
Moreover, let f : Rt+1 → R be of the form f(X0, . . . , Xt) = f¯(X0, Xt) for a second-order
Spence–Mirrlees function f¯ . Assume that for any finitely supported probability pi that is
concentrated on Γt and any t-competitor pi′ of pi that is concentrated on Vt, we have pi(f) ≥
pi′(f). Then, the projection Γt is left-monotone.
Proof. Consider (x, y1), (x, y2), (x
′, y′) ∈ Γt satisfying x0 < x′0 and suppose for contradiction
that y1 < y























Then pi and pi′ have the same projection pit = pi′t on the first t marginals and their last
marginals also coincide. Moreover, disintegrating pi = pit⊗κ and pi′ = pit⊗κ′, the measures
κ(x), κ(x′), κ′(x), κ(x′) all have barycenter y′. Therefore, pi and pi′ are t-competitors. We
must also have that pi′ is concentrated on Vt, by the shape of V. Now our assumption
implies that pi(f) ≥ pi′(f), but the second-order Spence–Mirrlees property of f¯ implies that
pi(f) < pi′(f).
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1.7.2 Geometry of Left-Monotone Transports
Next, we establish that transports with left-monotone support are indeed left-monotone in
the sense of Theorem 1.6.8.
Theorem 1.7.7. Let µ = (µ0, . . . , µn) be in convex order and let P ∈M(µ) be concentrated
on a nondegenerate, left-monotone set Γ ⊆ Rn+1. Then P is left-monotone.
Before stating the proof of the theorem, we record two auxiliary results about measures
on the real line. The first one is a direct consequence of Proposition 1.2.1.
Lemma 1.7.8. Let a < b and µ ≤c ν. If ν is concentrated on (−∞, a], then so is µ, and
moreover ν({a}) ≥ µ({a}). The analogue holds for [b,∞).
The second result is [16, Lemma 5.2].
Lemma 1.7.9. Let σ be a nontrivial signed measure on R with σ(R) = 0 and let σ =
σ+ − σ− be its Hahn decomposition. There exist a ∈ supp(σ+) and b > a such that ∫ (b −
y)+1[a,∞) dσ(y) > 0.
We can now give the proof of the theorem; it is inspired by [16, Theorem 5.3] which
corresponds to the case n = 1.
Proof of Theorem 1.7.7. Since the case n = 1 is covered by Proposition 1.6.3, we may
assume that the theorem has been proved for transports with n− 1 steps and focus on the
induction argument.
For every x ∈ R we denote by µtx the marginal (P |(−∞,x]×Rn) ◦X−1t . In particular, we
then have µ0x = µ0|(−∞,x] and µtx is the image of µ0x under P after t steps. For the sake
of brevity, we also set νtx := Sµ1,...,µt(µ0x). By definition, P is left-monotone if µtx = νtx for
all x ∈ R and t ≤ n, and by the induction hypothesis, we may assume that this holds for
t ≤ n− 1.
We argue by contradiction and assume that there exists x ∈ R such that µnx 6= νnx . Then,
the signed measure
σ := νnx − µnx
is nontrivial and we can find a < b with a ∈ supp(σ+) as in Lemma 1.7.9. Observe that
σ+ ≤ µn − µnx where µn − µnx is the image of µn|(x,∞) under P . Hence, a ∈ supp(µn − µnx)
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and as P is concentrated on Γ, we conclude that there exists a sequence of points
xm = (xm0 , . . . , x
m
n ) ∈ Γ with x < xm0 and xmn → a. (1.7.1)






due to the fact that µnx is the image of µ
0
x under a martingale
transport.
Step 1. We claim that for all x = (x0, . . . , xn−1) with x0 ≤ x and xn−1 ≤ a, it holds
that
Γx ∩ (a,∞) = ∅,
where Γx = {y ∈ R : (x, y) ∈ Γ} is the section of Γ at x. By way of contradiction,
assume that for some x with x0 ≤ x and xn−1 ≤ a we have Γx ∩ (a,∞) 6= ∅, then in
particular Γx ∩ (xn−1,∞) 6= ∅. In view of the nondegeneracy of Γ, we conclude that
Γx ∩ (−∞, xn−1) 6= ∅ and hence that Γx ∩ (−∞, a) 6= ∅. This yields a contradiction to the
left-monotonicity of Γ by using xm from (1.7.1) for x′ in Definition 1.7.1 for large enough
m, and the proof of the claim is complete.
Step 2. Similarly, we can show that for all x = (x0, . . . , xn−1) with x0 ≤ x and xn−1 ≥ a,
Γx ∩ (−∞, a) = ∅.





Then, in particular, µn−1x,a = µ
n−1
x |(−∞,a] and µnx,a is the image of µn−1x,a under the last step
of P . Step 1 of the proof thus implies that µnx,a is concentrated on (−∞, a]. We also write
νnx,a := Sµn(µn−1x |(−∞,a]).
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We have µn−1x,a ≤c µnx,a as M(µn−1x,a , µnx,a) 6= ∅, and µnx,a ≤ µnx ≤ µn. Therefore,
νnx,a ≤c µnx,a (1.7.2)
by the minimality of the shadow. Next, we show that
νnx − νnx,a ≤c µnx − µnx,a. (1.7.3)
Observe that µnx − µnx,a is the image of µn−1x |(a,∞) under P and therefore concentrated on
[a,∞) by Step 2. Using this observation, that µnx,a is concentrated on (−∞, a] as mentioned
above, and the fact that νnx,a({a}) ≤ µnx,a({a}) as a consequence of (1.7.2) and Lemma 1.7.8,
we have
µnx − µnx,a = (µnx − µnx,a)|[a,∞) ≤ (µn − µnx,a)|[a,∞) ≤ (µn − νnx,a)|[a,∞) ≤ µn − νnx,a.
We also have µn−1x |(a,∞) ≤c µnx − µnx,a since the latter measure is the image of the former
under P . Together with the preceding display, we have established that
µnx − µnx,a ∈
q
µn−1x |(a,∞);µn − νnx,a
y
.
On the other hand,
νnx − νnx,a = Sµn−ν
n
x,a(µn−1x |(a,∞))
from the additivity property of the shadow in Lemma 1.6.5 (i), and therefore (1.7.3) follows
by the minimality of the shadow.
Step 4. Recall from Step 3 that µnx,a is concentrated on (−∞, a] and that µnx − µnx,a
is concentrated on [a,∞). Therefore, νnx,a is concentrated on (−∞, a] and νnx − νnx,a is
concentrated on [a,∞), by Lemma 1.7.8. Moreover, we have νnx,a({a}) ≤ µnx,a({a}) by the
same lemma, and finally, the function y 7→ (b − y)+1[a,∞)(y) is convex on [a,∞) as a < b.
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(b− y)+1[a,∞)(y)(νnx − νnx,a)(dy) + (b− a)νnx,a({a})
≤
∫




This contradicts the choice of a and b, cf. Lemma 1.7.9, and thus completes the proof.
1.7.3 Optimality Properties
In this section we relate left-monotone transports and left-monotone sets to the optimal
transport problem for Spence–Mirrlees functions.
Theorem 1.7.10. For 1 ≤ t ≤ n, let ft : R2 → R be second-order Spence–Mirrlees func-
tions such that |ft(x, y)| ≤ a0(x) + at(y) for some a0 ∈ L1(µ0) and at ∈ L1(µt). There
exists a universally measurable, nondegenerate, left-monotone set Γ′ ⊆ Rn+1 such that any
simultaneous optimizer P ∈ M(µ) for Sµ(ft(X0, Xt)), 1 ≤ t ≤ n is concentrated on Γ′. In
particular, any such P is left-monotone.
Proof. The last assertion follows by an application of Theorem 1.7.7, so we may focus on
finding Γ′. For each 1 ≤ t ≤ n, we use Theorem 1.5.2 and Remark 1.5.3 to find a dual





φs(Xs) + (H ·X)n = ft
}
∩ V.
Here, we may choose a dual optimizer such that φs ≡ Hs ≡ 0 for s = t+ 1, . . . , n. (This can
be seen by applying Theorem 1.5.2 to the transport problem involving only the marginals
(µ0, . . . , µt) and taking the corresponding dual optimizer.) Theorem 1.5.4 shows that any







Using Remark 1.7.3 (i), we find a universally measurable, nondegenerate subset Γ′ ⊆ Γ
with the same property. Since the projection (Γ′)t is contained in the projection (Γ(t))t,
Lemma 1.7.5 and Lemma 1.7.6 yield that (Γ′)t is left-monotone for all t; that is, Γ′ is
left-monotone.
Remark 1.7.11. In Theorem 1.7.10, if we only wish to find a nondegenerate, left-monotone
set Γ′P ⊆ Rn+1 such that a given simultaneous optimizer P ∈M(µ) is concentrated on Γ′P ,
then we may choose Γ′P to be Borel instead of universally measurable. This follows by
replacing the application of Remark 1.7.3 (i) by Remark 1.7.3 (ii) in the proof.
The following is a converse to Theorem 1.7.10.
Theorem 1.7.12. Given 1 ≤ t ≤ n, let f ∈ C1,2(R2) be such that fxyy ≥ 0 and suppose
that the following integrability condition holds:

f(X0, Xt), f(0, Xt), f(X0, 0), h¯(X0)X0, h¯(X0)Xt
are P -integrable for all P ∈M(µ),
(1.7.4)
where h¯(x) := ∂y|y=0[f(x, y) − f(0, y)]. Then every left-monotone transport P ∈ M(µ) is
an optimizer for Sµ(f).
The integrability condition clearly holds when f is Lipschitz continuous; in particular, a
smooth second-order Spence–Mirrlees function (as defined in the Introduction) satisfies the
assumptions of the theorem for any µ.
The proof will be given by an approximation based on the following building blocks for
Spence–Mirrlees functions; the construction is novel and may be of independent interest.
Lemma 1.7.13. Let 1 ≤ t ≤ n and let f(X0, . . . , Xn) := 1(−∞,a](X0)ϕ(Xt) for a concave
function ϕ and a ∈ R. Then every left-monotone transport P ∈ M(µ) is an optimizer for
Sµ(f).
Proof. In view of Lemma 1.6.7, this follows directly by applying the defining shadow prop-
erty from Theorem 1.6.8 with x = a.
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The integrability condition (1.7.4) implies that setting
g(x, y) := f(x, 0) + f(0, y)− f(0, 0) + h¯(x)y,
the three terms constituting
g(X0, Xt) = [f(X0, 0) + h¯(X0)X0] + [f(0, Xt)− f(0, 0)] + [h¯(X0)(Xt −X0)]
are P -integrable and P [g(X0, Xt)] is constant over P ∈ M(µ). By replacing f with f − g,
we may thus assume without loss of generality that
f(x, 0) = f(0, y) = fy(x, 0) = 0 for all (x, y) ∈ R2. (1.7.5)






(y − t)fxyy(s, t) ds dt. (1.7.6)
Lemma 1.7.14. Theorem 1.7.12 holds under the following additional condition: there exists
a constant c > 0 such that
x 7→ f(x, y) is constant on {x > c} and on {x < −c},
y 7→ f(x, y) is affine on {y > c} and on {y < −c}.
Proof. Integration by parts implies that for all (x, y) ∈ R2, we have the representation





1(−∞,s](x)(y − t)+fxyy(s, t) ds dt
+ [f(x,−c)− (−c)fy(x,−c)]
+ [f(c, y)− f(c,−c)− fy(c,−c)(y − (−c))]
+ fy(x,−c)y.
The last three terms are of the form g(x, y) = φ˜(x)+ψ˜(y)+h˜(x)y and of linear growth due to
the additional condition. Hence, as above, P ′[g(X0, Xt)] = C is constant for P ′ ∈M(µ). If
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P ∈M(µ) is left-monotone and P ′ ∈M(µ) is arbitrary, Fubini’s theorem and Lemma 1.7.13
yield that











P ′[1(−∞,s](x)(y − t)+]fxyy(s, t) ds dt+ C
= P ′[f ],
where P, P ′ are understood to integrate with respect to (x, y) and the application of Fubini’s
theorem is justified by the nonnegativity of the integrand.
Proof of Theorem 1.7.12. Let f be as in the theorem. We shall construct functions fm,
m ≥ 1 satisfying the assumption of Lemma 1.7.14 as well as P [fm]→ P [f ] for all P ∈M(µ).
Once this is achieved, the theorem follows from the lemma.
Indeed, we may assume that f is normalized as in (1.7.5). Let m ≥ 1 and let ρm : R→
[0, 1] be a smooth function such that ρm = 1 on [−m,m] and ρm = 0 on [−m− 1,m+ 1]c.






(y − t)fxyy(s, t)ρm(s)ρm(t) ds dt.
It then follows that fm satisfies the assumptions of Lemma 1.7.14 with the constant c =
m+ 1. Moreover, we have
0 ≤ fm(x, y) ≤ fm+1(x, y) ≤ f(x, y) for x ≥ 0
and the opposite inequalities for x ≤ 0, as well as fm(x, y)→ f(x, y) for all (x, y).
Let P ∈ M(µ). Since f is P -integrable, applying monotone convergence separately on
{x ≥ 0} and {x ≤ 0} yields that P [fm]→ P [f ], and the proof is complete.
Remark 1.7.15. The function




satisfies the conditions of Theorem 1.7.12 for all marginals µ in convex order, since the latter
are assumed to have a finite first moment.
We can now collect the preceding results to obtain, in particular, the equivalences stated
in Theorem 1.1.1.
Theorem 1.7.16. Let µ = (µ0, . . . , µn) be in convex order. There exists a left-monotone,
nondegenerate, universally measurable set Γ ⊆ Rn+1 such that for any P ∈ M(µ), the
following are equivalent:
(i) P is an optimizer for Sµ(f(X0, Xt)) whenever f is a smooth second-order Spence–
Mirrlees function and 1 ≤ t ≤ n,
(ii) P is concentrated on Γ,
(ii’) P is concentrated on a left-monotone set,
(iii) P is left-monotone; i.e. P0t transports µ0|(−∞,a] to Sµ1,...,µt(µ0|(−∞,a]) for all 1 ≤ t ≤
n and a ∈ R.
Moreover, there exists P ∈M(µ) satisfying (i)–(iii).
Proof. Let Γ be the set provided by Theorem 1.7.10 for the function ft = f¯ of Remark 1.7.15.
Given P ∈ M(µ), Theorem 1.7.10 shows that (i) implies (ii) which trivially implies (ii’).
Theorem 1.7.7 and Remark 1.7.3 show that (ii’) implies (iii), and Theorem 1.7.12 shows
that (iii) implies (i). Finally, the existence of a left-monotone transport was stated in
Theorem 1.6.8.
We conclude this section with an example showing that left-monotone transports are not
Markovian in general, even if they are unique and (1.6.2) holds for µ.









































is left-monotone because its support is left-monotone (Figure 1.4), and it is clearly not
Markovian. On the other hand, it is not hard to see that this is the only way to build a
left-monotone transport in M(µ).
1.8 Uniqueness of Left-Monotone Transports
In this section we consider the (non-)uniqueness of left-monotone transports. It turns out
the presence of atoms in µ0 is important in this respect—let us start with the following
simple observation.
Remark 1.8.1. Let µ = (µ0, . . . , µn) be in convex order. If µ0 is a Dirac mass, then every
P ∈ M(µ) is left-monotone. Indeed, M(µ0, µt) is a singleton for every 1 ≤ t ≤ n, hence
P0t must be the (one-step) left-monotone transport.
Exploiting this observation, the following shows that left-monotone transports need not
be unique when n ≥ 2.










8δ2. By the remark,
any element in M(µ) is left-monotone. Moreover, M(µ) is a continuum since M(µ1, µ2)






























Figure 1.4: Support of the non-Markovian transport in Example 1.7.17.
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Figure 1.5: Supports of two left-monotone transports for the same marginals.
The example illustrates that non-uniqueness can typically be expected when µ0 has
atoms. On the other hand, we have the following uniqueness result.
Theorem 1.8.3. Let µ = (µ0, . . . , µn) be in convex order. If µ0 is atomless, there exists a
unique left-monotone transport P ∈M(µ).
The remainder of this section is devoted to the proof. Let us call a kernel κ(x, dy)
binomial if for all x ∈ R, the measure κ(x, dy) consists of (at most) two point masses. A
martingale transport will be called binomial if it can be disintegrated using only binomial
kernels. We shall show that when µ0 is atomless, any left-monotone transport is a binomial
martingale, and then conclude the uniqueness via a convexity argument.
The first step is the following set-theoretic result.
Lemma 1.8.4. Let k ≥ 1 be an integer and Γ ⊆ Rt+1. For x ∈ Rt, we denote by Γx :=
{y ∈ R : (x, y) ∈ Γ} the section at x. If the set
{x ∈ Rt : |Γx| ≥ k}
is uncountable, then it has an accumulation point. More precisely, there are x = (x0, . . . , xt) ∈
Rt and y1 < · · · < yk in Γx such that for all  > 0 there exist x′ = (x′0, . . . , x′t) ∈ Rt and
y′1 < · · · < y′k in Γx′ satisfying
(i) ‖x− x′‖ < ,




(iii) maxi=1,...,k |yi − y′i| < .
Proof. The proof is similar to the one of [16, Lemma 3.2] and therefore omitted.
The following statement on the binomial structure generalizes a result of [16] for the
one-step case and is of independent interest.
Proposition 1.8.5. Let µ = (µ0, . . . , µn) be in convex order and let µ0 be atomless. There
exists a universally measurable set Γ ⊆ Rn+1 such that every left-monotone transport P ∈
M(µ) is concentrated on Γ and such that for all 1 ≤ t ≤ n and x ∈ Rt,
|{y ∈ R : (X0, . . . , Xt)−1(x, y) ∩ Γ 6= ∅}| ≤ 2. (1.8.1)
In particular, every left-monotone transport P ∈M(µ) is a binomial martingale.
Proof. Let Γ be as in Theorem 1.7.16; then every left-monotone P ∈M(µ) is concentrated
on Γ. Let At be the set of all x ∈ Rt such that (1.8.1) fails. Suppose that At is uncountable;
then Lemma 1.8.4 yields points x,x′ such that for some y1, y2 ∈ Γtx and y ∈ Γtx′ we have
y1 < y < y2. This contradicts the left-monotonicity of Γ (Definition 1.7.1), thus At must
be countable. Hence, (X0, . . . , Xt−1)−1(At) is Borel and P -null for all P ∈ M(µ), as µ0 is
atomless. The set Γ′ = Γ \ ∪nt=1(X0, . . . , Xt−1)−1(At) then has the required properties.
Proof of Theorem 1.8.3. We will prove this result using induction on n. For n = 1 the result
holds by Proposition 1.6.3, with or without atoms. To show the induction step, let P ′ be the
unique left-monotone transport inM(µ0, . . . , µn−1) and let P1 = P ′⊗ κ1 and P2 = P ′⊗ κ2
be disintegrations of two n-step left-monotone transports. Then,
P1 + P2
2
= P ′ ⊗ κ1 + κ2
2
is again left-monotone, and Proposition 1.8.5 yields that (κ1 + κ2)/2 must be a binomial
kernel P ′-a.s. Using also the martingale property of κ1 and κ2, this can only be true if
κ1 = κ2 holds P
′-a.s., and therefore P1 = P2.
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1.9 Free Intermediate Marginals
In this section we discuss a variant of our transport problem where the intermediate marginal
constraints µ1, . . . , µn−1 are omitted; that is, only the first and last marginals µ0, µn are
prescribed. (One could similarly adapt the results to a case where some, but not all of the
intermediate marginals are given.)
The primal space will be denoted byMn(µ0, µn) and consists of all martingale measures
P on Rn+1 such that µ0 = P ◦ (X0)−1 and µn = P ◦ (Xn)−1. To make the connection with




where the union is taken over all vectors µ = (µ0, µ1, . . . , µn−1, µn) in convex order.
1.9.1 Polar Structure
We first characterize the polar sets of Mn(µ0, µn). To that end, we introduce an analogue
of the irreducible components.
Definition 1.9.1. Let µ0 ≤c µn and let (Ik, Jk) ⊆ R2 be the corresponding irreducible
domains in the sense of Proposition 1.2.3. The n-step components of Mn(µ0, µn) are the
sets13
(i) Ink × Jk, where k ≥ 1,
(ii) In+10 ∩∆n,
(iii) Itk × {p}n−t+1, where p ∈ Jk \ Ik and 1 ≤ t ≤ n, k ≥ 1.
The characterization then takes the following form.
Theorem 1.9.2 (Polar Structure). Let µ0 ≤c µn. A Borel set B ⊆ Rn+1 is Mn(µ0, µn)-
polar if and only if there exist a µ0-nullset N0 and a µn-nullset Nn such that




13A superscript m indicates the m-fold Cartesian product; ∆n is the diagonal in Rn+1.
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where the union runs over all n-step components Vj of Mn(µ0, µn).
It turns out that our previous results can be put to work to prove the theorem, by means
of the following lemma which may be of independent interest.
Lemma 1.9.3. Let µ ≤c ν be irreducible with domain (I, J) and let ρ be a probability
concentrated on J . Then, there exists a probability µ ≤c θ ≤c ν satisfying θ  ρ such that
µ ≤c θ and θ|I ≤c (ν − θ|J\I) are both irreducible.
Proof. Step 1. We first assume that ρ = δx for some x ∈ J and show that there exists θ
satisfying
µ ≤c θ ≤c ν and θ  δx.
If ν has an atom at x, we can choose θ = ν. Thus, we may assume that ν({x}) = 0 and in
particular that x ∈ I. Let a be the common barycenter of µ and ν and suppose that x < a.
For all b ∈ R and 0 ≤ c ≤ ν({b}), the measure
νb,c := ν|(−∞,b) + cδb
satisfies νb,c ≤ ν, and as x < a there are unique b, c such that bary(νb,c) = x. Setting
α = νb,c and 0 = α(R), we then have 0δx ≤c α ≤ ν, and a similar construction yields this
result for x ≥ a. The existence of such α implies that
δx ≤pc ν, 0 ≤  ≤ 0
and thus the shadow Sν(δx) is well-defined. This measure is given by the restriction of ν
to an interval (possibly including fractions of atoms at the endpoints); cf. [16, Example 4.7].
Moreover, the interval is bounded after possibly reducing the mass 0. Thus, for all  < 0,
the difference of potential functions
uSν(δx) − uδx ≥ 0
vanishes outside a compact interval, and it converges uniformly to zero as → 0.
On the other hand, as µ ≤c ν is irreducible, the difference uν − uµ ≥ 0 is uniformly
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bounded away from zero on compact subsets of I and has nonzero derivative on J \ I.
Together, it follows that
uν − uSν(δx) + uδx ≥ uµ (1.9.1)
for small enough  > 0, so that
θ := ν − Sν(δx) + δx
satisfies µ ≤c θ ≤c ν; moreover, θ  δx as ν({x}) = 0.
Step 2. We turn to the case of a general probability measure ρ on J . By Step 1, we can
find a measure θx for each x ∈ J such that
µ ≤c θx ≤c ν and θx  δx.
The map x 7→ θx can easily be chosen to be measurable (by choosing the  for (1.9.1) in a




θx(A)ρ(dx), A ∈ B(R)
which satisfies µ ≤c θ′ ≤c ν. Moreover, we have θ′  ρ; indeed, if A ∈ B(R) is a θ′-nullset,
then θx(A) = 0 for ρ-a.e. x and thus ρ(A) = 0 as θx  δx.
Finally, θ := (µ+θ′+ν)/3 shares these properties. As uµ < uν on I due to irreducibility,
we have uµ < uθ < uν on I and it follows that µ ≤c θ and θ|I ≤c (ν− θ|J\I) are irreducible.
Lemma 1.9.4. Let µ0 ≤c µn and let pi be a measure on Rn+1 which is concentrated on an
n-step component V of Mn(µ0, µn) and whose first and last marginals satisfy
pi0 ≤ µ0, pin ≤ µn.
Then there exists P ∈Mn(µ0, µn) such that P  pi.
Proof. If V = In+10 ∩∆n, then pi must be an identical transport and we can take P to be
any element of M(µ0, µ0, . . . , µ0, µn). Thus, we may assume that V is of type (i) or (iii) in
65
Definition 1.9.1, and then, by fixing k ≥ 1, that µ0 ≤c µn is irreducible with domain (I, J).
Using Lemma 1.9.3, we can find intermediate marginals µt with
µ0 ≤c µ1 ≤c · · · ≤c µn−1 ≤c µn
such that µt  pit for all 1 ≤ t ≤ n − 1, and each of the steps µt−1 ≤c µt, 1 ≤ t ≤ n has
a single irreducible domain given by (I, J) as well as (possibly) a diagonal component on
J \ I. We note that V is an irreducible component ofM(µ0, µ1, . . . , µn) as introduced after
Theorem 1.3.1.
Let ft = dpit/dµt be the Radon–Nikodym derivative of the marginal at date t. For
m ≥ 1, we define the measure pim  pi by







pi(dx0, . . . , dxn).
Then, the marginals pimt satisfy the stronger condition pi
m
t ≤ µt for 0 ≤ t ≤ n. Thus,
we can apply Lemma 1.3.3 to µ = (µ0, . . . , µn) and the irreducible component V , to find
Pm ∈ M(µ) ⊆ Mn(µ0, µn) such that Pm  pim. Noting that
∑
m≥1 2




−mPm  pi satisfies the requirements of the lemma.
Proof of Theorem 1.9.2. The result is deduced from Lemma 1.9.4 by following the argument
in the proof of Theorem 1.3.1.
1.9.2 Duality
In this section we formulate a duality theorem for the transport problem with free interme-
diate marginals.
Definition 1.9.5. Let f : Rn+1 → [0,∞]. The primal problem is
Snµ0,µn(f) := sup
P∈Mn(µ0,µn)
P (f) ∈ [0,∞]
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and the dual problem is
Inµ0,µn(f) := inf(φ,ψ,H)∈Dnµ0,µn (f)
µ0(φ) + µn(ψ) ∈ [0,∞],
where Dnµ0,µn(f) consists of all triplets (φ, ψ,H) such that (φ, ψ) ∈ Lc(µ0, µn) and H =
(H1, . . . ,Hn) is F-predictable with
φ(X0) + ψ(Xn) + (H ·X)n ≥ f Mn(µ0, µn)-q.s.
i.e. the inequality holds P -a.s. for all P ∈Mn(µ0, µn).
The analogue of Theorem 1.5.2 reads as follows.
Theorem 1.9.6 (Duality). Let f : Rn+1 → [0,∞].
(i) If f is upper semianalytic, then Snµ0,µn(f) = I
n
µ0,µn(f) ∈ [0,∞].
(ii) If Inµ0,µn(f) <∞, there exists a dual optimizer (φ, ψ,H) ∈ Dnµ0,µn(f).
The main step for the proof is again a closedness result. We shall only discuss the case
where µ0 ≤c µn is irreducible; the extension to the general case can be obtained along the
lines of Section 1.4.
Proposition 1.9.7. Let µ0 ≤c µn be irreducible and let fm : Rn+1 → [0,∞] be a sequence
of functions such that fm → f pointwise. Moreover, let (φm, ψm, Hm) ∈ Dnµ0,µn(fm) be
such that supm µ0(φ
m) + µn(ψ
m) <∞. Then there exist (φ, ψ,H) ∈ Dnµ0,µn(f) such that




Proof. Let µt, 1 ≤ t ≤ n−1 be such that µ = (µ0, . . . , µn) is in convex order and µt−1 ≤c µt
is irreducible for all 1 ≤ t ≤ n; such µt are easily constructed by prescribing their potential
functions. Setting φm = (φm, 0, . . . , 0, ψm) we have (φm, Hm) ∈ Dgµ(fm) and can thus
apply Proposition 1.4.21 to obtain (φ, H) ∈ Dgµ(f). The construction in the proof of that
proposition yields φt ≡ 0 for 1 ≤ t ≤ n− 1. Therefore, (φ0, φn, H) ∈ Dnµ0,µn(f) and
µ0(φ0) + µn(φn) = µ(φ) ≤ lim inf
m→∞ µ(φ





Proof of Theorem 1.9.6. On the strength of Proposition 1.9.7, the proof is analogous to the
one of Theorem 1.5.2.
1.9.3 Monotone Transport
The analogue of our result on left-monotone transports is somewhat degenerate: with un-
constrained intermediate marginals, the corresponding coupling is the identical transport in
the first n − 1 steps and the (one-step) left-monotone transport in the last step. The full
result runs as follows.
Theorem 1.9.8. Let P ∈Mn(µ0, µn). The following are equivalent:
(i) P is a simultaneous optimizer for Snµ0,µn(f(X0, Xt)) for all smooth second-order Spence–
Mirrlees functions f and 1 ≤ t ≤ n.
(ii) P is concentrated on a left-monotone set Γ ⊂ Rn+1 such that
Γn−1 = {(x, . . . , x) : x ∈ Γ0}.
(iii) For 0 ≤ t ≤ n − 1, we have P ◦ (Xt)−1 = µ0 and P ◦ (Xt, Xn)−1 is the (one-step)
left-monotone transport in M(µ0, µn).
There exists a unique P ∈Mn(µ0, µn) satisfying (i)–(iii).
Proof. A transport P as in (iii) exists and is unique, because the identical transport between
equal marginals and the left-monotone transport in M(µ0, µn) exist and are unique; cf.
Proposition 1.6.3. The equivalence of (ii) and (iii) follows from the same proposition and
the fact that the only martingale transport from µ0 to µ0 is the identity.
Let P ∈Mn(µ0, µn) satisfy (i). In particular, P is then an optimizer for Snµ0,µn(f(X0, Xn)),
which by Proposition 1.6.3 implies that P0n = P ◦(X0, Xn)−1 is the (one-step) left-monotone
transport inM(µ0, µn). For t = 1, . . . , n−1, P is an optimizer for Snµ0,µn(−1{X0≤a}|Xt−b|),
for all a, b ∈ R. This implies that P0t transports µ0|(−∞,a] to the minimal element of
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{θ : µ0|(−∞,a] ≤c θ ≤pc µn} in the sense of the convex order, which is θ = µ0|(−∞,a]. There-
fore, P0t must be the identical transport for t = 1, . . . , n − 1 and all but the last marginal
are equal to µ0.
Conversely, let P ∈ Mn(µ0, µn) have the properties from (iii). Then, P is optimal for
Snµ0,µn(−1{X0≤a}(Xt − b)+) for all 1 ≤ t ≤ n and this can be extended to the optimality (i)
for smooth second-order Spence–Mirrlees functions as in the proof of Theorem 1.7.12.
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Chapter 2
Convergence to the Mean Field
Game Limit: A Case Study
2.1 Introduction
Mean field games were introduced by [84, 85, 86] and [68, 69] to overcome the notorious
intractability of n-player games. Two key simplifications are made. First, agents interact
symmetrically through the empirical distribution of their states. Second, by formally letting
n → ∞, one passes to a representative agent whose actions do not affect this distribution
because each individual agent becomes negligible. Thus, the mean field game is seen as an
approximation of the n-player game for large n. We refer to the lecture notes [31] and the
monographs [19, 33, 34] and their extensive references for further background.
In this paper, we conduct a case study of an n-player game of optimal stopping where
multiple equilibria may occur naturally. We formulate an associated mean field game and
highlight that certain mean field equilibria are limits of n-player equilibria while others are
not, and study how to distinguish them. Equilibria that are not limit points are questionable
from the point of view of applications, at least if they are motivated as “n-player games
with large n.”
Several ways of connecting n-player and mean field games have been studied in the
literature. In many cases it is easier to establish the reverse direction, namely that a
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given mean field equilibrium induces an approximate Nash equilibrium in the n-player game
for large n. This goes back to [69] and is by now established in some generality, see in
particular [82] for diffusion control, [35] for games of timing or [38] for finite state games
(but see also [30] for a counterexample in a degenerate case with absorption). It then follows,
conversely, that mean field equilibria are limits of approximate n-player equilibria. However,
we emphasize that approximate and actual Nash equilibria may look quite different, and
in particular one cannot expect in general that there is a true Nash equilibrium in the
proximity of an approximate one.
The convergence of n-player Nash equilibria to the mean field limit is often more delicate.
The deep result of [32] shows convergence for a class of (closed-loop) games where agents
choose drifts of diffusions. In their setting, the mean field game has a unique equilibrium
as a consequence of the so-called monotonicity condition [84] which postulates that it is
disadvantageous for agents’ states to be close to one another. In a related but different
(open-loop) framework, and without imposing uniqueness, [49] obtains convergence under
the assumption that the limiting measure flow is deterministic. More comprehensively, [82]
shows that n-player equilibria converge to a weak notion of mean field equilibria which can
include mixtures of deterministic equilibria, for a general class of diffusion-control games. A
corresponding result for games of timing is established in [35]. Most recently, [83] provides
results along the lines of [82] for the closed-loop case. Convergence has also been shown in
a number of more specific problems, for instance stationary mean field games [84], linear-
quadratic problems [7] or a game of Poissonian control [96], among others. However, to the
best of our knowledge, the question which mean field equilibria are limit points of (true)
n-player equilibria has not been emphasized as such in the literature. We can mention
the parallel work [39] on a two-state game: the game has unique n-player equilibria and
these converge to a mean field equilibrium as expected; however, a second, less plausible
mean field solution can appear for certain parameter values and this solution is not a limit.
Another interesting parallel work [43] studies several approaches of selecting an equilibrium
in a linear-quadratic mean field game with multiple equilibria, including the convergence of
n-player equilibria. Different approaches are shown to select different equilibria.
From the perspective of mean field games, being a limit point of n-player equilibria can
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be seen as a stability property of equilibria with respect to the number of players. We are
not aware of a systematic study in this direction (but see [27] for a recent investigation of
a different stability property that is potentially related). Since mean field equilibria are
often motivated as “large n” equilibria, it seems desirable to understand the phenomenon
in some generality and at least establish sufficient conditions. A general formulation and
investigation of this stability seems wide open at this time, whence our focus on a case study
in the present paper.
2.1.1 Synopsis
We start by introducing an n-player game of optimal stopping inspired by [21, 35, 93] and
the literature on bank-runs following [46]. In addition to their i.i.d. signals, players observe
how many other players have already stopped. A crucial feature is that whenever an agent
leaves the game, staying in the game becomes less attractive for the remaining agents. For
instance, this may reflect that the bank is more likely to default if other clients withdraw
their savings. In particular, the game satisfies the opposite of Lasry and Lions’ monotonicity
condition, or strategic complementarity in Economics terminology [28]. Indeed, the model
exhibits a “flocking” or “herding” behavior where groups of agents can collectively decide
to stop or not. We will see that these choices can naturally give rise to multiple equilibria;
more precisely, they parametrize the full range of n-player equilibria.
Next, we review the mean field version of the game which was introduced in [93] without
discussing the n-player game. Enhancing slightly a result of [93], mean field equilibria are
described by a simple equation: for any equilibrium, the proportion ρ(t) of agents that
have stopped by time t is a zero of a deterministic function gt on [0, 1] as is Figure 2.1.
More generally, any equilibrium t 7→ ρ(t) is characterized as an increasing, right-continuous
selection of such zeros. In Figure 2.1, we can distinguish several types of zeros: increasing-
transversal (i), tangential (t) and decreasing-transversal (d). These types are related to
how concentrated the distribution of the agents’ signals is in a neighborhood of the zero,
relative to the strength of interaction. Intuitively, tangential solutions are delicate in that
they may disappear if Figure 2.1 is perturbed, whereas the transversal solutions are stable
in this sense.
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We then turn to our main question and study which mean field equilibria are limits of
n-player equilibria. Roughly, the main result is that
(i) Increasing-transversal solutions are limits of n-player equilibria,
(ii) decreasing-transversal solutions fail to be limits,
(iii) tangential solutions can but need not be limits.
Specifically, we first consider the minimal and maximal equilibria, corresponding to the
left- and right-most solutions in Figure 2.1. The n-player game also has such extremal equi-
libria and these yield natural candidates for sequences converging to their mean field coun-
terparts. After introducing appropriate notions for dynamic equilibria, we show that this
convergence indeed holds, under the condition that the solutions are increasing-transversal
(on a sufficiently large set of times t). However, we also find that if the minimal (say)
solution is tangential, the minimal n-player equilibria can converge to a mixture of mean
field equilibria and then the minimal mean field equilibrium may fail to be a proper limit.
(The minimal and maximal solutions can be increasing-transversal or tangential, but never
decreasing-transversal.) This also yields a novel example of how randomization can emerge
in mean field games.
Second, we study the convergence to a general mean field equilibrium, possibly some-
where in the middle of Figure 2.1. In that case, there are no obvious candidates for the
n-player approximations and more abstract arguments need to be used. We show by a
fixed point construction that all increasing-transversal solutions are limits of n-player equi-
libria. Quite surprisingly however, (“strongly”) decreasing-transversal solutions fail to be
limits despite appearing stable in Figure 2.1. In fact, these solutions merely occur as parts
of mixtures that are limits, and the weight within these mixtures can be bounded by a




i d t i d i
Figure 2.1: Types of mean field equilibria at a fixed time t
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totic statistics, such as the expected number of n-player equilibria, can be analyzed in our
model—which is unusual for mean field games.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we introduce the
game of optimal stopping. Section 2.3 describes the Nash equilibria of the n-player version
and Section 2.4 covers the analogue for the mean field game. The results on the convergence
to the minimal and maximal equilibria are relatively direct and established in Section 2.5,
whereas the more abstract results on the convergence to general equilibria are reported in
Section 2.6.
2.2 Description of the Game
Let (I, I, λ) be a probability space representing the agents; we shall be interested in the
n-player case with a finite I and the mean field case with an atomless space. Let (Ω,G, P )
be another probability space, equipped with a right-continuous filtration G = (Gt)t∈R+ and
an exponentially distributed random variable E which is independent of G.
Given an agent i ∈ I, let αi ≥ 0 be a G-progressively measurable process which is locally






αis ds = E
}
.
As in [93], one may think of θi as the time when agent i expects the default of her bank.
We fix a parameter r ∈ R, interpreted as the interest rate paid by the bank (and assumed
to be constant for simplicity). Following [93], we suppose that αi is increasing1 and that
inf{t : αit − r ≥ 0} <∞ P -a.s. (2.2.1)









which we assume to have a finite value. Thus, if the default θi > τ , we may think of the
1Increase is to be understood in the non-strict sense throughout the paper.
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agent as accruing the interest on an initial unit investment until τ , but losing everything if
θi < τ . If the stopping time
τ i := inf{t : αit ≥ r} ∈ T (2.2.3)
is a.s. finite, then τ i is optimal and in fact the minimal solution of (2.2.2); cf. [93,
Lemma 2.1]. The solution is unique for instance if αi is strictly increasing, but not in
general. We assume that agents choose (2.2.3) in the case of non-uniqueness, which can be
motivated e.g. as a preference for early stopping when other things are equal. This conven-
tion is not essential, but simplifies our exposition and allows us to focus on multiplicity of
equilibria due to inherent game-theoretic aspects as it avoids ambiguity at the individual
agents’ level.
The processes αi will depend on the proportion ρ(t) of players who have already stopped,
thus inducing an interaction among the agents. Since given ρ, the optimal stopping times
are completely determined by (2.2.3), we shall simply say that an equilibrium is a process
ρ which is G-adapted and such that
ρ(t) = λ{i : τ i ≤ t},
where it is tacitly assumed that the above set is λ-measurable.
2.3 The n-Player Game
In this section, we formulate the n-player version of the “toy model” mean field game in
[93, Section 4]. Indeed, fix n ∈ N and take I = {1, . . . , n} to be a set with n elements,
equipped with the normalized counting measure. Each player i observes an idiosyncratic
signal Y it ≥ 0 which is right-continuous, progressively measurable, increasing and such that
{Y i}i∈I are pairwise i.i.d. with the common c.d.f.
y 7→ Ft(y) := P{Y it ≤ y}.
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Moreover, for a fixed interaction constant2 c > 0,
αi(t) = Y it + cρ
−i
n (t), where ρ
−i
n (t) =
#{j 6= i : τ j ≤ t}
n
is the fraction of other players3 (from the perspective of i) that have already stopped,
according to (τ j)j 6=i. Specializing from the previous section, an n-player equilibrium boils
down to the process ρn(t) = #{j : τ j ≤ t}/n where τ j are as in (2.2.3). In particular, if ρn
is an equilibrium and (t, ω) is such that ρn(t)(ω) = k/n, then as the stopping times satisfy
τ i = inf{t : αi(t) ≥ r}, we must have4
#{Y it (ω) + c
k − 1
n
≥ r} = k and #{Y it (ω) + c
k
n
< r} = n− k. (2.3.1)
This condition is also sufficient, in the sense made precise in Remark 2.3.5.
Next, we sketch the structure of all equilibria ρn(t) = #{i : τ i ≤ t}/n of this game by a
recursive construction, starting with K = ∅.
1. Suppose that at a given stopping time t0, a group K ( I of agents has already stopped.
Then every remaining agent i /∈ K examines her criterion




If θiK ≤ t0, then player i must stop immediately. We add i to the set K and repeat
Step 1 until no further players are forced to stop. (By the monotonicity in #K, it
does not matter in which order the agents are processed.)
2. Beyond individual players forced to stop, a group J ⊆ Kc of agents may be able to
2We could more generally consider processes αi which are nonlinear functions of Y i and ρ−i and possibly
a common noise, as in [93]. However, the increased generality does not seem to lead to additional insights
regarding the main questions of this paper, so we have chosen to use the simplified “toy model” in our
exposition. The constant c could in fact be normalized to 1 by changing Y i and r, but we find it useful to
represent the strength of interaction explicitly.
3Once again, we have decided to exclude player i in order to focus on the game-theoretic aspect of
multiplicity. If player i considers her own action; i.e., uses ρ instead of ρ−i, non-uniqueness can occur
without other agents’ involvement simply because of the direct feedback on the state process.
4We will often abbreviate #{i ∈ I : . . . } to #{. . . } in what follows.
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“coordinate” and stop together.5 Indeed, suppose that
θJK = inf{t : Y it + c
#K + #J − 1
n
≥ r}
satisfies θJK ≤ t0 for all i ∈ J . Then it is optimal for all these agents to stop as a
group, and they may or may not “choose” to do so. If they stop, we add J to K and
repeat the procedure starting with Step 1.
3. After all remaining groups of agents have decided whether to stop at time t0, we
increment time until there exists a group or individual agent wanting to stop, and
start again at Step 1.
The multiplicity of equilibria of this game arises because of the choices taken by the
groups J in Step 2, as well as the order in which the groups are processed. Next, we
describe two of these equilibria in detail. The first one is the minimal equilibrium and
corresponds to groups J in Step 2 always choosing not to stop. This is equivalent to all
players remaining in the game until their own optimality criterion forces them to quit.






#{Y it + c
k
n
≥ r} = k
#{Y it + c
k − l
n
≥ r} ≥ k − l + 1, 1 ≤ l ≤ k.
(2.3.2)
This equilibrium is minimal; i.e., ρmn (t) ≤ ρn(t) for any n-player equilibrium ρn.
Proof. The construction is iterative. Given a set K ( I corresponding to players who have
already stopped, we can consider for all i /∈ K the stopping times




with the corresponding order statistics θ
(1)
K ≤ θ(2)K ≤ . . . . We define θK = θ(1)K and iK = (1).
We note that agent i must stop at θiK , even if no further agents j /∈ K choose to stop, and
that iK is the first of the agents i /∈ K subject to this event.
5While we are using suggestive language here, it should be noted that these are simply different configu-
rations which may be equilibria. We are not trying to model a mechanism how players “find” an equilibrium.
77
To define the equilibrium, start with K0 = ∅ and set τ i = θK0 ≡ θ(1)K0 on {i = iK0}.
Next, set K1 = {iK0} and τ i = max{θK1 , θK0} on {i = iK1}, and continue inductively
setting Kk = Kk−1 ∪ {iKk−1} and τ i = max{θKk , τ iKk−1} on {i = iKk} for k = 2, . . . , n− 1.
(The maximum needs to be taken since all the αj are increased after player iKk−1 stops.)
Setting ρmn (t) = #{i : τ i ≤ t}/n, we have by construction that ρmn is an equilibrium with
corresponding optimal stopping times (τ i) and that (2.3.2) holds.
To see the minimality, let ρn be any n-player equilibrium and consider (t, ω) such that
ρn(t)(ω) = k/n. Let k
′ be such that ρmn (t)(ω) = k
′/n. If we had k′ > k, then (2.3.2) would
imply #{Y it (ω)+c kn ≥ r} ≥ k+1 and hence #{Y it (ω)+c kn < r} ≤ n−k−1, a contradiction
to (2.3.1). Thus, k′ ≤ k and we have shown that ρmn ≤ ρn.
Remark 2.3.2. Let ρ be an n-player equilibrium and t0 a stopping time. There exists
an equilibrium which is minimal among all n-player equilibria % such that % = ρ on [0, t0].
Indeed, it is obtained by agents stopping as in ρ until t0, whereas from t0 onwards we apply
the construction in the proof of Proposition 2.3.1 starting with K = {i : τ i ≤ t0}. We call
this % the minimal extension of ρ after t0.
The second extremal equilibrium is maximal and corresponds to players coordinating
their actions such as to stop as early as possible. As seen in the construction below, this
is equivalent to all players constantly seeking (maximally large) groups of collaborators so
that immediate simultaneous stopping is optimal for all agents in the group.






#{Y it + c
k − 1
n
≥ r} = k
#{Y it + c
k + l − 1
n
≥ r} ≤ k + l − 1, 1 ≤ l ≤ n− k.
(2.3.3)
This equilibrium is maximal; i.e., ρMn (t) ≥ ρn(t) for any n-player equilibrium ρn.
Proof. Given a set K ( I of size k = #K corresponding to players who have already
stopped, we can consider for 1 ≤ l ≤ n− k the stopping times
θlK = inf{t : #{i /∈ K : Y it + c
k + l − 1
n
≥ r} ≥ l};
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intuitively, this is the first time an additional group J of #J = l agents can collectively
stop. If θ
(1)
K ≤ · · · ≤ θ(n−k)K are the corresponding order statistics (ties are split by assigning
the lower rank to the larger index l), pick l = (1) and let J = J(K) be the set of i /∈ K
such that {Y i
θlK
}i∈J are the l largest elements in {Y iθlK}i∈Kc ; we think of J as the l most
pessimistic agents remaining at time θlK and denote θK := θ
l
K .
To define the equilibrium, start with K0 = ∅ and set τ i = θ∅ for i ∈ J(∅). Next, set
K1 = J(∅) and τ i = θK1 for i ∈ J(K1), and continue inductively with K2 = J(K1) ∪K1.
Setting ρMn (t) = #{i : τ i ≤ t}/n, we have by construction that ρMn is an equilibrium with
corresponding optimal stopping times (τ i) and that (2.3.3) holds.
To see the maximality, let ρn be any n-player equilibrium and consider (t, ω) such that
ρn(t)(ω) = k/n. Again, ρn must satisfy (2.3.1). Let k
′ be such that ρMn (t)(ω) = k
′/n. If
we had k′ < k, then (2.3.3) would imply that #{Y it (ω) + c k−1n ≥ r} ≤ k − 1, contradict-
ing (2.3.1).
The following observations will be used in Section 2.6 when we construct n-player equi-
libria converging to a given mean field equilibrium.
Remark 2.3.4. (i) Consider n-player equilibria ρ and ρ′, a stopping time t0 and assume
that ρ(t0) ≤ ρ′(t0). Then there exists an n-player equilibrium % such that
%1[0,t0) = ρ1[0,t0) and %1[t0,∞) = ρ
′1[t0,∞).
Indeed, let I0 be the set of agents that have stopped by time t0 in equilibrium ρ and let I1
be the analogue for ρ′. By (2.2.3) we necessarily have I0 ⊆ I1. The equilibrium % is obtained
by following the stopping times of ρ on [0, t0). At t0, all agents in the group J = I1 \ I0 stop
(and this must be optimal as ρ′ is an equilibrium). After that the remaining agents act as
in ρ′.
(ii) Extending the above, consider n-player equilibria ρ and ρ′, stopping times t0 ≤ t1
and assume that ρ(t0) ≤ ρ′(t1). Then there exists an n-player equilibrium % such that
%1[0,t0) = ρ1[0,t0) and %1[t1,∞) = ρ
′1[t1,∞). (2.3.4)
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Indeed, let ρ1 be the minimal extension of ρ after t0 (cf. Remark 2.3.2). Let I0 be the set
of agents that have stopped by time t0 in equilibrium ρ and let I1 be the set of agents that
have stopped by time t1 in equilibrium ρ
′. Again, we observe that I0 ⊆ I1, due to (2.2.3)
and the increase of Y i. Moreover, I1 must include all agents that stop in the construction
of the minimal extension on [t0, t1]. As a result, ρ1(t1) ≤ ρ′(t1), and now the claim follows
by applying (i).
(iii) A last generalization is that when ρ(t0) ≤ ρ′(t1) merely holds on some set A ∈ Gt1 ,
then we can still construct an n-player equilibrium % satisfying (2.3.4) on A. Indeed, % is
found as in (ii) except that on Ac, agents continue to stop according to ρ1 after t1.
Remark 2.3.5. (i) The necessary condition (2.3.1) is sufficient in the following sense. Fix
n and a stopping time t0, and suppose there exists an Gt0-measurable random variable k
satisfying (2.3.1) at t0; i.e.,
#{Y it0 + c
k − 1
n
≥ r} = k and #{Y it0 + c
k
n
< r} = n− k.
Then there exists an n-player equilibrium % such that %(t0) = k/n.
To construct %, let agents stop as in the minimal equilibrium ρmn up to time t0. By
the argument at the end of the proof of Proposition 2.3.1, we must have ρmn (t0) ≤ k/n.




n ≥ r stop, so that ρ(t0) = k/n. After that,
the remaining agents follow the construction in the proof of Proposition 2.3.1 starting with
K = {i : τ i ≤ t0}.
(ii) A variant of this holds when (2.3.1) is satisfied on some set A ∈ Gt0 , with the
conclusion that %(t0) = k/n holds only on A. Indeed, we construct % as above on A,
whereas on Ac we use ρmn .
(iii) For later use, we observe that if this construction is applied for two times t0 ≤ t1
and corresponding random variables k0 ≤ k1, the resulting equilibria satisfy %0 ≤ %1.
2.4 The Mean Field Game
The game considered in this section is the “toy model” mean field game of [93, Section 4].
Indeed, (I, I, λ) is an atomless probability space and we work on a so-called Fubini extension
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(I × Ω,Σ, µ) of the product (I × Ω, I × G, λ × P ); see [93, Section 3]. For each i ∈ I, let
Y it ≥ 0 be a right-continuous, increasing, G-progressively measurable process such that for
each t ≥ 0, (i, ω) 7→ Y it (ω) is Σ-measurable and Y it , i ∈ I are λ-essentially pairwise i.i.d.; see
also [93, Definition 3.1]. Working on a Fubini extension ensures that such processes exist,
as well as the validity of an Exact Law of Large Numbers. In all that follows, we assume
that the c.d.f. y 7→ Ft(y) = P{Y it ≤ y} is continuous.
Since λ is atomless, each individual agent has zero mass and hence does not influence the
state process ρ(t) = λ{i : τ i ≤ t}. In particular, we do not distinguish ρ and ρ−i and simply
set αi(t) = Y it + cρ(t). We recall that ρ is an equilibrium if ρ(t) = λ{i : τ i ≤ t} where τ i
is as in (2.2.3) for λ-a.e. i ∈ I. Such a process may be random (see also [93]). However, as
common in the mean field game literature, we pay special attention to equilibria which are
deterministic due to the infinite number of players.6 The following is an improved version
of [93, Proposition 4.1] with necessary and sufficient conditions.
Proposition 2.4.1. A real function ρ : R+ → [0, 1] is a mean field game equilibrium if and
only if it is increasing, right-continuous and
ρ(t) + Ft(r − cρ(t)) = 1, t ≥ 0. (2.4.1)
Proof. Suppose that ρ is a mean field game equilibrium, then ρ is clearly increasing. Since
Y it , i ∈ I are λ-essentially pairwise i.i.d., the Exact Law of Large Numbers (e.g., [93,
Section 3]) states that λ{i : Y it ≤ u} = Ft(u) for all u. Using also (2.2.3) and that y 7→ Ft(y)
is continuous, we have
ρ(t) = λ{i : τ i ≤ t} = λ{i : Y it + cρ(t+) ≥ r} = 1− Ft(r − cρ(t+)). (2.4.2)
Recall that Y i has right-continuous paths. Using again the continuity of Ft, this implies
that
(t, u) 7→ Ft(r − cu) is jointly right-continuous. (2.4.3)
It follows that t 7→ 1−Ft(r−cρ(t+)) is right-continuous, and thus the left-hand side of (2.4.2)
6Note that the key message of this paper, namely that some mean field equilibria are not limits of n-player
equilibria, is only amplified if more mean field equilibria are considered.
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must also be right-continuous. That is, ρ(t) = ρ(t+), and then (2.4.2) becomes (2.4.1).
Conversely, suppose that ρ is a function with the stated properties. Defining the corre-
sponding optimal stopping times τ i as in (2.2.3), the Exact Law of Large Number shows
that
λ{i : τ i ≤ t} = λ{i : Y it + cρ(t) ≥ r} = 1− Ft(r − cρ(t)) = ρ(t);
that is, ρ is an equilibrium.
The following notions will be crucial in determining the convergence to the mean field
limit.
Definition 2.4.2. Fix t ≥ 0. A solution u ∈ [0, 1] of u + Ft(r − cu) = 1 is called left-
increasing-transversal (or left-transversal for short) if
for all ε > 0 there is u′ ∈ (u− ε, u) such that u′ + Ft(r − cu′) < 1 (2.4.4)
and right-increasing-transversal (or right-transversal) if
for all ε > 0 there is u′ ∈ (u, u+ ε) such that u′ + Ft(r − cu′) > 1. (2.4.5)
It is called increasing-transversal if both (2.4.4) and (2.4.5) hold, and decreasing-transversal
if these hold with the inequality signs reversed.
For instance, in Figure 2.2, um is left-increasing-transversal and umrt, uM are right-
increasing-transversal, but only uMlt is increasing-transversal. A decreasing-transversal









Figure 2.2: Solutions um, umrt, uMlt and uM
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Lemma 2.4.3. Fix t ≥ 0. The equation u + Ft(r − cu) = 1 has a minimal solution um ∈
[0, 1], a maximal solution uM ∈ [0, 1], a minimal right-transversal solution umrt ∈ [0, 1], and
a maximal left-transversal solution uMlt ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Since G(u) := u+ Ft(r − cu) < 1 for u < 0 and G(u) > 1 for u > 1, the existence of
um and uM is immediate from the continuity of G. The fact that G(u) < 1 for all u < um
entails that um is left-transversal, and since it follows directly from the definition that the
set of left-transversal solutions is stable under increasing limits, it follows that uMlt exists.
The argument for umrt is similar.
As illustrated in Figure 2.2, these four solutions may be distinct, and while um is auto-
matically left-transversal, it can happen that umrt is not. Similarly for uM and uMlt. We
can also note that umrt ≤ uMlt may fail, say if the graph is replaced by a flat stretch on
[um, uM ]. But in more generic cases, and in particular whenever um and uM are not local
extrema, the quartet describes at most two distinct solutions um = umrt ≤ uMlt = uM and
these are then increasing-transversal.
In view of Lemma 2.4.3 we may define, given t ≥ 0,
ρm(t) = um, ρM (t) = uM , ρmrt(t) = umrt, ρMlt(t) = uMlt. (2.4.6)
Using the increase of Yt and (2.4.3), one can check that ρ
m, ρM , ρmrt, ρMlt are increasing,
ρM and ρmrt are right-continuous, and ρm and ρMlt are left-continuous (but not continuous
in general).
Corollary 2.4.4. (i) If ρ : R+ → [0, 1] is any increasing function such that (2.4.1) holds,
then ρ(t+) is an equilibrium.
(ii) The functions t 7→ ρm(t+) and t 7→ ρM (t) are the minimal and maximal equilibria of
the mean field game; i.e., they are equilibria and any other equilibrium ρ satisfies ρm(t+) ≤
ρ(t) ≤ ρM (t) for all t ≥ 0.
Proof. (i) If ρ is any increasing function such that (2.4.1) holds, then the joint right-
continuity in (2.4.3) implies that ρ(t+) + Ft(r − cρ(t+)) = 1 for all t ≥ 0. It now follows
from Proposition 2.4.1 that ρ(t+) is an equilibrium.
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(ii) Both ρm(t+) and ρM (t) are equilibria by (i). If ρ is any equilibrium, then it is
necessarily right-continuous by Proposition 2.4.1 and thus ρm ≤ ρ ≤ ρM implies ρm(t+) ≤
ρ(t) ≤ ρM (t) for all t ≥ 0.
2.5 Convergence to Extremal Equilibria
The main goal of the last two sections is to understand which mean field equilibria are
limits of n-player equilibria. In brief, we will see that mean field equilibria described by
increasing-transversal solutions of (2.4.1) (on a sufficiently large sets of times t) are such
limits, whereas other equilibria need not be proper limits of n-player equilibria; they merely
occur as parts of mixtures which are limits.
In this section, we focus on the convergence to the minimal and maximal mean field
equilibria; the less straightforward interior case is treated in the next section. As a first
step, we relate limits of arbitrary n-player equilibria to mean field equilibria at a fixed time.
We will see in Example 2.5.8 that such limits need not be deterministic mean field equilibria
as defined in the preceding section, hence the following result relates limits to mixtures of
equilibria. This is in line with the results of [35, 82] stating that n-player equilibria converge
to “weak” equilibria of the mean field game, while also illustrating that randomization can
indeed occur in a quite natural example.
Given a closed set A ⊆ R, we say that a sequence (ξn) of random variables is asymp-
totically concentrated on A if limn→∞ P (ξn ∈ Aε) = 1 for all ε > 0, where Aε = {x ∈ R :
d(x,A) < ε} is the open ε-neighborhood of A. When (ξn) is uniformly bounded, as it will
be the case below, this is equivalent to any weak cluster point of (ξn) being concentrated
on A. Moreover, for t ≥ 0, we denote the solutions of (2.4.1) by
U(t) = {u ∈ [0, 1] : u+ Ft(r − cu) = 1}.
Proposition 2.5.1. Fix t ≥ 0 and let (ρn)n≥1 be a sequence of n-player equilibria. Then
ρn(t) is asymptotically concentrated on U(t).
Proof. We first show that for any interval [u0, u1] ⊆ [0, 1] such that u 7→ u + Ft(r − cu) is
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strictly smaller than 1 on [u0, u1],
P (u0 + ε
′ ≤ ρn(t) ≤ u1 − ε′)→ 0 for all ε′ > 0. (2.5.1)
Indeed, let u0 < u1 be as above. By increasing the value of u1 if necessary, we may assume
without loss of generality that u 7→ u+ Ft(r − cu) attains its maximum over [u0, u1] at u1.
Given 0 < ε < u1 − u0, we can then choose by continuity some u ∈ (u1 − ε, u1) such that
u′ + Ft(r − cu′) ≤ u+ Ft(r − cu) < 1 for all u0 ≤ u′ ≤ u. (2.5.2)
Furthermore, setting
εn(x) =
#{Y it + cx ≥ r}
n
− (1− Ft(r − cx)), x ∈ R
and εn = supx∈R{|εn(x)|}, we have εn → 0 a.s. by the uniform convergence in the Glivenko–
Cantelli theorem. Let Xi = 1{Y it +cu≥r}, then
X1 + · · ·+Xn
n
= 1− Ft(r − cu) + εn(u). (2.5.3)
Denote by [x] the largest integer k ≤ x. For any [u0n] + 1 ≤ l ≤ [un], let Zli = 1{Y it +c ln≥r},
then similarly
Zl1 + · · ·+ Zln
n
= 1− Ft(r − c ln ) + εn( ln ).






+ Ft(r − c ln ) ≤ u+ Ft(r − cu)
by (2.5.2) and thus
X1 + · · ·+Xn
n
= 1− Ft(r − cu) + εn(u) ≤ u− εn( ln ) + εn(u) ≤ u+ 2εn.
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u+ Ft(r − cu) ≥ 1− 2εn + εn(u)
)
→ 0
by (2.5.3) and (2.5.2). Since ε > 0 was arbitrary, this shows (2.5.1).
In a symmetric way, one can show the analogue of (2.5.1) for intervals where u 7→
u+Ft(r− cu) is strictly larger than 1. Since for any ε > 0 the complement of U(t)ε consists
of finitely many intervals of one of these two types, the claim follows.
Next, we narrow down the asymptotic support for the minimal and maximal n-player
equilibria ρmn and ρ
M
n . We will see in Section 2.5.1 that the following result is optimal
and the limiting support is not a singleton in general. We recall the notation introduced
in (2.4.6).
Lemma 2.5.2. Fix t ≥ 0.
(i) The minimal n-player equilibrium ρmn (t) is asymptotically concentrated on
[ρm(t), ρmrt(t)] ∩ U(t).
(ii) The maximal n-player equilibrium ρMn (t) is asymptotically concentrated on
[ρMlt(t), ρM (t)] ∩ U(t).
Proof. (i) In view of Proposition 2.5.1 and the definition of ρm(t), it suffices to show that
P (ρmn (t) ≥ ρmrt(t) + ε′)→ 0 for all ε′ > 0. (2.5.4)
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Let ε > 0. As ρmrt(t) is right-transversal we can find u ∈ (ρmrt(t), ρmrt(t) + ε) such
that 1 − Ft(r − cu) < u. For n large enough, we then have ρmrt(t) < [un]/n ≤ u. Let
Xi = 1{Y it +cu≥r}, then
X1 + · · ·+Xn
n
→ EXi = 1− Ft(r − cu) a.s.
by the Law of Large Numbers. Hence,




→ 1− Ft(r − cu)− u < 0 a.s.
Using also (2.3.2), we conclude that
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n
≥ r} ≥ [un])
≤ P













As ε > 0 was arbitrary, the above implies (2.5.4).
(ii) The arguments are similar to (i) and therefore omitted.
Next, we introduce an appropriate notion of convergence for dynamic equilibria as re-
quired for our main results. Note that given an increasing function, its right- and left-
continuous limits (and all functions between these) differ only by the allocation of the
function value at the (countably many) jumps. The fact that mean field equilibria are right-
continuous, cf. Proposition 2.4.1, reflects the fact that agents stopping at time t are counted
as having left the game at time t, whereas left-continuity would correspond to counting them
as leaving immediately after t. Since this difference is not fundamental, it seems reasonable
to consider limits “up to taking right-continuous versions.” This has been accomplished by
notions of so-called Fatou convergence, e.g. [80, 113], in other areas of stochastic analysis.
For increasing functions ϕn, ϕ on R+, we have that
(lim infn ϕn)(t+) = (lim supn ϕn)(t+) = ϕ(t+) holds for all t ∈ R+ if and only if limϕn(t) =
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ϕ(t) for all t in a dense subset D ⊆ R+. This motivates the following.
Definition 2.5.3. A sequence (ρn)n≥1 of n-player equilibria Fatou converges in probability
to a mean field equilibrium ρ if there exists a dense set D ⊆ R+ such that ρn(t) → ρ(t) in
probability for all t ∈ D.
We note that by a diagonalization procedure, Fatou convergence in probability implies
Fatou convergence a.s. along a subsequence (nk), where the a.s. convergence is defined by
direct analogy to the above. In particular, it then follows that the right-continuous versions
of lim infk ρnk and lim supk ρnk coincide with ρ a.s.
With these notions in place, we can establish the convergence of extremal equilibria in
the increasing-transversal case. (Note that the extremal equilibria cannot be decreasing-
transversal; they are either increasing-transversal or tangential.)
Theorem 2.5.4. Suppose that for all t in a dense subset D ⊆ R+, the minimal solution
u ∈ [0, 1] of u+Ft(r−cu) = 1 is increasing-transversal. Then the minimal n-player equilibria
ρmn Fatou converge in probability to the minimal mean field equilibrium as n→∞.
The analogous assertion holds for the maximal equilibria ρMn .
Proof. By the hypothesis, ρm(t) = ρmrt(t) for t ∈ D. Thus, Lemma 2.5.2 implies that
lim ρmn (t) = ρ
m(t) = ρmrt(t) in probability for t ∈ D. The analogue holds for ρMn .
Next, we discuss the transversality condition in more detail. In fact, if uniqueness
holds for the mean field game, the condition is automatically satisfied and we conclude the
following.
Corollary 2.5.5. The following are equivalent:
(i) the mean field game has a unique equilibrium ρ,
(ii) the equation u + Ft(r − cu) = 1, u ∈ [0, 1] has a unique solution for a dense set of
t ∈ R+.
In that case, any sequence (ρn)n≥1 of n-player equilibria Fatou converges in probability to
ρ.
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Proof. If (i) holds, then ρm(t+) = ρM (t) for all t ≥ 0 by Corollary 2.4.4, and (ii) follows since
ρm(t+) = ρm(t) except at the (countably many) jumps of ρm. The converse holds because
equilibria are right-continuous; cf. Proposition 2.4.1. Finally, if u + Ft(r − cu) = 1 has a
unique solution, this solution is necessarily increasing-transversal since u + Ft(r − cu) < 1
for u < 0 and u+ Ft(r − cu) > 1 for u > 1.
While we will see below that the transversality condition in Theorem 2.5.4 cannot be
dropped, we can argue that this condition holds for a generic choice of signals Y i. More
generally, we discuss the following hypothesis (again, note that the extremal solutions can
never be decreasing-transversal).
Definition 2.5.6. We say that Hypothesis (H) holds if for all t in a dense subset of R+, any
solution of u ∈ [0, 1] of u+Ft(r− cu) = 1 is increasing-transversal or decreasing-transversal.
While this hypothesis does not hold for all choices of Y i, the exceptional set is small
in the sense that a “typical” Ft will not have a local extremum of u 7→ u + Ft(r − cu) at
a solution of u + Ft(r − cu) = 1, so that the latter must be transversal. As t varies over
R+, the non-transversal case is somewhat more likely to occur, but typically at only finitely
many t so that the hypothesis still holds. There seems to be no obvious way to quantify
this. However, we state the following result which confirms the general intuition and shows
that Hypothesis (H) is always valid after a small perturbation of Y i.
Proposition 2.5.7. For every δ > 0 there exists 0 ≤ ε ≤ δ such that after replacing Y it
with Y it + ε, Hypothesis (H) is satisfied.
Proof. Let us first observe that for any real function f(x), the set of local minimum values
S = {f(x) : x is a local minimum of f} is countable. Indeed, for every s ∈ S there is an
open interval Is with rational endpoints such that s = min{f(x) : x ∈ Is}. If s, t ∈ S and
Is = It, then s = t, showing that I : S → Q×Q is injective.
For fixed t ≥ 0, denote by S(t) the set of all local minimum and maximum values of
u 7→ u + Ft(r − cu) − 1, then ∪t∈QS(t) is again countable. Thus, we can find a sequence
ak ↓ 0 with ak /∈ ∪t∈Q+S(t). Set εk = cak. Then, passing from Yt to Y εkt = Yt + εk, the
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function under consideration is
u 7→ u+ F εkt (r − cu) = u+ Ft(r − cu− εk) = (u+ ak) + Ft(r − c(u+ ak))− ak.
By the construction of ak, we know that 1 is not a local extremum value of this function.
However, if a solution of u+ F εkt (r − cu) = 1 failed to be transversal, then 1 would be the
value at a local extremum.
2.5.1 Counterexamples
In this section, we illustrate that the assertion of Theorem 2.5.4 may fail without the
transversality condition, and more generally that the intervals in Lemma 2.5.2 cannot be
improved. The examples presented here are essentially static, meaning that Y it does not
depend on t. For purely technical reasons, namely to ensure the finiteness of the optimal
stopping times (2.2.3) as assumed throughout, we introduce a time horizon T ∈ (0,∞) at
which Y it jumps to a value larger than r, thus ensuring that all players stop.
In the first example, we allow for atoms in the distribution of Y it to obtain an analyti-
cally tractable example. We argue below that the atoms are not essential to the observed
phenomenon.
Example 2.5.8. Let r = c = 1 and let Y it = Y
i
0 , 0 ≤ t < T be constant i.i.d. processes such




2δ2 for all 0 ≤ t < T , and set Y it = 2 for t ≥ T . Then the law of the




2δ1 for all 0 ≤ t < T .
Proof. Proposition 2.3.1 yields two cases for every ω. If strictly less than n/2 of the real-
izations {Y i0 (ω), i = 1, . . . , n} equal 2, all players i with Y i0 (ω) = 2 stop at t = 0 and those
with Y i0 (ω) = 1/2 never stop. Whereas if n/2 or more of the realizations equal 2, then all




The limit law 12δ 12 +
1
2δ1 can be seen as a mixture of the deterministic mean field equilibria
ρm(t) ≡ 12 and ρmrt(t) ≡ 1. In fact, with an appropriate definition allowing for randomized
equilibria, this mixture is itself an equilibrium. However, a remarkable conclusion is that
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Figure 2.3: Graphs of Ft(1− u) (solid) and 1− u (dashed)
Corollary 2.5.9. In the context of Example 2.5.8, ρm(t) is not a weak accumulation point
of n-player equilibria, for any 0 ≤ t < T .
Proof. Suppose that there exists a subsequence ρk = ρnk of nk-player equilibria such that




It may be useful to contrast this with the fact that ρm is a limit of approximate Nash
equilibria. To wit, if all players i with Y i0 (ω) = 2 stop at t = 0 whereas those with
Y i0 (ω) = 1/2 do not stop until T , we obtain an approximate Nash equilibrium converging
to ρm as n→∞.
The following example is a smooth version of Example 2.5.8 where Y it admits a density;
see also Figure 2.3(b). It is not analytically tractable but the qualitative behavior is the
same.
Example 2.5.10. Let r = c = 1 and let Y it = Y
i
0 , 0 ≤ t < T be i.i.d. processes such
that the law of Y it has the density ft(y) = 4 1[ 38 ,
1
2 ]
(y) + 1[ 32 ,2](y) for all 0 ≤ t < T , and let
Y it = 2 + X
i, t ≥ T , where Xi are i.i.d. with a continuous distribution on [0, 1]. Then the
simulation of ρmn (t), cf. Figure 2.4(a), shows that ρ
m





0 ≤ t < T which is again a mixture of the deterministic mean field equilibria ρm(t) ≡ 12 and
ρmrt(t) ≡ 1.
In the third example, the mean field game admits a continuum of solutions; see also
Figure 2.3(c).
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Example 2.5.11. Consider the setting of Example 2.5.10 with density ft(y) = 1[0, 12 ](y) +
1[ 32 ,2](y). In this case, we again have ρ
m(t) ≡ 12 and ρmrt(t) ≡ 1, but now all values in
between also correspond to mean field equilibria. The simulation of ρmn (t), cf. Figure 2.4(b),
illustrates that the law of ρmn (t) converges to a mixture of all these equilibria.




](y) + 1[ 3
2
,2](y) (b) density 1[0, 1
2
](y) + 1[ 3
2
,2](y)
Figure 2.4: Simulations for n-player minimal equilibria (n = 10′000). Locations k/n of
equilibria with k stopped players on the x-axis, number of samples with that equilibrium
on the y-axis.
When the minimal mean field equilibrium is not increasing-transversal, the preceding
examples illustrate that it need not be the limit of the minimal n-player equilibria. The
final example shows that both cases are possible: it may be the limit even if it is not
increasing-transversal.
Example 2.5.12. Consider the setting of Example 2.5.10 with density ft(y) = 2 1[1/2,1](y).
In this case, we easily compute that ρm(t) ≡ 0 and ρmrt(t) ≡ 1. Nevertheless, ρmn (t) ≡ 0
due to Y it < r a.s., and thus ρ
m
n (t)→ ρm(t).
2.6 Convergence to General Equilibria
Theorem 2.5.4 shows that if the minimal and maximal mean field equilibria are increasing-
transversal (on a dense set), then they are the limits of the minimal and maximal n-player
equilibria. Indeed, the latter are obvious candidates for sequences converging to these mean
field equilibria. For mean field equilibria that are not extremal, there are no obvious candi-
dates for the approximating n-player equilibria. The following result shows that increasing-
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transversal equilibria are still limits; however, the approximating n-player equilibria have no
simple description. We will see in Section 2.6.2 that the analogue for decreasing-transversal
solutions fails.
2.6.1 Increasing-Transversal Equilibria
Theorem 2.6.1. Let ρ be a mean field equilibrium. Suppose that for all t in a dense subset
D ⊆ R+, the solution u := ρ(t) of u+ Ft(r − cu) = 1 is increasing-transversal. Then there
exist n-player equilibria (ρn)n≥1 which Fatou converge in probability to ρ as n→∞.
The first step of the proof is to solve a static version of the problem. This will be
accomplished by a fixed point argument for monotone functions.
Lemma 2.6.2. Let t ≥ 0, let u ∈ [0, 1] be an increasing-transversal solution of u + Ft(r −
cu) = 1 and let ε, δ > 0. There are n0 ∈ N and A ∈ Gt with P (A) > 1− ε such that for all
n ≥ n0 and ω ∈ A, there exists k(ω) ∈ N such that |u− k(ω)/n| ≤ δ and (2.3.1) holds; i.e.,
#{Y it (ω) + c
k(ω)− 1
n
≥ r} = k(ω) and #{Y it (ω) + c
k(ω)
n
< r} = n− k(ω).
Moreover, k(ω) can be chosen as a measurable function of Y 1t (ω), . . . , Y
n
t (ω).
Proof. Since u is increasing-transversal, there are points u0, u1 ∈ R such that u − δ/2 ≤
u0 < u < u1 ≤ u+ δ/2 and
u0 < 1− Ft(r − cu0) ≤ 1− Ft(r − cu1) < u1,
where the inequality in the middle is due to the monotonicity of Ft. The Glivenko–Cantelli
theorem then implies that the event An consisting of all ω such that
[nu0] ≤ #{Y it (ω) + c
[nu0]− 1
n
≥ r} ≤ #{Y it (ω) + c
[nu1]
n
≥ r} ≤ [nu1]
satisfies P (An)→ 1. For fixed n and ω ∈ An, consider the integer-valued function
k 7→ G(k) := #{Y it (ω) + c kn ≥ r}.
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By the above, G maps {[nu0] − 1, [nu0], . . . , [nu1]} into {[nu0], . . . , [nu1]}. Moreover, G is
monotone increasing. Lemma 2.6.3 below then yields the existence of [nu0] ≤ k ≤ [nu1]
such that G(k−1) = G(k) = k which is exactly (2.3.1). By the choice of u0, u1 we also have
|u − k/n| ≤ δ for n large. Moreover, it is clear from the proof of Lemma 2.6.3 that k is a
measurable function of Y 1t , . . . , Y
n
t .
Lemma 2.6.3. Let x0 < x1 < · · · < xN be real numbers for some N ≥ 1. Let J =
{x1, . . . , xN} and J0 = {x0} ∪ J . If f : J0 → J is monotone increasing, there exists
k ∈ {1, . . . , N} such that f(xk−1) = f(xk) = xk.
Proof. Since f is monotone and maps J into J , it must have a fixed point in J . We claim
that the minimal k ∈ {1, . . . , N} such that f(xk) = xk has the desired property. Indeed,
if k = 1, monotonicity implies that f(x0) = f(x1) and the proof is complete. If k > 1, we
observe that f(xl−1) ≥ xl for all 1 ≤ l ≤ k. Indeed, f(x1) ≥ x2 since x1 is not a fixed
point, but then f(x2) ≥ x3 since x2 is not a fixed point and f is monotone, and so on. In
particular, f(xk−1) ≥ xk and thus f(xk−1) = f(xk) = xk.
Proof of Theorem 2.6.1. Fix N ∈ N and let t1 < · · · < tN be in D. For n large enough,
Lemma 2.6.2 allows us to find sets Al ∈ Gtl with P (Al) > 1−N−2 and random variables kl
satisfying |ρ(tl)− kl/n| ≤ δ := 1/N and (2.3.1) on Al, for 1 ≤ l ≤ N .
Following Remark 2.3.5, we can construct n-player equilibria ρln such that ρ
l
n(tl) = kl/n
on Al. Next, we argue that these ρ
l
n can be chosen such that
ρ1n(t1) ≤ · · · ≤ ρmn (tm) on A1 ∩ · · · ∩Am, 1 ≤ m ≤ N. (2.6.1)
Indeed, we have ρ(tl) ≤ ρ(tl+1) by the increase of ρ. If ρ(tl) < ρ(tl+1), then we can
ensure ρln(tl) ≤ ρl+1n (tl+1) on Al ∩ Al+1 simply by choosing δ < |ρ(tl) − ρ(tl+1)|/2 in
Lemma 2.6.2. If ρ(tl) = ρ(tl+1), we can observe that if the construction in the proof of
Lemma 2.6.2 is executed twice with tl and tl+1, then by choosing the same parameters
u0, u1 the corresponding functions fl and fl+1 satisfy fl ≤ fl+1 due to the increase of
Y i. This implies that the corresponding minimal fixed points produced by the proof of
Lemma 2.6.3 satisfy ρln(tl) ≤ ρl+1n (tl+1).
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In view of (2.6.1), we can use Remark 2.3.4(iii) to construct from the equilibria (ρln)1≤l≤N
another n-player equilibrium %n with the property that %n(tl) = ρ
l
n(tl) for all 1 ≤ l ≤ N on
AN := ∩Nl=1Al.
To summarize, %n satisfies |ρ(tl)− %n(tl)| ≤ 1/N for all 1 ≤ l ≤ N on the set AN which
has probability P (AN ) ≥ 1 −N−1. By letting t1, . . . , tN exhaust a countable dense subset
D′ ⊆ D ⊆ R+ as N →∞, this shows that there exist n-player equilibria (%n)n≥1 such that
%n(t)→ ρ(t) in probability for all t ∈ D′ and the proof is complete.
Remark 2.6.4. The construction leading to Theorem 2.6.1 is pathwise and thus extends
beyond deterministic mean field equilibria. For instance, let ρ1, ρ2 be such equilibria satis-
fying the assumption of Theorem 2.6.1, let λ ∈ [0, 1] and suppose that the n-player game
admits a set A ∈ G0 with P (A) = λ. Then we can apply the construction separately on A
and Ac to find n-player equilibria ρn converging to the mixture λδρ1 + (1−λ)δρ2 on a dense
set. In the same vain, convergence to more general mixtures could be analyzed.
2.6.2 Decreasing-Transversal Equilibria





Figure 2.5: C.d.f. and simulation of Example 2.6.5. The decreasing-transversal equilibrium
at 0.5 can only be approximated on 12.5% of the samples.
Example 2.6.5. Let r = c = 1 and let Y it = Y
i
0 , 0 ≤ t < T be constant i.i.d. processes such
that Law(Y it ) has the tent-shaped probability density f(x) = 2 − 4|x − 1/2|, x ∈ [0, 1]. As
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illustrated in Figure 2.5 (left panel), the corresponding equation (2.4.1) has a decreasing-
transversal solution at u = 1/2 and increasing-transversal solutions at u = 0 and u = 1.
For the game with n = 10′000 players, the histogram in Figure 2.5 shows the values of
k/n such that k satisfies the equilibrium conditions (2.3.1). The simulation illustrates the
convergence to the equilibria at u = 0, 1 as proved in Theorem 2.6.1 but also suggests that
u = 1/2 is not a limit of n-player equilibria; indeed, only about 12.5% of the samples allow
for an n-player equilibrium with k/n close to 1/2. In Proposition 2.6.11, we will establish
an asymptotic upper bound which yields e−2 ≈ 13.5% in this example.
In the remainder of this section we assume that Ft admits a continuous density ft. Let
x ∈ [0, 1] be a solution of u+Ft(r−cu) = 1. We say that x is strongly decreasing-transversal
if ∂u|u=x[u+ Ft(r − cu)] < 0 or equivalently
ft(r − cx) > c−1.
We note that x is then necessarily in (0, 1) and decreasing-transversal in the sense of Defini-
tion 2.4.2; the only difference (given the continuity assumption) is that we exclude the case
where u + Ft(r − cu) has a vanishing derivative at x (see also Remark 2.6.10). Intuitively,
when ft(r− cx) is large, there are many similar agents (in terms of values of Y i and relative
to the interaction constant c) close to such a state. As a result, these agents may tend to
coordinate and either all stop or all not stop: it may be impossible to break up the group7
and create an n-player equilibrium close to x.
Theorem 2.6.6. Let ρ be a mean field equilibrium and suppose that the set
{t ≥ 0 : ρ(t) is strongly decreasing-transversal}
has nonempty interior.8 Then there does not exist a sequence of n-player equilibria ρn Fatou
converging to ρ in probability.
7Clearly, this intuition does not explain the phase-transition character of the phenomenon. To gather
the intuition for a large density, it may be useful to consider the limiting case of an atom in Ft: all agents
corresponding to the atom make the same stopping decision.
8Note that the condition is nonempty interior rather than the set being nonempty. This corresponds
to the fact that convergence in probability on a dense set of times t is sufficient for Fatou convergence; cf.
Definition 2.5.3.
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This theorem follows from Corollary 2.6.8 below which shows non-existence with positive
probability at any fixed time t where ρ(t) is strongly decreasing-transversal. For brevity, we
set
Gn,t(k) = #{Y it + c kn ≥ r}
so that the n-player equilibrium conditions (2.3.1) can be expressed concisely as Gn,t(k) =
k = Gn,t(k − 1). Moreover, we introduce
Kn,t = {0 ≤ k ≤ n : Gn,t(k) = k = Gn,t(k − 1)}.
Roughly speaking, we think of Kn,t(ω) as the set of all k such that k/n = ρn(t)(ω) for
some n-player equilibrium ρn(t). (This is not quite meaningful since equilibria can always
be altered on nullsets.) More precisely, we have that if ρn is a given equilibrium, then
nρn(t) ∈ Kn,t a.s. by (3.1). In particular, we will use below that {|x− ρn(t)| < ε} ⊆ {∃ k ∈
Kn,t : |x− kn | < ε} a.s. for all x ∈ [0, 1] and ε > 0. Finally, we also introduce the superset
K∗n,t = {0 ≤ k ≤ n : Gn,t(k) = k} ⊇ Kn,t
which has no direct interpretation in terms of our game but is conveniently related to
crossings of empirical distribution functions (see the proof below).
Proposition 2.6.7. Fix t ≥ 0 and let x ∈ (0, 1) satisfy x + Ft(r − cx) = 1. Let α :=




n→∞P (∃ k ∈ K
∗
n,t : |x− kn | < ε) =
1− θ
α− 1 < 1
where θ ∈ (0, 1) is defined through θe−θ = αe−α.
Proof. We first observe the local nature of the claim. Indeed, introducing the uniform
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random variables U i = Ft(Y
i
t ) we see that the event
An,ε = {∃ k ∈ K∗n,t : |x− kn | < ε}
= {∃ 0 ≤ k ≤ n : #{Y it + c kn ≥ r} = k, |x− kn | < ε}
= {∃ 0 ≤ k ≤ n : #{U i ≥ Ft(r − c kn )} = k, |x− kn | < ε}
depends only on the values of Ft in an ε-neighborhood of x. In particular, for ε small
enough, we may change Ft outside that neighborhood to guarantee that the set of solutions
of u+ Ft(r − cu) = 1 is {0, x, 1}.
Considering the c.d.f. G(u) = 1 − Ft(r − cu), the proposition can be rephrased as the
probability of having no crossings of the empirical distribution of G and the (theoretical)
uniform distribution near x:
An,ε = {∃ t ∈ [0, 1] : 1n#{G−1(U i) ≤ t} = t, |x− t| < ε}.
(To see this identity, note that 1n#{G−1(U i) ≤ t} = t implies t = k/n for some 0 ≤ k ≤ n.)
Following [91], this problem can be related to boundary-crossing probabilities of Poisson
processes which turn out to be computable. In particular, after changing Ft as outlined
above, the conditions of [91, Theorem 1] are satisfied for G and noting that α = G′(x), this
theorem yields the result.
In view of Kn,t ⊆ K∗n,t, we have the following consequence (see also Figure 2.6).





n→∞P (∃ k ∈ Kn,t : |x−
k
n | < ε) < 1.
Remark 2.6.9. One can ask if the non-existence result is related to the convention made
in Section 2.3 that players do not consider their own impact on the state process. To
address this question, we can drop the first equation in the equilibrium conditions (2.3.1)
and keep only the second (which seems uncontroversial); i.e., #{Y it + c kn < r} = n − k.
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Figure 2.6: Bounds for the probability of finding an n-player equilibrium near x as in
Corollary 2.6.8. The dashed and dashed-dotted lines are the upper bounds derived from
Proposition 2.6.7 and Proposition 2.6.11, respectively. The solid line is the lower bound
from Proposition 2.6.13.
This corresponds to the definition of K∗n,t and Proposition 2.6.7 shows that non-existence
holds even under this condition alone.
Remark 2.6.10. Heuristics suggest that in the tangential case of a decreasing-transversal
x with α = 1, the limiting probability is 1; i.e., the equilibrium is in fact a limit of n-player
equilibria. The tangential case is less important because it generically does not occur, in
the same sense as discussed below Definition 2.5.6. We do not provide a rigorous result.
In our last result, we determine the asymptotic expected number of equilibria close to
x (for both increasing- and decreasing-transversal cases). Importantly, it implies that this
number is positive with positive probability. When α > 1 is not close to 1, it also yields a
fairly accurate upper bound for the probability of not finding an n-player equilibrium close
to x (cf. Example 2.6.5) since the probability of finding more than one solution is small. On
the other hand, we see that as α → 1, the expected number of solutions tends to infinity,
and in particular the probability of finding many solutions becomes large9.
Proposition 2.6.11. Fix t ≥ 0 and let x ∈ (0, 1) satisfy x + Ft(r − cx) = 1. Let α :=
9In fact, one can show that limα→1 lim supn→∞ P (#{Kn,t ∩ |x − kn | < ε} = j) = 0 for all finite j ≥ 0
when ε > 0 is small enough.
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n→∞E[#{k ∈ Kn,t : |x−
k








P (∃ k ∈ Kn,t : |x− kn | < ε) ≤
e−α
|1− α| .
One consequence of Proposition 2.6.11 is that non-uniqueness is indeed the typical case
for the n-player game, as claimed in the Introduction: under the stated smoothness as-
sumption on Ft, we typically have at least one mean field equilibrium corresponding to
0 6= α < 1 and then the proposition and Lemma 2.6.2 imply that there is more than one
n-player equilibrium, for large n.
Proof of Proposition 2.6.11. We may assume that c = 1, and we drop the index t every-
where. We denote
α(z) = f(r − z)
and recall that x ∈ (0, 1) and α = α(x) 6= 1. Fix ε > 0 and denote
x− = x− ε, x+ = x+ ε,
F− = F (r − x− ε), F+ = F (r − x+ ε),
α− = inf|z−x|<ε





z(1− z), M(z) = sup
|z−x|≤ε
z(1− z).
We assume that ε is small enough such that x± ∈ (0, 1) and 1 /∈ [α−, α+].
Step 1: Bounds for P (k ∈ Kn). Fix n and let U i = F (Y i), 1 ≤ i ≤ n so that (U i)
are i.i.d. Unif[0, 1], and let U (1) ≥ · · · ≥ U (n) be the associated reverse order statistics.
Noting that U (k) = U(n−k+1) for the usual (increasing) order statistics U(·), we have that
U (k) ∼ Beta(n − k + 1, k) and U (k+1) = U (k)W
1
n−k
k where Wk ∼ Unif[0, 1] is independent;
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cf. [5, Section 4]. Moreover, we note that k ∈ Kn is equivalent to
U (k) ≥ F (r − k−1n ) =: Fk−1 and U (k+1) ≤ F (r − kn ) =: Fk. (2.6.2)
As a result, for any deterministic integer 1 ≤ k ≤ n,
P (k ∈ Kn) = P
(







U (k+1) ≤ Fk







∣∣U (k) = z) dP (U (k) = z)
=
n!
(n− k)!(k − 1)!
∫ 1
Fk−1






Fn−kk (1− Fk−1)k (2.6.3)
where dP (U (k) = z) indicates integration with respect to the law of U (k). We may observe
that this quantity is reminiscent of a binomial distribution except that the success probability
changes with k. Next, we use Taylor’s theorem to find that
Fk−1 = F (r − kn + 1n ) = F (r − kn ) + αk/n = Fk + αk/n (2.6.4)
where αk = α(ηk) with ηk ∈ [k−1n , kn ] and in particular αk ∈ [α−, α+]. Now suppose that
|x− kn | < ε. Then k ≥ nx−, and using also Fk ≥ F−,




























(1− y) ≤ e−y ≤ (1− y)(1 + o(y))
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as y → 0 applied with y = w/n yields
(1− wn )n ≤ e−w ≤ (1− wn )n (1 +O(1/n))
as n→∞, uniformly over w in a compact interval. This leads us to the upper bound







Similarly, we have the lower bound





























showing in particular that n! =
√
2pin (ne )
n (1 +O(1/n)). Since n− k and k are comparable













uniformly over all k such that |x− kn | < ε. This shows that
Zn,ε :=
∑








k: |x− kn |<ε
1√
2pin(1− kn ) kn
Fn−kk (1− Fk)k








(1− kn )n−k( kn )k
. (2.6.7)
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Our next goal is to estimate the summand above. We introduce the function
ϕ(z) = (1− z)n−kzk
so that
Fn−kk (1− Fk)k





is the term in question. We can use Taylor’s theorem similarly as above to find
Fk = F (r − kn ) = F (r − x+ x− kn ) = F (r − x) + α˜k(x− kn )
where α˜k ∈ [α−, α+]. As F (r − x) = 1− x, this equality can be rewritten as
Fk = 1− kn + (α˜k − 1)(x− kn ).
Introducing also
ψ(z) = logϕ(z) = (n− k) log(1− z) + k log z,
we have













and then ψ′(k/n) = 0 shows that ψ and ϕ have a global maximum at k/n. Taylor’s theorem
at the second order yields
ψ(1− Fk)− ψ( kn ) = ψ( kn − (α˜k − 1)(x− kn ))− ψ( kn ) =
ψ′′(ξk)
2
(α˜k − 1)2(x− kn )2




n−(α˜k−1)(x− kn ). Therefore, we have |ξk−x| < Aε,











ψ(1− Fk)− ψ( kn ) ≤ −
n
2
Γε(α˜k − 1)2(x− kn )2.
103








Γε(α∗ − 1)2(x− kn )2
)
and plugging this into (2.6.7) we have that
Zn,ε ≤ 1 +O(1/n)√
m(x)
∑













nΓε|α∗ − 1|( kn − x)
and note that




The above sum can then be written as































2/2 dw = 1. Indeed, after
subtracting the two largest summands neighboring the origin, the sum can be seen as a




















Step 3: Conclusion. Recalling (2.6.5) we have
E[#{k ∈ Kn : |x− kn | < ε}] =
∑
k: |x− kn |<ε




















|α∗ − 1| .
As ε→ 0 we have x− → x, α− → α, α∗ → α, F− → F (r − x) = 1− x and












E[#{k ∈ Kn : |x− kn | < ε}] ≤
e−α
|α− 1| .
The matching lower bound follows similarly after replacing α− by α+, F− by F+, and so
on.
Remark 2.6.12. The above proof offers insight into the speed of convergence of n-player
equilibria. Specifically, the estimates entail that if εn ↓ 0 is such that εn
√
n → β ∈ [0,∞],
then









where µ is the standard Gaussian distribution. Thus, a ball of radius rn/
√
n around x, where
rn →∞ arbitrarily slowly, will asymptotically contain all n-player equilibria converging to
x, and this is optimal in the sense that if lim sup rn <∞ the ball will miss some solutions.
In our final result we complement the upper bound in Proposition 2.6.11 by a lower
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bound. The gap between the bounds vanishes for large α; see also Figure 2.6.
Proposition 2.6.13. Fix t ≥ 0, let x ∈ (0, 1) satisfy x + Ft(r − cx) = 1 and suppose that




n→∞ P (∃ k ∈ Kn,t : |x−
k




α− 1) (1 + 2√ 2|a0| {1− Φ(√2|a0|)})
with a0 := 1− α+ log(α) < 0 and Φ is the standard normal c.d.f.
Since the lower bound is strictly positive, we can interpret the result as stating that x
is necessarily part of a mixture which is itself a limit of n-player equilibria. In summary,
when x is strongly decreasing-transversal, we cannot find n-player equilibria converging to
x at time t, but at least we can find n-player equilibria converging to a randomized mean
field equilibrium which charges x.
Proof of Proposition 2.6.13. We use the notation from the proof of Proposition 2.6.11 and
suppress t. Let K = Kn,t and X = Xn,ε = #{k ∈ Kn,t : |x− kn | ≤ ε}. Set µ = E[X] and let
A = An,ε = {|X − cµ| ≥ cµ}
for a constant c > 0 to be chosen later. Clearly P (X = 0) ≤ P (A). Using the Markov
inequality
























and choosing c = θE[X
2]
2µ2 for some θ > 1, we obtain that








µ2 and conclude that







Since we have already determined the limit of E[X] in Proposition 2.6.11, our goal is to find
an upper bound for E[X2]. To that end, we first compute
P (k ∈ K, j ∈ K) = P (U (k+1) ≤ Fk, U (k) ≥ Fk−1, U (j+1) ≤ Fj , U (j) ≥ Fj−1)
for k < j; recall the notation of (2.6.2). In fact, this probability is zero for j = k + 1, so we
focus on k+ 2 ≤ j. Conditionally on U (k+1) = h < U (k) = u, the pair (U (j), U (j+1)) has the
same distribution as (hV (j−(k+1)), hV (j−k)) where V (`) are the reverse order statistics of an
i.i.d. sample V1, · · · , Vn−(k+1) of size n− (k + 1) and distribution Unif[0, 1]. Thus, we have
P
(
U (j+1) ≤ Fj , U (j) ≥ Fj−1
∣∣U (k+1) = h, U (k) = u)
= P
(
V j−(k+1) ≤ Fj
h




Clearly P (V (j−k) ≥ Fj−1h ) = 0 if Fj−1 ≥ h, so we only need to consider the case h ∈
[Fj−1, Fk]. Using the formula developed in (2.6.3), we obtain
P
(
U (j+1) ≤ Fj , U (j) ≥ Fj−1
∣∣U (k+1) = h, U (k) = u)
=
(
n− (k + 1)









As above (2.6.2), the joint density of U (k) and U (k+1) can be computed using the fact that















(1− u)k−1hn−(k+1) 10≤h≤u≤1 du dh.
Integrating with respect to this density and using the appropriate restrictions, we deduce
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n− (k + 1)















(1− Fk−1)k n− k
j − k
(
n− (k + 1)
j − (k + 1)
)


































By a repeated application of (2.6.4) we have that
Fj
Fk
= 1− αj(j−k)nFk for some αj ∈ [α−, α+]







































































2pi(j − k) exp
(
1








2pi(j − k) .
As a result, we obtain the upper bound







2pi(j − k) exp(a(j − k)) (2.6.12)
where
a = a(α, ε) := 1− α− 1− x+
F+

































P (k ∈ K) + 2
∑
k<j
P (k ∈ K, j ∈ K).









P (k ∈ K, j ∈ K)








Note that a0 := limε↓0 a(α, ε) = 1 − α + log(α) is strictly negative since α > 1. Thus,
a = a(α, ε) < 0 for ε small enough, so that 1√
`

























Recalling also that limε→0 limn→∞E[X] = e
−α























Heterogeneous beliefs about fundamental values are a key motive for trade on financial
markets. Accordingly, a rich literature studies how prices form as the aggregate of subjective
beliefs; see e.g. the survey [101] for numerous references. This synthesis happens by means of
trading: agents with lower individual valuations sell to agents who are more optimistic about
fundamentals. Hence, liquidity—the ease with which trades can be implemented—plays an
important role in determining how beliefs are reflected in prices.
In the present study, we propose a tractable model that allows us to study the interplay
of heterogenous beliefs and liquidity in determining asset prices. We consider N (types of)
agents who have different beliefs about the state process determining the payoff of a given
asset. They trade the asset in continuous time to maximize their expected returns, penalized
with quadratic costs on inventories and trading rates. We show that this model admits a
unique Markovian equilibrium. The equilibrium price is characterized as the solution of a
linear system of parabolic equations with a weak coupling (i.e., the equations are coupled
only through the zeroth-order terms). The solution, as well as the necessary estimates on its
derivatives, are obtained by combining a fixed point argument of [8] for reaction–diffusion
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equations, classical Schauder theory for parabolic equations and a gradient estimate that
seems to be novel.
This characterization allows us to study the influence of the two costs. The holding costs
on inventories, parametrized by a coefficient γ, can be seen as a proxy for risk aversion,
whereas the costs on the trading rate, with coefficient λ > 0, stand in for the liquidity (or
transaction) cost caused by market impact. These costs determine how agents take into
account current and future expected returns when choosing their portfolios, and turn out to
play inverse roles. Specifically, when the asset is in zero net supply (a natural assumption
for derivative contracts, say) the two costs only enter through their ratio γ/λ. For a positive
supply, the asset price remains invariant if the inverse of the supply is rescaled in the same
manner as transaction and holding costs, so that the larger trading and holding costs of
bigger asset positions are offset by reducing both frictions.
Explicit asymptotic formulas obtain in the limiting regimes where either transaction
costs or holding costs are small (γ/λ ≈ ∞ or γ/λ ≈ 0, respectively). For small transac-
tion costs λ → 0, a singular perturbation expansion identifies the leading-order correction
term relative to the frictionless equilibrium in which assets are priced by taking conditional
expectations under a representative agent’s probability measure that averages the agents’
beliefs. The correction term turns out to be proportional to the square root
√
λ of the
transaction costs. The corresponding constant of proportionality is related to the average
of the subjective integrated drifts of the agents’ frictionless portfolios. Thus, equilibrium
prices increase relative to their frictionless counterparts if agents on average expect to in-
crease their positions in the future, and vice versa. The interpretation is that in illiquid
markets, agents take into account their future trading needs to reduce transaction costs.
Accordingly, expectations of future purchases already lead to increased positions earlier on
and equilibrium prices increase according to the excess demand created by the aggregated
adjustments of all agents, and vice versa.
The equilibrium for small holding costs γ → 0 can be approximated by a regular per-
turbation expansion around the risk-neutral equilibrium price which averages all agents’
subjective conditional expectations. Here, the leading-order correction term is determined
by γ times the average of the agents’ expectations of their future positions. Other things
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equal, agents reduce the magnitude of their positions when holding costs are introduced,
thereby reducing the demand of agents who expect to be long on average, and increasing
the demand of agents that expect to be short. The resulting sign of the price correction
therefore depends on the aggregate expectations in the market.
To illustrate the implications of these results and test the numerical accuracy of the ex-
pansions, we consider an example where the state process determining the asset’s payoff has
Ornstein–Uhlenbeck dynamics. Agents agree on the mean-reversion level and volatility, but
disagree about the speed of mean-reversion. For these linear state dynamics, the parabolic
PDE system describing the equilibrium price can be reduced to a system of linear ODEs by
a suitable ansatz. The corresponding equilibrium prices can be computed numerically using
standard ODE solvers and compared to the explicit formulas that obtain for our small-cost
asymptotics in this case. We find that the introduction of small transaction costs increases
volatility, in line with the asymmetric information model of [42], the risk-sharing model
studied in [62] and empirical studies such as [57, 71, 109]. By contrast, the introduction of
small holding costs decreases the equilibrium volatility. The reason is the opposite manner
in which the two costs influence how agents take into account future trading opportunities.
Without transaction costs, agents who believe in faster than average mean-reversion per-
ceive a mean-reverting price process and therefore sell when its value is high, whereas agents
who believe in slower mean-reversion perceive a price process that exhibits “momentum”
and therefore buy in this case. While this frictionless tradeoff only depends on the current
dynamics of the asset, transaction costs force the agents to take into account future trading
opportunities as well. This makes the current trading opportunities less attractive for the
agent believing in faster mean-reversion and therefore creates an excess demand for the asset
when its price is high. This in turn further increases high prices and conversely decreases
low ones, leading to additional volatility.
Holding costs have the opposite effect, by discounting the importance of future trading
opportunities and therefore reducing volatility relative to the risk-neutral limiting price. In
fact, numerical experiments suggest that the exact equilibrium volatility smoothly inter-
polates between the risk-neutral volatility (which is highest) and its counterpart without
transaction costs (which is lowest). For model parameters estimated from time series data
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for the USD/EUR exchange rate, we find that the exact equilibrium prices agree with these
comparative statics gleaned from their asymptotic approximations.
For models where trading is frictionless, there is an extensive literature on asset pricing
under heterogeneous beliefs; see, e.g., [23, 45, 72, 101] and the references therein. To obtain
tractable results with limited liquidity, we focus on a model with quadratic holding and
trading costs as well as linear preferences over gains and losses.
Similar linear-quadratic liquidity models are used in partial equilibrium contexts by [1,
4, 6, 79]. Risk-sharing equilibria with homogenous beliefs are studied in [25, 54, 62, 99].
Since the corresponding first-order conditions are linear, these models are considerably more
tractable than equilibrium models with other preferences or trading costs, where analytical
results are only available if prices or trading strategies are deterministic [87, 110, 111, 112]
or agents only trade once [100]. A numerical analysis of an equilibrium model with het-
erogenous beliefs and transaction costs is carried out in [29].
Considering a holding cost on risky positions as in [36, 40, 94, 99] further simplifies the
analysis compared to models where the corresponding risk penalty is imposed on the variance
of the risky positions as in [53, 54, 62]. Indeed, in the present model, we can characterize
the equilibrium price by a system of linear PDEs, avoiding the nonlinear equations that
naturally appear in models where agents have risk aversion in the form of concave utility
functions. Since the present work focuses on equilibrium asset prices with heterogeneous
beliefs about the underlying state process, we abstract from heterogeneous holding costs.
These are considered in [62] for agents with homogeneous beliefs and in [37] for a partial
equilibrium model with heterogeneous beliefs.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 details the financial market and the defi-
nition of an equilibrium. In Section 3.3 we derive the optimal portfolio of any agent given
an exogenous asset price process. Section 3.4 provides the existence, uniqueness and PDE
characterization of the equilibrium price. The leading-order asymptotics for small transac-
tion and holding costs are presented in Sections 3.5 and 3.6, respectively. The concluding
Section 3.7 covers the example with mean reversion.
Notation. As usual, C = C(Rn) is the space of continuous functions g(x) on Rn and Ck
is the space of functions g ∈ C whose partial derivatives up to order k exist and belong to
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C. Similarly, C1,k is the space of continuous functions g(t, x) such that g(t, ·), ∂tg(t, ·) ∈ Ck.
For any of these spaces, a subscript “b” indicates that the functions and all mentioned
derivatives are bounded. The dimension n of the underlying domain is often understood from
the context. Conditional expectations are denoted Et[·] = E[·|Ft] for brevity and when F is
a functional of the paths of a process Y , we will often write Et,y[F (Y )] = E[F (Y )|Yt = y].
In this context, Y will be the solution of an SDE and E[F (Y )|Yt = y] can be unambiguously
defined as E[F (Y t,y)] where (Y t,ys )s≥t is the unique solution of the corresponding SDE with
initial condition y at time t.
3.2 Model
Beliefs. Let X be the coordinate-mapping process on the space Ω = C0([0, T ],Rd) of
continuous, d-dimensional paths with ω0 = 0, equipped with the canonical σ-field F and
filtration (Ft) generated by X. We consider N (types of) agents with heterogeneous views
on the distribution of the state process X. Specifically, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ N , let Qi be a
probability measure on Ω under which X satisfies
dXt = bi(t,Xt)dt+ σi(t,Xt)dW
i
t (3.2.1)
where W i is a d′-dimensional Brownian motion. We assume that bi : [0, T ]× Rd → Rd and
σi : [0, T ] × Rd → Rd×d′ are jointly Lipschitz and bounded. This guarantees in particular
that (3.2.1) has a unique strong solution. Moreover, we assume that the matrix σ2i := σiσ
>
i
is uniformly parabolic: there is a constant κ > 0 such that ξ>σ2i ξ ≥ κ|ξ|2 for all ξ ∈ Rd.
The associated generator is denoted by
Li = ∂t + bi∂x + 1
2
Trσ2i ∂xx. (3.2.2)
Remark 3.2.1. The above assumptions imply that the support of Qi is the whole space Ω;
cf. [105, Theorem 3.1]. Thus, if F and G are continuous functions on Ω, then F (X) = G(X)
Qi-a.s. is equivalent to F = G. This fact will be used throughout the paper, often implicitly.
Uniform parabolicity is convenient to simplify the exposition, but of course results similar
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to ours could be obtained under different assumptions. When the support of X is not the
whole space, the statements involving price functions and PDEs need to be restricted to a
suitable domain (as, e.g., in [90]).
Market Model. Let f ∈ C3b (Rd). We consider N agents that dynamically trade an
asset with a single payoff f(XT ) at the time horizon T > 0. Fix a constant a0 ≥ 0, the
exogenous supply at time t = 0, and the initial asset allocation ai ∈ R to each agent,
where
∑N
i=1 ai = a0. Let L
p(Qi) denote the set of progressively measurable processes
φ = (φt)0≤t≤T (of appropriate dimension) such that Ei[
∫ T
0
φpt dt] < ∞. An (admissible)
portfolio for agent i is a scalar process φ ∈ L 4(Qi) which satisfies φ0 = ai and is absolutely
continuous with rate φ˙ ∈ L 4(Qi).1 We say that portfolios φi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N clear the market if
N∑
i=1
φit = a0, t ∈ [0, T ]
holds pointwise. A price process (for f) is a progressively measurable process S = (St)0≤t≤T









i, νi ∈ L 4(Qi) (3.2.3)
for some Qi-Brownian motion W
i, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
Equilibrium. To formulate the agents’ optimization criteria, we fix a holding cost param-
eter γ > 0 and a transaction cost parameter λ > 0. (The boundary cases λ = 0 and γ = 0
will be considered in Sections 3.5 and 3.6, respectively.) For a given price process S, agent
i maximizes her expected returns, penalized for inventories and trading costs,












over the set of her admissible portfolios. A portfolio φi is optimal for agent i if it is a
maximizer. If S is a price process such that there exist optimal portfolios φi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N
1The precise integrability condition is not crucial; we simply need to ensure that the local martingale
part of
∫
φdS has vanishing expectation when S is defined as in (3.2.3). In our main equilibrium result the
optimal portfolios are bounded.
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for the agents which clear the market, then S is an equilibrium price process. Finally,
v : [0, T ] × Rd → R is an equilibrium price function if v(t,Xt) defines an equilibrium price
process. We shall be interested in equilibria with prices of this Markovian form; however,
the associated portfolios are usually path-dependent in the presence of transaction costs.
3.3 Single-Agent Optimality
As a preparation for the equilibrium result, we first fix agent i and solve her individual
optimization problem in the face of an exogenous price process. Similar linear-quadratic
optimization problems have been considered, e.g., in [4, 6, 25, 36, 53, 54, 79]; we provide a
self-contained proof for the convenience of the reader.







, t ∈ [0, T ]. (3.3.1)


































, φi0 = ai. (3.3.3)







γ ds] of the future values of the no-transaction cost portfolio µ
i
t/γ
obtained by pointwise maximization of the drift of (3.2.4). To wit, illiquidity it accounted
for by “aiming in front of the moving target” [53]. Both the tracking speed −G′(t)/G(t) and
the discount kernel K(t, s) = −γG(s)/λG′(t) are determined by the ratio γ/λ of holding
and transaction costs, with relatively lower transaction costs leading to faster trading and
more emphasis on the current returns of the asset.
Proof of Lemma 3.3.1. Direct differentiation shows that φ˙i of (3.3.3) is indeed the derivative
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of φi in (3.3.2). Moreover, µi ∈ L 4(Qi) and Doob’s inequality imply that φi ∈ L 4(Qi) and
then (3.3.3) yields that φ˙i ∈ L 4(Qi).
Note that
















for any portfolio φ and that portfolios can be parametrized by their trading rates since the
initial allocations are fixed and φ˙ ∈ L 4(Qi) implies φ ∈ L 4(Qi). The strict concavity of J i
implies that any optimizer is (a.e.) unique and that a trading rate φ˙ is optimal if and only
if the Gaˆteaux derivative limε→0 1ε [J
i(φ˙ + εϑ˙) − J i(φ˙)] of (3.2.4) vanishes in all directions



























, ϑ˙ ∈ L 4(Qi).

















for some Qi-martingale M
i. Put differently, φ˙ ∈ L4(Qi) is optimal if and only if it solves
the linear forward-backward SDE










dt+ dMt, φ˙T = 0. (3.3.5)










































































λ ds], where G
′′(t) = γλG(t) was used. As
G′(T ) = 0, the terminal condition φ˙iT = 0 is also satisfied.
3.4 Equilibrium
The following result establishes the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium price func-
tion v ∈ C1,2b ([0, T ] × Rd) and its characterization through a weakly-coupled system of








Trσ2i ∂xxvi + bi∂xvi +
G′(t)
G(t)










vi(T, ·) = f, 1 ≤ i ≤ N (3.4.3)
has a unique solution v1, . . . , vN ∈ C1,2b ([0, T ]×Rd), and the function v defined via (3.4.2) is
an equilibrium price function. It is unique in the sense that any equilibrium price function




















An immediate consequence of this result is that the holding costs γ and transaction
costs λ have dual roles. In particular, in the case of zero net supply a0 = 0, the equilibrium
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price depends only on the ratio γ/λ, so that small transaction costs are equivalent to large
holding costs. When a0 > 0, the theorem shows that the equilibrium price is 0-homogeneous
in (γ, λ, 1/a0). We discuss this in more detail in Section 3.6 below, after deriving the limiting
cases for small costs.
As a preparation for the proof of Theorem 3.4.1, we first establish the analytic properties
of the parabolic system. Given α ∈ (0, 1), the Ho¨lder space C1+α/2,2+α([0, T ]×Rd) consists
of the functions w(t, x) such that w, ∂tw, ∂xw, ∂xxw exist, are bounded, and uniformly Ho¨lder
continuous with exponents α/2 in t and α in x.
Proposition 3.4.2. The system (3.4.1–3.4.3) has a unique solution v1, . . . , vN ∈ C1,2b ([0, T ]×
Rd). In fact, v1, . . . , vN ∈ C1+α/2,2+α([0, T ] × Rd) for all α ∈ (0, 1) and uniqueness holds
in the larger class of functions w1, . . . , wN ∈ C1,2([0, T ) × Rd) ∩ C([0, T ] × Rd) satisfying
|wi(t, x)| ≤ c1 exp(c2|x|2) for some constants c1, c2 ≥ 0.
Proof. The system (3.4.1–3.4.3) is a weakly coupled, uniformly parabolic linear system;
see [51, Chapter 9] for background. Uniqueness in the stated class is a special case of [22,
Theorem 1]. An existence result for such linear systems is contained, e.g., in [51, Theorem 3,
p. 256], but this does not yield growth estimates of the type we require here. Our system
is also covered by a literature on reaction–diffusion systems. Specifically, [8, Theorem 2.4]
yields that (3.4.1–3.4.3) has a unique solution v1, . . . , vN ∈ C1,2([0, T )×Rd)∩Cb([0, T ]×Rd).
The main point (which we have not found provided in the literature) is to prove a useful
growth estimate on the derivatives, and for that, the key element is to provide a Ho¨lder
estimate for vi.
(i) In this step we show that vi is globally Lipschitz in x, uniformly in t. Writing
u = (u1, . . . , uN ), our system is of the general form
Liui(t, x) + h(t, u(t, x)) = 0, ui(T, x) = fi(x), 1 ≤ i ≤ N (3.4.4)
satisfying the following conditions, for some constant c > 0: the function h is jointly Lips-
chitz with norm Lip(h) ≤ c (hence h(t, ·) is of linear growth, uniformly in t); the coefficients
of Li are bounded and Lipschitz; each fi is bounded and Lipschitz with norm Lip(fi). Ac-
cording to [8, Theorem 2.4], such a system has a (unique) solution v1, . . . , vN ∈ C1,2 ∩ Cb.
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Indeed, define










, 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
It is shown in the proofs of [8, Theorems 2.3 and 2.4] that F = (F1, . . . , FN ) is a contraction
on (Cb)
N = Cb×· · ·×Cb for a complete norm which is equivalent to the uniform norm. More
precisely, this holds after suitably truncating h (i.e., so that the truncation does not affect the
bounded solution). It is shown that if we start at any u ∈ (Cb)N and iterate F , the sequence
un = (F ◦ · · · ◦ F )(u) will converge uniformly to a solution (v1, . . . , vN ) ∈ (C1,2 ∩ Cb)N
of (3.4.4). We may, in particular, pick u ∈ (Cb)N such that sup0≤s≤T Lip(ui(s, ·)) <∞ for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ N as our starting point for the iteration.
By a standard estimate on SDEs (e.g., [107, Theorem 2.4 (i), p. 8]),
Ei|Xt,xs −Xt,ys | ≤ K|x− y|, 0 ≤ s ≤ T
for a constant K depending only on the Lipschitz constants of the coefficients of Li and T .








Then for t ≤ s ≤ T we have that






cmaxi Lip(ui(r, ·))|Xs,xr −Xs,yr |dr
]
≤ [K Lip(fi) + τcKLu] |x− y|.
This holds for all i. Choose τ such that ε := τcK < 1 and set Lf = max1≤i≤N K Lip(fi),
then
Lip(F (u)(s, ·)) ≤ Lf + εLu, t ≤ s ≤ T,
the notation of course meaning that each component Fi(u) satisfies this property. Iterating
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yields that un = (F ◦ · · · ◦ F )(u) satisfies the geometric estimate




and hence the uniform limit (v1, . . . , vN ) = limu
n satisfies Lip(vi(s, ·)) ≤ Lf (1 − ε)−1 for
t ≤ s ≤ T .
Note that the size τ of the interval in the above argument does not depend on Lip(f).
Hence we can repeat the argument on the interval [T − 2τ, T − τ ], replacing the termi-
nal condition fi by f˜i := vi(T − τ, ·). Continuing finitely many times, we conclude that
sup0≤s≤T Lip(vi(s, ·)) <∞.
(ii) Next, we show that vi is globally 1/2-Ho¨lder in t, uniformly in x. A simple SDE
estimate shows that
Ei|Xt′,xs −Xt,xs | ≤ K|t′ − t|1/2, 0 ≤ t ≤ t′ ≤ s ≤ T
where K now depends on the Lipschitz constants and uniform bounds for bi and σi as well
as T . (To see this one may, e.g., go through the proof of [107, Theorem 2.4 (ii), p. 8] and
use the uniform bounds in the estimate below Equation (2.5) of that reference to avoid a
dependence on x in the final estimate for Ei|Xt,xs −Xt,ys |.)
As mentioned above, the relevant function h in (3.4.4) is truncated in u, so that ‖h‖∞ <
∞. This yields the (crude but simple) estimate
∫ t′
t
|h(s,Xt,xs , u(s,Xt,xs ))|ds ≤ ‖h‖∞|t′ − t| ≤ c′|t′ − t|1/2 (3.4.5)
for some constant c′, since |t′ − t| ≤ T . If u ∈ (Cb)N is Lipschitz in x with constant Lu
uniformly in t, we then have, similarly as in (i) but using also (3.4.5),










≤ [K Lip(fi) + c′ + TcLuK] |t′ − t|1/2.
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Again, we iterate the mapping F to generate un = (F ◦ · · · ◦ F )(u). By (i) we have that
supn Lun <∞. Hence, the above shows that |uni (t′, x)−uni (t, x)| ≤ c′′|t′−t|1/2 for a uniform
constant c′′, and then the same holds for the limit (v1, . . . , vN ) = limun.
(iii) We have shown above that v is globally Lipschitz in x and 1/2-Ho¨lder in t; in
particular vj ∈ Cα/2,α for all α ∈ (0, 1). (See [81, p. 117] for a detailed definition of the
Ho¨lder spaces.) For fixed i, we can see vi as the solution of a scalar PDE which contains
(vj)j as coefficients: ϕ = vi is the solution of
L˜ϕ(t, x) + g(t, x) = 0, ϕ(T, ·) = f
on [0, T ] × Rd with terminal value f ∈ C2+α, parabolic operator L˜u := Liu − u and inho-
mogeneous term g ∈ Cα/2,α defined by













using the fixed functions (vj)1≤j≤N . We can now apply a suitable version of the Schauder
estimates to conclude that vi = ϕ ∈ C1+α/2,2+α([0, T ]×Rd); cf. [81, Theorem 9.2.3, p. 140].
Remark 3.4.3. Suppose that bi, σi, f ∈ C∞b for 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Then we also have vi ∈ C∞b .
Proof. If bi, σi ∈ C∞([0, T ) × Rd), interior regularity for parabolic systems as stated in
[51, Theorem 11, p. 265] immediately yields that the solution from Proposition 3.4.2 is in
C∞([0, T )× Rd). We need to show that the partial derivatives of any order are bounded.
Fix 1 ≤ i ≤ N and 1 ≤ k ≤ d and consider the function ϕ = ∂xkvi. We can differentiate
the system (3.4.1) with respect to xk and rearrange the terms to find that ϕ is the solution
of a scalar parabolic equation
Lϕ(t, x) + g(t, x) = 0, ϕ(T, ·) = ∂xkf
on [0, T ]× Rd with terminal value ∂xkf ∈ C∞b ⊆ C2+α. Here the inhomogeneity g incorpo-
rates all other terms resulting from the differentiated equation: it is a linear combination,
with coefficients in C∞([0, T ) × Rd), of the functions vj , 1 ≤ j ≤ N as well as their first
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and second-order spatial derivatives. As vj ∈ C1+α/2,2+α by Proposition 3.4.2, we see in
particular that g ∈ Cα/2,α. Thus, we can conclude from [81, Theorem 9.2.3, p. 140] that
∂xkvi = ϕ ∈ C1+α/2,2+α([0, T ] × Rd). In particular, the third-order spatial derivatives of
vi are bounded and uniformly Ho¨lder continuous. Moreover, by the parabolic form of the
above equation, the same follows for ∂t∂xkvi = ∂tϕ.
This argument can be iterated to the higher-order derivatives.
Proof of Theorem 3.4.1. The formula for the equilibrium portfolios is a direct consequence
of Proposition 3.5.1, so we focus on the price.
(i) Let v1, . . . , vN ∈ C1,2b be the solution from Proposition 3.4.2 and define v by (3.4.2);
we show that v is an equilibrium price function. Itoˆ’s formula shows that St = v(t,Xt) is
a price process as defined in (3.2.3); the coefficients µi and νi are even bounded. In view
of (3.4.2), the function wi(t, x) := G(t)vi(t, x) satisfies
Liwi = GLivi +G′vi = G′v
and wi(T, x) = G(T )vi(T, x) = f(x). Thus, Itoˆ’s formula and the boundedness of ∂xvi imply
that under Qi we have the Feynman–Kac representation




































is optimal for agent i. It remains to prove that these portfolios clear the market. Recalling





G(T )ST −G(s)Ss −
∫ T
s






















[vi(s, x)− v(s, x)]. (3.4.8)































(ii) Let St = w(t,Xt) be an equilibrium price process for some function w ∈ C1,2([0, T ]×
Rd) of polynomial growth (or, more generally, w ∈ C1,2([0, T ) × Rd) of polynomial growth
and locally Ho¨lder continuous on [0, T ]×Rd). We have w(T, ·) = f by Remark 3.2.1. Recall
that the coefficients µit = Liw(t,Xt) and νit = ∂xw(t,Xt)>σit of (3.2.3) are in L4(Qi) as
part of our definition of a price process. We define wi by the Feynman–Kac formula (3.4.6)
with w instead of v. In view of the assumptions on bi and σi, the function wi has polynomial
growth like w. Moreover, by a careful application of standard PDE results, wi ∈ C1,2 and wi
is a solution of the associated linear PDE (3.4.1). Specifically, we can use an approximation
with bounded domains as detailed in [58, Theorem 1, Condition (A3’), Lemma 2 and the
comments above it] under the stated conditions on w.
It remains to show (3.4.2). As a consequence of Lemma 3.3.1, the agent’s equilibrium




































−1 = −a0 G
′(s)
G(s)2
which is equivalent to (3.4.2). We have thus established that w1, . . . , wN ∈ C1,2 are a
solution of (3.4.1) with polynomial growth. The claim now follows by the uniqueness of the
solution as stated in Proposition 3.4.2.
Remark 3.4.4. The restriction to Markovian equilibria in Theorem 3.4.1 (meaning that
the price is a function of t and x) is related to our choice of proof through PDE arguments
rather than fundamental. For instance, if the volatility σi is the same for all agents, similar
arguments could be carried out using Backward SDEs as in [77]. In that framework, one
would obtain uniqueness within a class of possibly non-Markovian equilibria and one could
also cover beliefs where (3.2.1) is replaced by coefficients that may depend on the path of X.
3.5 Asymptotics for Small Transaction Costs
In this section we provide intuition for the equilibrium price from Theorem 3.4.1 by describ-
ing its asymptotics for small transaction costs λ→ 0. For later comparison, we first consider
the model without transaction costs; i.e., λ = 0. In this case we drop the requirement of ab-
solute continuity in the definition of the admissible portfolios and we also do not enforce the
initial holdings ai (in any event, agents can instantaneously adjust their position after t = 0
without incurring costs). The following result, which is a special case of [94, Theorem 2.1
and Remark 3.5], shows that the corresponding equilibrium corresponds to the price of a
representative agent with a view Q¯ defined by the averaged drift and volatility coefficients.
Proposition 3.5.1. Let λ = 0 and γ > 0. There exists a unique equilibrium price function
v0 ∈ C1,2b , given by
v0(t, x) = E¯t,x[f(XT )]− (T − t)γa0
N
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where E¯ is the expectation for the probability Q¯ under which














Tr σ¯2∂xxv + b¯∂xv − γa0
N
= 0, v(T, ·) = f. (3.5.1)





In the remainder of this section we denote the equilibrium price from Theorem 3.4.1 by
vλ to emphasize the dependence on λ. Our goal is to compute its leading-order deviation
λ−1/2(vλ−v0) from the frictionless equilibrium price v0 of Proposition 3.5.1. For simplicity,
we focus on the case of a one-dimensional state variable (d = 1) with smooth drift and
diffusion coefficients and terminal condition: bi, σi, f ∈ C∞b for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , and hence
v, vi ∈ C∞b on the strength of Remark 3.4.3.
Theorem 3.5.2. For fixed holding costs γ > 0 and small transaction costs λ → 0, the
equilibrium price function vλ from Theorem 3.4.1 has the expansion
vλ(t, x) = v0(t, x) +
√
λv∗(t, x) + o(
√
λ) locally uniformly on [0, T ]× R. (3.5.3)













where φˆi,0(s, x) = Liv0(s, x)/γ is the feedback function determining agent i’s frictionless
optimal portfolio (3.5.2) and the expectation is taken under the probability measure Q¯ of the
frictionless representative agent for which











The singular perturbation expansion (3.5.3) shows that the leading-order deviation of
the frictional equilibrium price vλ from its frictionless counterpart v0 scales with the square
root
√
λ of the trading cost, as in the risk-sharing equilibrium of [62]. With the hetero-
geneous beliefs considered in the present study, the constant of proportionality (3.5.4) is
determined by the integrated drift rates
∫ T
t
Liφˆi,0(s,Xs)ds of the agents’ frictionless equi-
librium portfolios, averaged with respect to agents and states. Thus, equilibrium prices
increase relative to their frictionless counterparts if agents on average expect to increase
their positions in the future, and vice versa.2 The interpretation is that in illiquid markets,
agents take into account their future trading needs such as to save cumulative transaction
costs over the whole time interval. Accordingly, expectations of future purchases already
lead to increased positions earlier on, and vice versa. To clear the market, equilibrium prices
increase or decrease according to the excess demand or supply created by the aggregated
adjustments of all agents.
3.5.1 Proof of Theorem 3.5.2
The first step towards the proof of Theorem 3.5.2 is to show that the functions vλi from
Theorem 3.4.1 are not just bounded for each λ, but that this bound is in fact uniform
for λ ∈ (0,∞). In view of the PDEs (3.4.1) from Theorem 3.4.1 and since λG′(t)2NG(t)2 a0 is
uniformly bounded for all λ > 0 and t ∈ [0, T ] by the definition of G, this is a special case of
the following more general result that will also allow us to derive estimates for small holding
costs in the subsequent section.





i , hi ∈ C∞b ([0, T ]× R) and write
Li = ∂t + 1
2
β2i ∂xx + αi∂x.
Suppose that aεi , b
ε
i are bounded uniformly in ε ∈ E and let ui = ui(ε, λ, γ), i = 1, . . . , N
2 Note that while the actual future portfolio changes add up to zero by market clearing, this is not
necessarily true for the changes as anticipated by the heterogeneous agents under their subjective probability
measures, Liφˆi,0. In the formula for v∗, these anticipated changes are averaged across all states under the
probability measure Q¯ corresponding to the frictionless representative agent.
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i = 0, ui(T, ·) = hi, i = 1, . . . , N.
Then, |ui(t, x)| ≤ M for a constant M > 0 independent of ε, λ, γ ∈ (0,∞) and (t, x) ∈
[0, T ]× R.
Proof. Existence and uniqueness of the ui is a special case of [8, Theorem 2.4]. Since
these functions are bounded, the Feynman–Kac formula as in [76, Theorem 5.7.6] as well as





































where the expectation is taken under the measure for which the state variable has dynam-
ics dXt = αi(t,Xt)dt + βi(t,Xt)dW
i
t . Choose a uniform bound M for
∣∣e∫ s0 aεidτ bεi ∣∣ and∣∣e∫ T0 aεidτhi∣∣, and define





aεi (τ,xτ )dτui(t, xt)|
}
<∞,




















which in turn leads to












We may read this as an inequality of the form u(t) ≤ ∫ T
t
B(s)u(s)ds + A(t) for u(t) =
G(t)K(t, λ, γ). Using G′/G = (logG)′ and that G is decreasing,
∫ T
t
G(r)dr ≤ G(t)T and
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Gro¨nwall’s lemma yield









Observe that G satisfies G = λγG
′′ and G′(T ) = 0 and λγ
(G′)2























ds = 1− 1
G(t)
≤ 1,
it follows from (3.5.5) and G(t) ≥ 1 that K(t, λ, γ) ≤ 2M(T+1). As aε is uniformly bounded
in ε, t, x, the function ui is therefore uniformly bounded in ε, γ, λ, t, x by the definition of
K(t, λ, γ).
Corollary 3.5.4. There exists M > 0 such that |vλi (t, x)| ≤ M for all λ > 0 and (t, x) ∈
[0, T ]× R.
Next, we establish an analogous uniform bound for the derivatives of the functions vλi
and vλ from Theorem 3.5.2.
Lemma 3.5.5. Fix k ≥ 0. There exists M > 0 such that
|∂kxvλi (t, x)|, |∂kxvλ(t, x)|, |∂t∂kxvλ(t, x)| ≤M
for all λ > 0 and (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R.
Proof. By Theorem 3.4.1 and Remark 3.4.3, the x-derivatives of the functions vλi , i =
1, . . . , N from Theorem 3.4.1 satisfy the following PDEs obtained by differentiating (3.4.1)




























j = 0, ∂xv
λ
i (T, ·) = f ′.
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Lemma 3.5.3 therefore yields the desired uniform bound for |∂xvλi (t, x)|, and in turn also
for ∂xv




i (t, x). The corresponding bounds for the higher-order x-
derivatives follow by iterating this argument. Finally, the uniform bound for the time
derivative of ∂kxv
λ is then direct consequences of the parabolic form of the PDEs (3.4.1),
(3.5.6), etc., and their sums.
Lemma 3.5.6. For λ > 0, consider α, β, aλ, h of class C∞b and write
L = ∂t + 1
2
β2∂xx + α∂x.
Suppose that wλ ∈ C∞b satisfies wλ(T, ·) = h and ∂twλ, ∂xwλ, ∂xxwλ, aλ are bounded
uniformly in λ. Then, the unique bounded classical solution uλ of
Luλ + aλ(t, x) + G
′(t)
G(t)
(uλ − wλ) = 0, uλ(T, ·) = h
satisfies
|uλ(t, x)− wλ(t, x)|√
λ
≤M
for some M > 0 independent of λ > 0 and (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R.
Proof. Following the same steps as in the derivation of (3.4.8) yields that











where the expectation is taken under the measure for which the state variable has dynamics
dXt = α(t,Xt)dt+β(t,Xt)dWt. With a uniform bound M for a
λ+Lwλ, the desired bound
is
















where we have once again used G(u) = λγG
′′(u) and G′(T ) = 1 in the second step and the
definition of G for the last inequality.
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Corollary 3.5.7. Fix k ≥ 0. There exists M > 0 such that
|∂kxvλi (t, x)− ∂kxvλ(t, x)|√
λ
≤M
for all λ > 0 and (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R and i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Proof. In view of the PDEs (3.4.1) from Theorem 3.4.1 and the uniform bounds from Lemma
3.5.5, Lemma 3.5.6 yields that λ−1/2|vλi − vλ| ≤ M for some constant M . This proves the
assertion for k = 0. The analogous bounds for the derivatives follow by applying the same
argument to the corresponding PDEs obtained by differentiating (3.4.1) as in the proof of
Lemma 3.5.5.
We can now estimate the difference between vλ and the frictionless equilibrium price v0
of Proposition 3.5.1.
Proposition 3.5.8. Fix k ≥ 0. There exists M > 0 such that
|∂kxvλ(t, x)− ∂kxv0(t, x)|√
λ
,
|∂t∂kxvλ(t, x)− ∂t∂kxv0(t, x)|√
λ
≤M
for all λ > 0 and (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R.
Proof. Using (3.4.2) and then (3.4.1) for v, subtracting the PDE (3.5.1) for v0, and using
once again G(u) = λγG
′′(u), we obtain
∂t(v
λ − v0) + 1
2
σ¯2∂xx(v

















i − ∂xvλ) = 0
with (vλ − v0)(T, ·) = 0. Here b¯, σ¯ are as defined in Proposition 3.5.1. The desired uniform
bound for λ−1/2|vλ − v0| is now a consequence of the Feynman–Kac formula and Corol-
lary 3.5.7. The analogous result for λ−1/2|∂kxvλ − ∂kxv0| follows from the same argument
since Remark 3.4.3 shows that these derivatives satisfy similar PDEs obtained by differ-
entiating (3.5.8). The corresponding bounds for the time derivatives in turn is a direct
consequence of the parabolic form of the equations.
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t)) as λ→ 0.












du→ F (t) as λ→ 0. (3.5.9)





























G(t) converges to 0
locally uniformly on (t, T ], one verifies that the first term vanishes for λ → 0. Integration
by parts and G = λγG
′′ show that the second term converges to F (t).
Together with the uniform bounds from Proposition 3.5.8, Lemma 3.5.9 allows us to
compute the leading-order expansions of vλi − vλ and its derivatives.











Proof. The proof is similar for k = 0, 1, 2; we only spell it out in the case k = 2 for which
the computations are most involved. By Theorem 3.4.1 and Remark 3.4.3, the second-order
x-derivatives of the functions vλi , i = 1, . . . , N from Theorem 3.4.1 satisfy the following






























j = 0, ∂xxv
λ
i (T, ·) = f ′′,
where ci = 2∂xbi + (∂xσi)
2 + σi∂xxσi. Since all functions appearing here are bounded by
either by assumption or by Remark 3.4.3, the Feynman–Kac formula and G′/G = (logG)′
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where the expectation E′[·] is taken under the measure Q′ for which the state variable
has dynamics dXt = (bi + 2σi∂xσi)(t,Xt)dt+ σi(t,Xt)dW
i













































Recalling that ci, f
′′ and (by Lemma 3.5.5) also ∂xxvλ are bounded (uniformly in λ),
dominated convergence and the definition of G show that the expectation of the second term
on the right-hand side of (3.5.11) converges to zero as λ → 0. Since limλ→0 G(T )√λG(t) = 0,























Here we have used Corollary 3.5.7 and Proposition 3.5.8, and Lemma 3.5.9 for the equality.
Finally, the expectation of the first term on the right-hand side of (3.5.11) can be rewritten




λ(u,Xu), inserting the Q
′-dynamics of X and taking
into account that the corresponding local martingale part has expectation zero because all
involved functions are bounded. Dominated convergence as well as Proposition 3.5.8 and
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= L′′i ∂xxv0(t, x), (3.5.13)
where L′′i = ∂t+ 12σ2i ∂xx+ (bi+ 2σi∂xσi)∂x+ ciId. The assertion for k = 2 now follows from
(3.5.11–3.5.13) by observing that L′′i ∂xx + ∂xxbi∂x = ∂xxLi.
We can now prove the expansion of the equilibrium price for small transaction costs.
Proof of Theorem 3.5.2. We first observe that the PDE (3.5.8) for vλ − v0 admits the
Feynman–Kac representation

























































where φˆi,0 = Liv0/γ is the frictionless equilibrium portfolio function of agent i; cf. (3.5.2).
Since these strategies clear the market, the sum of their time derivatives is zero and the
pointwise limit (3.5.14) simplifies to (3.5.4). The family {λ−1/2(vλ − v0)}λ>0 is bounded
and equicontinuous by Proposition 3.5.8; whence, the convergence is in fact locally uniform
as a consequence of the Arzela`–Ascoli theorem.
3.6 Asymptotics for Small Holding Costs
Next, we study the asymptotics of the equilibrium price from Theorem 3.4.1 for small holding
costs γ → 0 (and fixed transaction costs λ > 0). To emphasize the dependence on γ, we
denote the price v by vγ in this section. We again focus on the case of a one-dimensional
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state variable (d = 1) with smooth drift and diffusion coefficients and terminal condition;
see Remark 3.4.3.
To formulate the result, we first note that the risk-neutral version γ = 0 of our model is
well posed and essentially covered as a simple special case of Theorem 3.4.1 (with the same
proof, read with the conventions G(u)/G(s) = 1 and G′(u)/G(s) = 0). The corresponding












and the corresponding portfolios are











(The above notation for the case γ = 0 should not be confused with the notation for the
case λ = 0 in the preceding section.)
Lemma 3.3.1 shows that when γ > 0 and λ > 0, the optimal portfolios take into account
future expected returns that are discounted with a kernel determined by γ/λ. As a limiting
case, we have seen that the no-transaction-cost portfolio (3.5.2) for λ = 0 only takes into
account the current (subjective) drift rates; this corresponds to an infinite discount. In
the opposite extreme, the no-holding cost portfolio (3.6.2) aggregates the future expected
returns without discounting.
Accordingly, we expect small holding costs to play a similar role as large transaction
costs. Indeed, Theorem 3.4.1 shows that when the supply a0 vanishes, the equilibrium
price only depends on the ratio γ/λ—the “urgency parameter” that determines optimal
execution trajectories [2] and, more generally, optimal trading strategies with transaction
costs in various contexts; cf., e.g., [89] and the references therein. In particular, small
holding costs are equivalent to large transaction costs in terms of resulting prices. When
a0 > 0, Theorem 3.4.1 shows that the equilibrium price is 0-homogeneous in (γ, λ, 1/a0).
This means that the asset price remains invariant if the inverse of the supply is rescaled in
the same manner as transaction and holding costs, so that the larger trading and holding
costs of bigger asset positions are offset by reduced friction coefficients.
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The main result of this section is the following regular perturbation expansion for small
holding costs γ → 0.
Theorem 3.6.1. For fixed transaction costs λ > 0 and small holding costs γ → 0, the
equilibrium price function from Theorem 3.4.1 has the expansion
vγ(t, x) = v0(t, x) + γv∗(t, x) + o(γ) uniformly on [0, T ]× R. (3.6.3)
Here v0 is the equilibrium price (3.6.1) for γ = 0 and









where φi,0t is the optimal strategy (3.6.2) of agent i for γ = 0 and the expectation is taken
under agent i’s belief Qi.
The reference point for the expansion (3.6.3) is the risk-neutral price v0 of (3.6.1). In
this limiting case, agents only consider future expected returns. Other things equal, agents
reduce the magnitude of their positions when holding costs are introduced. The above
expression for v∗ reflects each agent’s expectation Eit,x[
∫ T
t
φi,0s ds] of their average future
position. Adding holding costs reduces the demand by agents who expect to be long on
average, and the converse holds for shorts. The resulting sign of the price correction will
thus depend on the aggregate expectations in the market. Indeed, the formula for v∗ shows
that at the first order, the arithmetic average over all agents’ expected average positions is
the negative of the correction.
Proof. Step 1. Similarly as for Theorem 3.5.2, the first step towards proving this expansion is
to establish that the functions vγi from Theorem 3.4.1 are uniformly bounded in γ. Indeed,
note that the function λG
′(t)2
NG(t)2 a0 is bounded locally uniformly in γ. Hence, Lemma 3.5.3
applied with the PDEs (3.4.1–3.4.2) from Theorem 3.4.1 yields that given 0 < γ¯ <∞, there
exists M > 0 such that
|vγi (t, x)| ≤M for all γ ∈ [0, γ¯]. (3.6.4)
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Step 2. Next, we show that as γ → 0,
|vγi (t, x)− v0i (t, x)| → 0 uniformly on [0, T ]× R. (3.6.5)




















 = 0, (vγi − v0i )(T, ·) = 0.
Thus, the Feynman–Kac formula yields



















where the expectation is taken under agent i’s subjective probability measure Qi. Note that
G′(t)→ 0 andG(t)→ 1 as γ → 0, uniformly on [0, T ]. In view of (3.6.4), we conclude (3.6.5).
Step 3. We can now prove the expansion from Theorem 3.6.1. By (3.6.6),





























= −T − t
λ
, uniformly on [0, T ]. (3.6.7)
Together with (3.6.4), dominated convergence, (3.6.5) and (3.6.1), this yields
lim
γ→0













uniformly on [0, T ]×R. In view of the definition of vγ in (3.4.2), and (3.6.7), it follows that
lim
γ→0

















− (T − t)a0
N
. (3.6.8)
By (3.6.2) and the first identity of (3.4.8) in the special case γ = 0, we have
























i,0 = a0, the theorem follows.
3.7 Example: Mean-Reversion Trading
To gain further intuition for the equilibrium of Theorem 3.4.1, we consider an example that
can be solved explicitly up to a system of linear ODEs. We will also use this example to test
the numerical accuracy of the expansions for small transaction and holding costs relative to
the exact solution.
Suppose that f(x) = x, so that at time T , the state X represents the asset. Agents
believe that X has mean-reverting dynamics
dXt = κi(X¯ −Xt)dt+ σdW it . (3.7.1)
That is, agents agree on the volatility σ > 0 and the mean-reversion level X¯ > 0, but
disagree about the mean-reversion speed κi > 0. This can be interpreted as a simple model
for a forward contract on a mean-reverting underlying such as an FX rate. As is natural in
that context, and to simplify the exposition, we henceforth assume that the net supply of
the contract is a0 = 0.
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3.7.1 Equilibrium with Costs
We first consider the exact equilibrium price v with transaction costs λ > 0 and holding
costs γ > 0 from Theorem 3.4.1. For the linear state dynamics (3.7.1), the parabolic system
(3.4.1–3.4.3) can be reduced to a system of linear ODEs by the ansatz
vλi (t, x) = Ai(t) +Bi(t)x, i = 1, . . . , N.
Indeed, writing 1N and IN for the N ×N -matrices of ones and the identity matrix, respec-
tively, the deterministic functions B = (B1, . . . , BN )
> and A = (A1, . . . , AN )> satisfy
B′(t) =
[



















A(t)− X¯diag(κ1, . . . , κN )B(t),
A(T ) = 0.











where we have used the ODEs for the Ai and Bi for the second equality. To be precise, the
unbounded terminal conditions and state dynamics (3.7.1) do not satisfy the boundedness
assumptions of Theorem 3.4.1. However, with the unique solutions A and B of the above
ODEs at hand, the arguments in the proof of Theorem 3.4.1 show that (3.7.2) identifies the
unique equilibrium price in the class from smooth functions with linear growth, say.
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3.7.2 Transaction-Cost Asymptotics
We first study the equilibrium v0 with vanishing transactions costs λ = 0 and fixed holding
costs γ > 0. As the state variable has the dynamics





under the aggregate measure Q¯, Proposition 3.5.1 yields that
v0(t, x) = E¯t,x [XT ]− (T − t)γ
N
a0 = X¯ + (x− X¯)e−κ¯(T−t). (3.7.4)
As a result, agent i believes that the frictionless equilibrium price has dynamics
dv0(t,Xt) = (κi − κ¯)e−κ¯(T−t)(X¯ −Xt)dt+ e−κ¯(T−t)σdW it




dt+ e−κ¯(T−t)σdW it . (3.7.5)
This means that agents who believe in faster than average mean-reversion (i.e., κi > κ¯)
observe a mean-reverting process. By contrast, agents who believe in slower than average
mean reversion conclude that the process exhibits “momentum” in that prices above the
mean-reversion level are followed by further positive drifts. Whence, in equilibrium, the
market is endogenously populated by both “mean-reversion traders” and “trend-followers”
even though all agents believe that the underlying has a mean-reverting fundamental value.
Next, we study the leading-order correction vλ(t, x) − v0(t, x) for λ → 0. Again, Theo-
rem 3.5.2 does not apply directly due to the unbounded coefficients, but it is straightforward




















































(T − t)e−κ¯(T−t)(x− X¯). (3.7.6)
Note that ∂xv
∗ ≥ 0, so that the equilibrium volatility is always increased when small
transaction costs are added. This is in line with the asymmetric information model of [42],
the risk-sharing model studied in [62], and empirical studies such as [57, 71, 109].
In our model, the reason for the increased volatility is that the sign of the correction
term v∗ is determined by x − X¯, so that transaction costs amplify the fluctuations of the
frictionless equilibrium price (3.7.4). Let us now discuss why illiquidity affects price levels in
this manner. In view of the above formula for v∗, adding small transaction costs increases
equilibrium prices when Xt > X¯ and reduces prices for Xt < X¯. If Xt > X¯, agents who
believe in larger than average mean-reversion speeds predict the frictionless equilibrium
price (3.7.5) to mean-revert downwards towards its long-run mean. Conversely, agents
believing in a lower than average mean-reversion speed expect the positive trend to continue
and prices to rise even further. Accordingly, the first group of agents wants to sell the asset
and the second group wants to purchase it. With small transaction costs added, these trading
motives persist, yet changes in portfolios can only be implemented gradually. Accordingly,
agents do not only take into account the difference between the current value of the state
variable and its long-run mean, but also their expected differences in the future. Since
agents believing in faster mean-reversion expect differences to disappear faster, they have a
weaker motive to act on the trading opportunities they observe. For Xt > X¯, this means
that sellers have a weaker motive to trade than buyers, so that prices need to rise in order to
clear the market. For Xt < X¯, the situation is reversed and small transaction costs decrease
prices relative to their frictionless counterparts.
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In summary, adding small transaction costs increases prices above the mean-reversion
level and decreases price below it, thereby generating larger price fluctuations and a larger
equilibrium volatility. By contrast, the average price level remains unchanged, in that
the correction term mean-reverts around zero under each agent’s probability measure. In
particular, the simple model considered here—where holding costs are homogenous and
long and short positions are treated symmetrically, for example—does not generate the
systematic “illiquidity discounts” observed in the empirical literature dating back to [3].
3.7.3 Holding-Cost Asymptotics
We now turn to the small-holding-cost asymptotics from Section 3.6. As a first step, we
compute the equilibrium price v0 with vanishing holding costs γ = 0 and fixed transactions








v0i (t, x) = E
i
t,x[XT ] = X¯ + (x− X¯)e−κi(T−t). (3.7.7)





























The first factor is the difference between κi and a (time-dependent) weighted average of
κ1, . . . , κN . Thus, the interpretation is similar as for the equilibrium (3.7.5) with λ = 0:
agents who believe in fast mean reversion observe a mean-reverting asset price whereas
agents believing in slow mean reversion perceive momentum. One can also note that the
equilibrium volatility without holding costs is always larger than or equal to its counterpart
without transaction costs. This follows by applying Jensen’s inequality to the gradients
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of v0 and (3.7.4).
We now turn to the leading-order correction term for γ → 0. Again, the boundedness
assumptions in Theorem 3.6.1 are not satisfied in this example, but the arguments in the







































κi − κj e






where the last equality follows from an elementary but lengthy integration.
The Chebychev sum inequality applied to the second representation shows that the co-
efficient multiplying x− X¯ is always negative. Whence, adding small holding costs increases
the risk-neutral equilibrium price when the state process Xt is below its mean-reversion
level X¯ and decreases it when Xt > X¯. Since larger holding costs play the same role as
lower transaction costs in our model for a0 = 0, the intuition for this is the converse of the
argument for adding small transaction costs in Section 3.7.2.
In particular, in view of (3.7.7), adding small holding costs dampens the fluctuations of
the risk-neutral equilibrium price and accordingly reduces the equilibrium volatility. This
negative effect on the equilibrium volatility and the positive effect of small transaction
costs are consistent with the observation made above that the equilibrium volatility without
transaction costs always lies below its counterpart with no holding costs. In fact, numerical
experiments suggest that the exact equilibrium volatility 1N
∑N
i=1Bi(t) from Section 3.7.1
smoothly interpolates between these two extreme cases as γ/λ ranges between ∞ and 0.
3.7.4 A Calibrated Example
To assess the accuracy of the small-cost asymptotics from Sections 3.7.2 and 3.7.3, we now
compare the explicit formulas (3.7.6) and (3.7.8) to the numerical solutions of the ODEs
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from Section 3.7.1 describing the exact equilibrium price. Throughout, we consider a time
horizon of T = 3 years.
To obtain reasonable values for the other model parameters, we calibrate the state dy-
namics (3.7.3) to USD/EUR exchange rate data from 2009–2019 available from the website
of the St. Louis Fed at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DEXUSEU. The model pa-
rameters can then be estimated by matching the first two stationary moments to their
empirical counterparts and fitting the (linear) log-autocorrelation function to its empirical
counterpart using linear regression. This leads to
σ = 0.128, X¯ = 1.25, κ¯ = 0.575.
With a zero net supply, this suffices to pin down the equilibrium price without transaction
costs (3.7.4), since the latter does not depend on the agents’ holding costs in this case. For
the equilibrium prices with transaction costs (3.7.2), we additionally need to specify each
agent’s individual belief as well as the transaction cost λ and the holding cost γ. Inspired
by similar parameter values used for commodities and equities in [53, 36], respectively, we
use
λ = 10−7 and γ = 10−8.
The free parameter κ1 = 2κ¯ − κ2 can in turn be chosen arbitrarily to capture the agents’
disagreement about the mean-reversion speed of the exchange rate. For
κ1 = 3κ2 = 0.8625,
and x = 1, equilibrium asset prices and volatilities are plotted in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. These
numerical examples clearly display the qualitative properties derived from the asymptotic
formulas in the previous sections. Indeed, the equilibrium values with both holding and
transaction costs always lie between the limiting cases where only one of these costs is
present. Moreover, for Xt = x < X¯, the equilibrium price with transaction costs lies
below its no-transaction cost counterpart and the corresponding volatility is increased by
the trading cost, in line with the discussion in Section 3.7.2.
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Figure 3.1: Equilibrium prices with both transaction and holding cost (solid), no transaction
costs (dotted), and no holding costs (dashed).
Figure 3.2: Equilibrium volatilities with both transaction and holding cost (solid), no trans-
action costs (dotted), and no holding costs (dashed).
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Figures 3.1 and 3.2 also clearly show that the equilibrium price with holding and trans-
action costs is much closer to the risk-neutral price than to the frictionless one. This is
not surprising, since γ/λ = 0.1 in this example. Accordingly, even though the qualitative
predictions of both small-cost expansions are correct, only the small-holding-cost expansion
provides useful quantitative approximations here. As shown in Figure 3.3, using the first-
order correction term v0 + γv∗ − vγ reduces the already small approximation error v0 − vγ
by another order of magnitude.
Figure 3.3: Approximation errors v0 − vγ (top panel) and v0 + γv∗ − vγ (lower panel).
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